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This thesis is a study of the doctrine of partnership (mudarabah and musharakah)
in Islamic commercial law and its application in Malaysian experiments in Islamic
banking and finance. The aim of this thesis is to analyse the operations of the three
main Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia, namely Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
(BIMB), Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad (Takaful Insurance Company
Malaysia Limited) and Lembaga Urusan Dan Tabung Haji (The Malaysian Pilgrims
Management and Fund Board) which claim to operate on the principles of Islamic
commercial law.
The thesis falls into two parts: Part One focusses on the doctrine of partnership
in Islamic commercial law, while Part Two consists of the application of the doctrine
of partnership in the Malaysian experiments in Islamic banking and finance. After a
general introduction, Part One divides into two chapters. Chapter One discusses the
doctrine of sharikah (partnership) as a mode of financing in Islamic Commercial
Law. Chapter Two deals with the doctrine of mudarabah as a mode of financing in
Islamic commercial law.
Part Two consists of three chapters (Chapters Three, Four and Five). Chapter
Three examines and evaluates the operations and performance of the BIMB which
operates on principles of Islamic Commercial Law such as mudarabah and
musharakah. Chapter Four examines the operations of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia
Sendirian Berhad which operates Family and General Takaful Schemes based on the
principles of mudarabah and takaful. Chapter Five attempts to analyse the
management and operations of TabungHaji which was establised in order to mobilize
the voluntary savings of the Malaysian Muslims in accordance with the principles of
mudarabah and ijarah. The study ends with a conclusion and some suggestions and
proposals to remedy the weaknesses in interest-free banking and finance in Malaysia,
followed by a Bibliography.
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NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY
Malay names have been cited according to the standard bibliographical system
employed in modern Malaysian studies in which the first name is put first. This











^ b s b) k
> t sh vj 1
th s m
Z J v_> d O n
£ h b t ^ h
£ kh b> ? ^ w
o d L ^ y
3 dh ^ gh





oa a ' aw
J J u ^ u v3 —ay
ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
The following is a list of the abbreviations used for the most frequently consulted
works:
Asl Al-Shaybani, Kitab al-Asl, Part 1, (Kitab al-Buyuc wa al-
Salam).
Awfar Al-Shawkani, NayI al-Awfar.
Bidayah Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtabid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid.
Bukhari Al-Bukhari? Sahib al-Bukhari.
Dusuqi Al-Dusuqi, Hashiyat al-Dusuqi cAla al-Sharh al-Kabir.
EI(1) The Encyclopaedia of Islam (First Edition).
EI(2) The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Second Edition).
Fa'iq Al-Zamakhshari, Al-Fa'iq fi Gharib al-Hadith.
Fath Q. Ibn al-Humam, Sharh Fath al-Qadir.
Hash. A. Ibn cAbidin, Hashiyah Radd al-Mukhtar cAla al-Durr al-
Mukhtar.
Hidayah Al-Marghinani, Al-Hidayah Sharh Bidayat al-Mubtadi.
Ibn al-Athir Ibn al-Athir, Al-Nihayah fi Gharib al-Hadith wa al-Athar.
Flam Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Flam al-MuwaqqFin can Rabb al-
'Alamin.
Isabah Ibn Hajar al-cAsqalani, Kitab al-I$abah fi Tamyiz al-Sahabah.
Jaziri Al-Jaziri, Kitab al-Fiqh cAla al-Madhahib al-Arbacah.
Kasani Al-Kasani, Kitab Bada'F al-Sana'F fi Tartib al-Shara'ic.
X
Lane E.W.Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon.
Lisan Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-cArab.
Mabsuf Al-Sarakhsi, Al-Mabsuf.
Minhaj N. Al-Nawawi, Minhdj al-Talibin.
Muzani Al-Muzani, Kitdb al-Mukhtasar, on the margin of al-Shafici's
Kitdb al-Umm, Vol.VIII.
Mufassal Jawad °Ali, Al-Mufassal ft Tarikh al- cArab Qabl al-Islam.
Mughni Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughni.
Muhalla Ibn Hazm, Kitdb al-Muhalla.
M. Muhtaj Muhammad al-Sharbini al-Khapb, Mughni al-Muhtaj.
Mukhtasar Khali! b. Ishaq, Al-Mukhtasar.
Muslim Muslim b. al-Hajjaj al-Qushayri, Sahih al-Muslim.
Musannaf Al-Sancani, Al-Musannaf.
Muw Sh. Malik b. Anas al-Asbahi, al-Muwat(a'. The version of
Muhammad b. Hasan al-Shaybani.
Muw Y. Malik b. Anas al-Asbahi, Al- Muwafta'. The version of Yahya
b. Yahya al-Laythi.
Origins J. Schacht, The Origins ofMuhammadan Jurisprudence.
Q. Al-Qur'an (Referring to The Qur'an, the first figure indicates
the number of surah and the second figure indicates the verse,
e.g. 8:5).
Qinac Al-Bahuti, Kashshaf al-Qinac cAn Matn al-Iqndl.
Sahnun cAbd al-Salam b. Sacid b. Habib al-Tanukhi, Al-Mudawwanah
al-Kubrd Li al-Imam Malik b. Anas.
xi
Shirazi Al-Shirazi, Al-Muhadhdhab fi Fiqh Madhhab al-Imam al-
Shaffi.
S. Mizan Al-Shacrani, Mizan al-Kubra.
Taj Al-Zabidi, Taj al-cAriis.
Tanwir Al-Suyu^i, Tanwir al-Hawalik Shark cAla Muwaf(a' Malik.
Tartib Al-Shafici, Tartib Musnad al-Imam al-Shaffi.
Transaction Subhi Mahmasani, "Transaction in The Sharia", in Law in The
Middle East, Origin and Development of Islamic Law.
Umm Al-ShafTi, Al-Umm.
Wahbah Wahbah al-Zuhayli, Al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuh.
Wajiz Al-Ghazali, Kitab al-Wajiz fi Madhhab al-Imam al-Shaffi.





















The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, [Herndon,
U.S.A.]
Arab Law Quarterly, [London]
Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies, [London]
Hamdard Islamicus, [Karachi, Pakistan]
Islamic Culture, [Hyderabad]
International Journal ofMiddle Eastern Studies, [Cambridge]
The Islamic Quarterly, [London]
Islamic Studies, [Karachi and Islamabad, Pakistan]
Journal of the American Oriental Society, [New Haven]
Journal of Economic and Social History of The Orient,
[Leiden]
Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance, [Karachi]
Journal Institute ofMuslim Minority Affairs, [London]
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, [London}
Journal ofResearch in Islamic Economics, [Jeddah]
The Muslim World, [Hartford, Connecticut]
Al-Nahdah, [Kuala Lumpur]
Studia Islamica, [Paris]





NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY vii
NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ix-xi
JOURNALS xii
TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii-xxi
INTRODUCTION 1-13
PART ONE : THE DOCTRINE OF PARTNERSHIP IN ISLAMIC
COMMERCIAL LAW




1.2. Legitimacy of Sharikah (Partnership) 17-21
1.3. Classification of Commercial Partnership
(Sharikah al-cUqud) 21 -22
1.3.1. Sharikat al-Mufawadah (Unlimited Investment Partnership)
(a) Definition 22-24
(b) Legitimacy of mufawadah partnership 24-25
xiv
(c) Equality of mufawadah partnership 25
i. Equality in person (personal status) 25-27
ii. Equality of investment, profit and loss 28-33
(d) Conduct of mufawadah partnership 33
i. Deposits and pledge in
mufawadah partnership 33-35
ii. Loan in mufawadah partnership 35-38
iii. Purchase, sale and debt of
mufawadah partners 38-41
iv. Expenses in mufawadah partnership 41
v. Investmentwith third parties 42
vi. Limit of mutual surety 42-43
a. Concept ofwakalah (agency) 43-50
b. Concept of kafalah (suretyship) 50-58
vii. Dissolution ofmufawadah partnership 8-59
1.3.2. Sharikat al-Inan (Limited Investment Partnership)
(a) Definition 59-60
(b) Legality of cinan partnership 60
(c) Classification of cinan partnership 61-62
(d) Conduct of ainan partnership
i. Personal status 62-63
ii. Form of investment 63-64
iii. Expenses 64-65
XV
iv. Distribution of profit and liability
for loss 65-66
v. Differences between mufawadah partnership
and cinan partnership 66
1.3.3. Sharikat al-Acmal (Labour Partnership) 67-68
1.3.4. Sharikat al-Wujuh (Partnership in Credit) 68-69
Conclusion 69-70




2.2. Legitimacy of Mudarabah 74-77
2.3. Investment Form 77-82
2.4. Conduct ofMudarabah 82-83
2.4.1. Unlimited Mudarabah 83-86
2.4.2. Limited Mudarabah 86-88
2.4.3. Specific Restrictions 89-91
2.4.4. Two Agent-Managers 91-92
2.4.5. Purchase and Sale 92-95
2.4.6. Expenses 95-97
2.4.7. Invalid Mudarabah 97-98
2.4.8. Dispute between Parties 98-99
2.5. Distribution of Profits and Liability for Loss
xvi
2.5.1. The Proportional Division of Profits 99-104
2.5.2. Liability for Loss 104-108
2.5.3. Methods of Settlement of Accounts 108-112
2.6. Termination of Mudarabah Contract 112-114
2.7. Quasi -Mudarabah Transactions 115
2.7.1. Bayc al-Murabahah (A resale at a specific surcharge on the stated original
cost which represents the profit) 116-118
(a) Conduct of murabahah 118-119
(b) Expenses in relation tomurabahah 119-122
(c) Option when murabahah price may be inflated 122-124
2.7.2. Al-Samsarah (Brokerage) 124-129
PART TWO : PARTNERSHIP IN ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE
IN MALAYSIA
CHAPTER THREE : PARTNERSHIP IN THE OPERATION OF
ISLAMIC BANKING IN MALAYSIA
Introduction 130
3.1. TheEmergenceoflslamicBanks 130-139
3.2. Theory of Islamic Banking 139
3.2.1. Establishment of an Islamic Bank : A
Simple Model 139-141
3.2.2. Principles ofMudarabah and Musharakah 142-148
3.3. Estab 1 ishment ofBank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) 149
xvii
3.3.1. Historical Perspective 149-153
3.3.2. Basic Principles of the Bank Islam Malaysia
Berhad 153-154
3.3.3. Legal and Regulatory Framework of BIMB 154
(a) Incorporation 154-157
(b) Islamic Banking Act 1983 157-158
(c) Salient features of the Islamic Banking
Act 1983 158-160
(d) Government Investment Act 1982 160-161
(e) Religious Supervisory Council 161-162
3.4. Corporate Organisation 162
3.4.1. Corporative Objectives 162
3.4.2. Organizational Structure 162-163
3.4.3. Subsidiaries and Branch Network 164
3.5. Banking Operations 164-165
3.5.1. Customers' Deposits 165-168
3.5.2. Project Financing 168
(a) Project financing under the principle
of mudarabah 168-169
(b) Project financing under the principle
of musharakah 169
(c) Financing the acquisition of assets 169-171
3.5.3. Qard Hasan (Benevolent Loan) 171
3.5.4. Trade Finance 172-174
xviii
3.5.5. Other Services 174-175
3.6. Examination and Evaluation ofthe BIMB's Performance 175
3.6.1. Mobilisation of Monetary Resources 175-178
3.6.2. Financing and Investment 179-181
3.6.3. Profits and Loss Accounts 182
3.7. BIMB and Economic Development 182-183
3.7.1. Mobilisation of Savings and Promoting
Investment 183-184
3.7.2. Financing Projects 184-185
3.7.3. Social Welfares 185-186
3.8. BIMB : Problems and Challenges 187
3.8.1. Legal Impediments to Islamic Banking 187-189
3.8.2. Islamic Banking in aCapitalistic World 190-192
3.8.3. Over-Dependence on "Second-Line Techniques" 192-196
3.9. The Future of Islamic Banking in Malaysia 196-201
Conclusion 7 - 202
CHAPTER FOUR : MUDARABAH IN THE OPERATION OF
SYARIKAT TAKAFUL MALAYSIA SENDIRIAN
BERHAD
Introduction 203
4.1. Nature of Insurance 203-205
4.2. An Islamic View ofPresent-Day Insurance 206-208
4.3. The Establishment of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia
Sendirian Berhad. 208
xix
4.3.1. Origin/Historical Development of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian
Berhad 208-212
4.3.2. The Concept of Takaful (Mutual Insurance) and
Mudarabah 212-214
4.3.3. The Concept of Tabarruc 214-215
4.3.4. Types of Takaful Business 215-216
(a) Family Takaful Plans 216-223
(b) General Takaful Schemes 223-225
4.4. Syarikat Takaful as a Financial Institution : An Evaluation of Performance
4.4.1. Family Takaful Fund 225
(a) Contributions of Family Takaful Fund 225-228
(b) Investments of the Family Takaful Fund and profits attributable to the
Company and participants 229-230
4.4.2. Group Family Takaful Fund 231
(a) Contributions ofGroup Family Takaful Fund 231 -233
(b) Income from investments 233-234
(c) Profits attributable to the Company and
participants 234
4.4.3. General Takaful Fund 235
(a) Contributions of General Takaful Fund 235-237
(b) General Takaful Fund's investments 237-239
(c) General Takaful incomes and profits attributable to the Company and
participants 239-241
XX
4.4.4. Performance of Syarikat Takaful 241
(a) Branch network and employment structure 241-242
(b) Total financing 242-244
(c) Syarikat TakafuFs investments 244-246
(d) Syarikat Takaful's incomes 246-248
4.5. Some Issues Relating to the Takaful Schemes 248
(a) The Takaful Act 1984 248-249
(b) The Syariah Supervisory Council 250
(c) The Takaful Contract 250-252
Conclusion 252-253
CHAPTER FIVE : PARTNERSHIP IN THE OPERATION OF TABUNG
HAJI
Introduction 254
5.1. Historical Background and Establishment 254-257
5.2. Corporate Objectives 257
5.2.1. Aims and Objectives 257-258
5.2.2. Organizational Structure 258-260
5.3. Economic Activities of Tabung Haji 260
5.3.1. Mobilization of Deposits 260-262
5.3.2. Withdrawal of Deposits 262-263
5.4. Tabung Haji as a Financial Institution : An Evaluation of Performance
5.4.1. Branch Network and Employment Structure 263-264
5.4.2. Growths of Deposits 264-268
5.4.3. Investment Activities 268-277
5.4.4. Income From Investments 277-278
xxi
5.4.5. Appropriation of Profits 279
5.4.6. Payment of Zakat 280
5.4.7. Payment of Bonus 280-281





One of the significant developments in the Muslim world in the last decades of
the present century has been the emergence of a number of Islamic banks in certain
Muslim as well as non-Muslim countries. The motivation for the establishment of
these institutions comes from a desire to formulate and re-organize social and in
particular financial activities in accordance with Islamic commercial law.
The theory of Islamic banking predates the practice of it. In non-Arabic
languages, the earliest contributor to the notion of Islamic banking was Anwar Iqbal
Qureshi in the late forties, who discussed profit-sharing as a substitute for interest,
although in no great detail.1 Uzair's An Outline of Interestless Banking in the fifties,
though a small booklet of 21 pages, formulated an early version of the theory of
interest-free banking. He briefly discussed the core of the future proposals on the
subject, basing depositor-banker and banker-businessmen relations on the contract of
mudarabah.
A mature and comprehensive model of Islamic banking has resulted from works
appearing in the late sixties and early seventies by a number of scholars, for example
cAbd Allah al-cArabi,2 Siddiqi,3 Mahmud Ahmad,4 al-Najjar,5 Baqir al-Sadr,6
1
Islam and The Theory of Interest, Lahore. 1967 (First published in Lahore in 1946). See especially pp.
130 - 133, which contain the idea of profit and loss sharing in its embryonic form. The researcher is not
aware of any works on the subject in Arabic during the forties.
2
"Contemporary Bank Transactions and Islam's View Thereon", Islamic Thought, Vol. II, (Aligarh, July
1967), pp. 55 - 64.
3 Banking Without Interest, Leicester, 1988, pp. 15 - 52. It was first published in 1969 in Urdu.
4 "Semantics of Theory of Interest", Islamic Studies, Vol. VI (2), (Rawalpindi, 1967), pp. 171 - 196.
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Mannan,7 Gharib al-Jammal8 and Mustafa cAbd Allah al-Hamshari.9 They have
discussed the role of an Islamic bank as a financial intermediary mobilising savings
from the public on the basis of profit-sharing such as mudarabah, musharakah, and
making advances to entrepreneurs on the same basis. Profits of investments are
shared between the bank and the entrepreneurs according to a mutually agreed
percentage. Further, the bank shares these profits with depositors in the mudarabah
accounts also according to a percentage agreed in advance. Liability to loss in capital
in the bank-entrepreneurs and depositors-bank's investment is borne by the bank and
depositors respectively. The entrepreneurs only lose their time and effort in the
investment.
The central feature of an Islamic financial system is the replacement of the rate
of interest with the rate of return on real activities as a mechanism for allocating
financial resources. Islam, moreover, encourages trade which implies the permission
to profit thereby.10 To facilitate trade transactions, Muslim jurists and scholars have
developed specific forms of financial arrangement. The most important and
unanimously agreed upon forms of financing provided by an Islamic bank or an
Islamic financial institution are mudarabah and musharakah arrangements, as a
principal means of earning profit without resort to charging interest. Both of these
5
Buniik Bila Fawa'id Ka Istiratijiyyah Li al-Tanmiyah al-Iqtisadiyyah wa al-IjtimcTiyyah fi al-Duwal al-
Islamiyyah, Jeddah, 1972, pp. 41 - 62.
6 Al-Bank al-La Rabawi fi al-Islam, Kuwait, n. d., pp. 76 - 127.
7 Islamic Economics : Theory and Practice, Lahore, 1982, pp. 217 - 250. It was first published in 1970.
*
Al-Masarifwa al-Acmal al-Masrafiyyah fi al-Sharfah al-Islamiyyah wa al-Qaniin, Cairo, 1972, 477pp.
9 AI-ALmal al-Masrafiyyah wa al-Islam, Cairo, 1973, pp. 75 - 206.
10 Q. 2 : 275 : ".. Allah has permitted trade and forbidden usury".
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forms are essentially variants of partnership agreements in which loss (risk) and profit
(return), in the case of a musharakah contract, are shared by the contracting parties.
In the case of a mudarabah contract, however, profit (return) is shared between the
provider of the capital and the agent-entrepreneur (the contracting parties), while loss,
if any, is solely borne by the provider of the capital.
In the case of mudarabah, one party provides the necessary financial capital and
the other (the agent-entrepreneur) the human capital needed for successful
performance of the economic activity undertaken. The resulting profit is then shared
between the parties in accordance with a sharing rule specified beforehand in a
mudarabah contract. Under such an arrangement, if loss is incurred, it will be borne
by the owner of the financial resources, while the entrepreneur risks the loss of his
time and effort. Moreover, the entrepreneur is completely free to manage the project
undertaken unless otherwise specified in the contract.
Mudarabah traditionally has been applied to commercial activities of short
duration." Musharakah, on the other hand, which is regarded as a complementary
form to mudarabah financing, is applicable to production or commercial activities of
longer duration. Musharakah is a form of business arrangement in which a number
of partners pool their financial resources to undertake a commercial-industrial
enterprise and share in the resulting profits (or losses) corresponding to their shares
in the financial capital of the enterprise.
As has been mentioned earlier, Muslim economists and jurists appear to suggest
"
Chapter Two, 2.1, pp. 1 - 4.
3
that the mudarabah and musharakah contracts which are legal in Islam should be the
basic methods (first-line techniques) in the transaction of Islamic banking and finance
which permit risk-return sharing between the providers of capital and the
entrepreneurs and by which financial resources are mobilised and combined with
entrepreneurial and management skills for the purpose of expanding trade and
investment. However, it is recognised that these techniques may not be applicable in
all circumstances. Literature on Islamic banking and finance has mentioned other
techniques of financing arrangements to meet such situations. These include ijarah
(leasing), ijarah wa istiqna' (hire-purchase/lease-purchase), murabahah (mark-up),12
bayc bi thaman ajil (a trade-deal in which the seller allows the buyer to pay the price
of a commodity at a future date in a lump sum or instalments), bayc al-salam
(purchase with deferred delivery) and qard hasan (benevolent loans).
These latter modes of financing, however, are considered as the weaker
Islamically speaking, because of their minimal risk and pre-determined fixed rate of
return,13 and their preserving of the status quo associated with conventional banking,
with its emphasis on creditworthiness of the client and maintenance of the credit-
debtor relationship, rather then the risk-return sharing between the providers of capital
in the case of musharakah and between the provider of capital and the entrepreneur
in the case of mudarabah.
12
A contract in which a client wishing to purchase equipment or goods requests the bank to purchase the
items and sell them to him at cost plus a declared profit. See Chapter Two, 2.7.1, pp. 116 - 124.
13 The report of the Council of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan on the elimination of interest, for example,
sounded a note of caution in this regard in these words: "However, although this mode of financing is
understood to be permissible under the Sharicah, it would not be advisable to use it widely or
indiscriminately in view of the danger attached to it of opening a back door for dealing on the basis of
interest". See Chapter 3, 3.2.2, footnote 47.
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The Purpose of the Inquiry
The present study seeks to analyse and examine the application of mudarabah
and musharakah modes of financing in the operations ofBIMB, Syarikat Takaful and
Tabung Haji in Malaysia. This study will also be devoted to various aspects of
financing operations as practised by these three main Islamic financial institutions in
Malaysia.
Islamic banking, which has been defined as "banking in consonance with the
ethos of the value systems of Islam" is expected to practice its transactions on the
basis of the principles of Islamic commercial law and also to participate actively in
achieving the goals and objectives of an Islamic economy.14 Ideally, an Islamic bank
is not merely a bank that is not involved with any form of interest on loan and
deposits. It is also not simply a bank that refrains from financing services and
commodities prohibited in Islam. Neither is it just a development or investment bank
nor a financial intermediary whose operations are linked with profit and loss-sharing.
An Islamic bank is rather perceived as an institution with integrated features that
can be considered a social, investment and development bank. In view of the present
situation of the Muslim ummah, which often considers the Islamic bank a stepping
stone towards Islamising the economy, the bank is entrusted with a gigantic task. It
is expected to function not merely in economic aspects but more importantly as a
means to foster spiritual values, a centre of enlightenment, a school of morality, and
14
Ahmed (1984), pp. 8, 11 - 12; Mohsin S. Khan, "Islamic Interest-Free Banking : A Theoretical
Analysis", in Encyclopaedia of Islamic Banking and Insurance, London, 1995, pp. 50 - 51; The Concise
Encyclopaedia of Islam, London, 1989, s.v. "Islamic Banking".
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a practical method leading to a condition of dignity for the ummah and a buttress for
the economies of the Muslim countries.15
The practical experiences of Islamic banks in general and BIMB, Syarikat Takaful
Malaysia Sendirian Berhad (STMSB) and Lembaga Urusan dan TabungHaji (LUTH)
in particular, however, reflect a perception that they seem to ignore the above
distinctive nature of Islamic banks and financial institutions. Many people feel that
BIMB in particular and Syarikat Takaful and Tabung Haji in general are too
concerned with profits, at the expense of a more noble role they should play. In
addition, BIMB has confined its modes of financing to mainly murabahah and bayc
bi thaman ajil rather than mudarabah and musharakah, which theoretically are the
main modes of financing operation of an Islamic bank. Furthermore, the mark-ups
charged by the bank are about the same as the rate of interest. This has led some
people to accuse the bank of continuing to practise interest but disguising it under
different names. Consequently, the costs of finance advanced by an Islamic bank
under murabahah and bayc bi thaman ajil principles are still high and comparable to
the cost charged by conventional banks based on interest.
This is thus the basis for some people to question the real status of the bank,
whether it is really an Islamic bank as assumed or merely an 'interest-free'
commercial bank. There are also apprehensions among Muslim scholars that
murabahah and bayc bi thaman ajil modes of financing may deteriorate into mere
financing arrangements with the agreed profit margin being no more than a
'\ Sayed al-Hawary, "The Distinctive Nature of Islamic Banks", paper presented at the First Advanced
Course on Islamic Banks organised by International Institute of Islamic Banking and Economics, Cairo,
28 August to 17 September, 1981.
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camouflage for interest. In this respect, it is expected that Islamic banks should avoid
using them widely or indiscriminately.16
The Scope of This Study
This study covers the doctrines of partnership in Islamic Commercial Law which
constitute mudarabah (dormant-partnership) and sharikah (partnership), both ofwhich
have been thoroughly studied and carefully developed by the jurists {fuqaha') in their
legal works. These two modes of financing are essentially regarded as the main
variants of partnership arrangement in Islamic Commercial Law due to the fact that
risk and return are shared by the contracting parties. As an exception, only in the
mudarabah arrangement, risk is borne by the provider of the financial capital.
In this regard, other themes which are included in Islamic Commercial Law such
as muzaracah and musaqat (two types of sharecropping) have not been studied in the
present work because they are not pertinent to the operations of the Malaysian
Islamic banking and finance. The study of riba 17(usury) is also not included, except
M. U. Chapra, Towards A Just Monetary System, Leicester, 1986, p. 171.
17 Riba literally means increase, addition, expansion or growth (Lisan, Vol. XIX, p. 17 - 20; Taj, Vol. X,
pp. 142 - 143). The same meaning is also unanimously indicated in all Qur'an commentaries. See for
example al-Tabari, JamT al-Bayan, Vol. Ill, p. 69. It is, however, not every increase or growth which has
been prohibited by Islam. Technically, riba refers to the premium that must be paid by the borrower to the
lender along with the principal amount as a condition for the loan or for an extension in its maturity (Ibn
Manzur specifies that what is prohibited is the extra amount, benefit or advantage received on any loan.
Lisan, Vol. XIX, p. 304; see also commentary on verse 2 : 275 in Abu Bakr al-Jassas, Ahkam al-Qur'an,
Vol. II, ed. Muhammad al-Sadiq Qamhawi, Cairo, n. d., pi83; Ibn al-cArabi, Ahkam al-Qur'an, Vol. I,
Cairo, 1967, p. 242; al-Tabari, op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 69). After studying the various forms of business and
credit transactions containing an element of riba which were in Arabia during the time of the Prophet
Muhammad, riba may be defined as a predetermined excess or surplus over and above the loan received
by the creditor conditionally in relation to a specified period. In this sense, riba has the same meaning as
interest by the consensus of all the fuqaha' without exception (Jaziri, II, p. 245). Riba has also been
defined as excess (fadl) in the exchange of six commodities (gold, silver, wheat, barley, dates and salt)
which if they are exchanged against themselves, should be exchanged on thespot, equal and alike (Muslim,
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that it is mentioned under various topics which are related to it. It is considered to
be unnecessary to discuss it in detail in the present study, since the subject of riba
has been extensively covered by many researchers in recent years. This study also
does not discuss the framework and operations of other Islamic financial institutions
in Malaysia such as The Islamic Mortgage Company, Baitul Mai, Yayasan
Pembangunan Ekonomi Islam Malaysia (YAPEIM) and Islamic Cooperatives.
This study is an attempt to analyse the way the two main modes of financing, i.e.
mudarabah and musharakah, are practised by the three main Islamic financial
institutions in Malaysia, in order to help them to practice them in accordance with
Islamic Commercial Law, and to avoid any possibility of the profit paid to the
depositors of BIMB and Tabung Haji, and the participants in the case of Syarikat
Takaful, containing an element of interest.
BIMB, Syarikat Takaful and Tabung Haji are chosen as the case studies in this
research because they are the main Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia operating
based on Islamic principles. BIMB is the first bank granted permission to operate all
its transactions based on the principles of Islamic commercial law. Syarikat Takaful
is the only financial institution to offer and operate Islamic Takaful schemes based
on mudarabah and takaful contracts. It has a major role as an intermediary institution
Sahih Muslim, "Kitab al-Musaqat", Vol. Ill, p. 1211; Aw(dr. Vol. V, p. 297). Some modern scholars try
to confine the meaning of riba merely to excessive interest and that the Qur'anic references to "doubling
and redoubling" of the principal apply to this type of excess (S. F. Ulgener, "Monetary Conditions of
Economic Growth and the Islamic Concept of Interest", Islamic Review, Vol. 55 (2), 1967, p. 12; F.
Rahman, "Riba and Interest", IS, Vol. Ill (1), 1964, p. 30). The Fuqaha' are unanimous that this notion can
lead to arbitrariness, and in any case, they argue that all forms of interest are banned. The most widely used
argument for this stand is the verse of the Qur'an (Q. 2 : 279) that is interpreted to suggest the recovery
of only the principal (Z. Ahmad, "The Theory of Riba", IS, Vol. XIV (4), 1978, p. 179; Abu Zahrah,
Buhiith fi al-Riba, Kuwait, 1970, p. 53).
8
in mobilizing funds from the participants in both General Takaful Schemes and
Family Takaful Plans to be invested in any profitable venture and investment which
will yield profits. Further, in Malaysia Tabung Haji is the oldest Islamic financial
institution and appears as one of the largest Islamic holding companies.
In doing so, the views of the four major schools of Islamic Law, viz. the
Malikis, Hanafis, Shaffis and Hanbalis, will be the main basis of this study. The
different views of these schools will be assessed in accordance with the relevant
evidence used to support their position and the exigencies of the times. However, for
the purpose of comparison and to give more scope for discussion, the views of other
schools such as the Zahiris, ja°faris and Zaydis and, in addition, the views of early
individual (independent) jurists such as al-Zuhri of the Hijaz (d. 124/742), Ibn Abi
Layla of Kufah (d. 148/765), al-Awzaci of Syria (d. 157/774) and Sufyan al-Thawri
of Kufah (d. 161/778) will also be touched on briefly from time to time where it
seems appropriate. Although some of these views were expressed in the early period
of Islam they may need to be reexamined in the light of the present situation. These
views and the discussions therein are still relevant and worth studying.
Although the inquiry in Part One is primarily concerned with the legal aspects
of mudarabah and musharakah, reference will also be made to the literature of the
Qur'an and its exegesis, al-sirah (biography of the Prophet), his Traditions, the
practices of the Companions of the Prophet, treatises, biographies and historical
annals since these accounts are indispensable for an understanding and
comprehension of the subject in its totality.
As far as Part One is concerned, this study covers no specific period of time.
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This is due to its very nature. For the prolific yet scattered writings of the jurists on
the subject stretch from the inception of the Islamic intellectual milieu until about the
seventh and eighth centuries A. H. when the period of decadence began and the so-
called closure of the gate of ijtihad prevailed. However, most of the subject-matter
analysed in the first part is from the works of early jurists.
In Part Two, the material used is mainly from late and modern works, especially
in the discussions of the operations of BIMB, Syarikat Takaful and Tabung Haji.
Therefore, the annual reports of Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia),
and the annual reports of the concerned institutions discussed, together with articles,
magazines, newspapers, reports and statutes, will be the main sources of reference for
analysing the application of mudarabah and musharakah in their operations.
A Brief Survey of the Sources
So far little has been written in English on the doctrine of partnership in Islamic
commercial law. In particular, no comprehensive attempt has been made to analyse
the application of the above doctrine in the operations of Malaysian Islamic banking
and finance.
In the case of Part One, the main sources of information on the subjects are from,
in general, the materials of Islamic fiqh. Therefore, the books of Islamic
jurisprudence (fiqh) are the primary sources of information and form the basis of
analysis for the problems and issues in question.
The following, among others, are the general legal works used in Part One : al-
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Mudawwanah al-Kubra by Sahnun, Kitab al-Umm by al-Shaffi, al-Muhalla by Ibn
Hazm, Kitab al-Mabsuf by al-Sarakhsi, Bada'f al-Sana'f fi Tartib al-Shara'f by al-
Kasani, and al-Mughni by Ibn Qudamah. In addition, the works of early exegetes
such as Jamic al-Bayan cAn Ta'wil Ay al-Qur'an by al-Tabari and al-Jamic Li Ahkam
al-Qur'an by al-Qmfubi have also been consulted in order to serve as a supporting
evidence for each case and to be compared with the understanding of the jurists. The
same applies to the books of Traditions of the Prophet. Since the jurists frequently
quote Traditions to support their views on every case, resort to the books of
Traditions is indispensable in order to ascertain their validity and applicability to the
case in point. Amongst the frequently consulted books of Traditions are al-Muwa({a'
by Malik b. Anas, al-Musannaf by al-Sancani, al-Musnad by Ahmad b. Hanbal,
Sahih al-Bukhari by al-Bukhari, Sahib Muslim by Muslim and Sunan by Abu
Dawud.
Amongst the modern works related to the subject are the following:
i) Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam written by Abraham L. Udovitch, first
published in Princeton, New Jersey, 1970. The treatise gives some accounts of the
commercial transactions such as sharikah which prevailed in medieval Islam. The use
of this contract in the operations of modern Islamic banking and finance had never
been discussed. However, the book seems to be well researched by providing many
primary sources. Therefore, it is a useful reference for a basic understanding of the
subject.
ii) Al-Sharikat fi al-SharPah al-Islamiyyah wa al-Qaniin al-WacLi, by cAbd al-cAziz
al-Khayyaj, 2 Vols., Beirut, 1984. Since the author directly deals with the subject,
it covers most of the topics pertaining to sharikah in Islam such as classification of
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sharikah, mudarabah, dissolution of the contract and distribution of the profit in a
contract. The book, on the other hand, does not discuss how these contracts can be
applied in the operations of Islamic banking and finance. In short, the work is a
theoretically invaluable reference on the subject.
iii) Waqar Masood Khan, "Towards an Interest-free Islamic Economic System"
Although the book is brief and small in size (126 pp.), it is a useful reference on the
subject and the author has made a useful theoretical contribution to the field.
iv) More recently, Shahrukh Rafi Khan in his works "Profit and Loss Sharing : An
Islamic Experiment in Finance and Banking1,19 has examined the origin of, and the
institutional and ethical issues underlying the Islamic banking movement and its
adaptation of financial instruments including profit and loss-sharing (PLS). He
discusses very briefly the doctrine of partnership as explained by the jurists. Despite
the research being focussed on the Pakistani experiments in Islamic banking, it is an
invaluable reference on the subject.
v) Another work dealing with the subject is "Modelling an Interest-Free Economy"20
written by Muhammad Anwar. The author has discussed mainly the theoretical
aspects of an Interest-free Economy. Although the book is small in size (119 pp.), it
is very informative on the subject.
vi) Within the Malaysian context, Azlan Khalili Shamsuddin in his M. A. thesis
"Banking and Public Finance in Islam"f which was submitted to New York
l!>
Originally a Ph. D thesis submitted to Boston University, in 1983 and later published by The Islamic
Foundation, Leicester, in 1985.
19 The work was originally a Ph. D thesis completed at University of Michigan, in 1987 and was published
by Oxford University Press, Karachi, in 1987 (180 pp.).
20 The works was originally a Ph. D thesis submitted to the University of Hampshire, in 1987 and was
published by the International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, in 1987.
21 This thesis was published by Dewan Pustaka Fajar. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 1988.
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University, in 1987, has only discussed the theoretical framework of Islamic banking
and finance in Islam in a narrative manner. Although the author mentions briefly the
concepts of mudarabah and musharakah as a substitute for interest in banking
practices, he does not mention the application of these contracts in the operations of
Islamic banking and financial institutions in Malaysia.
Apart from what has been mentioned, there are numerous articles and working
papers related to the Malaysian Islamic banking and finance which I have benefitted
from: Syed Waseem Ahmad, "Islamic Insurance in Malaysia"; Radiah Abdul
Kader, "The Malaysian Pilgrims Management and Fund Board and Resource
Mobilization"; Abdul Halim Ismail, "Bank Islam : Prospect dan
Perkembangannya Pada Masa Hadapan"; Badariah Sahamid, "Bank Islam
Malaysia Berhad : Konsep Dan Amalan"; Mohd. Fadzli Yusuf, "The Principle of
Islamic Insurance in Malaysia" and W. M. Wan Hussein, "Pengurusan Kewangan
dan Pelaburan Islam : Pengalaman Tabung Haji".
These sources complement each other and therefore for the purpose of this study
they need to be rearranged and analysed in order to show the feasibility and viability
of mudarabah and musharakah contracts as developed by jurists in their legal works
in the operations of Malaysian Islamic banking and finance.
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PART ONE
THE DOCTRINE OF PARTNERSHIP IN
ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL LAW
CHAPTER ONE
SHARIKAH (PARTNERSHIP) AS A MODE OF
FINANCING
CHAPTER ONE : SHARIKAH (PARTNERSHIP) AS A MODE OF
FINANCING
Introduction
In this chapter we consider the concept and legitimacy of sharikah (Partnership)
in Islamic commercial law. The topics to be discussed are, among others, the
definition of sharikah, its legitimacy and the classification of sharikat al-uqud
(commercial partnership).
1.1. Definition
The literal meaning of the word sharikah is sharing, participating or participation,
partaking or co-partnership.1 Legally, sharikah means that a property or thing belongs
to several owners or co-proprietors in such a way that every one has ownership of
every smallest part of it in proportion to the share allotted to him.2 What the jurists,
therefore, understand primarily by sharikah is proprietory partnership {sharikat al-
amlakf which arises, for example, through inheritance (mirath) or gift. Sharikat al-
'
Lisan, Vol. X. pp. 448 - 449; Lane, Vol. II, p. 1542.
2 Mughni, Vol. V. p. 1; M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 211; Hash. A., Vol. Ill, p. 364; Bidayah. Vol. II, pp. 189 -
193; Minhaj N, pp. 132 - 133*; Mabsuf, Vol. XI, p. 151; Fath Q.. Vol. VI, p. 152; Cf. cAli al-Khafif,
Atjkam al-mitdmalat al-shaFiyyah. n. d., pp. 483 - 484; W. Heffening, "Shirka", EI(1), Vol. IV, 1934. pp.
380 - 381.
3 Sharikal al-mulk (plural, al-amlak) implies co-ownership and comes into existence when two or more
persons happen to get joint-ownership of some asset without having entered into a formal partnership
agreement; for example, two persons receive an inheritance or gift of land or property which may or may
not be divisible. The partners have to share the gift, or inherited property or its income, in accordance with
their share in it until they decide to divide it (if it is divisible, e.g. land) or sell it (if it is indivisible, e.g.
a house). If the property is divisible and the partners still decide to stick together, the sharikat al-milk is
termed ikhliyariyyah (voluntary). However, if it is indivisible and they are constrained to stay together, the
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amlak, the essence of which is common ownership of property, cannot be considered
as partnership in a strict sense because it has not come into existence by mutual
agreement to share profits and risks. Accordingly, it appears in fiqh discussions as
a peripheral notion. The second kind of sharikah as understood by the jurists was
not only primarily proprietory partnership, but also commercial partnership (sharikat
al-uqudf).4
According to Udovitch,5 the brief statement on proprietory partnership (sharikat
al-amlak) first found in al-Quduri's Mukhtasarb is repeated with only slight
elaboration in most succeeding Hanafi treatises. For example, al-Sarakhsi writes:
Proprietary partnership occurs when two people are partners in the
possession of property. This can be of two kinds: firstly, a partnership
which becomes effective without any action on their part, as, for
example, in the case of inheritance; secondly, a partnership which
becomes effective through their own actions. This comes about
through the acceptance of a purchase or a gift or a bequest.7
Sharikat al-cuqud, may be concluded with regard to money and goods. These two
sharikat al-milk is characterised as jabriyyah (involuntary). For example see Fath Q., Vol. VI, pp. 153 -
154.
4 It is also called contractual partnership or mercantile partnership. See for example Kasani, Vol. VI, p.
57; Mabsuf, Vol. XI. p. 151; Fath Q, Vol. V. p. 3; Hash A., Vol. III. p. 364; Jaziri, Vol. Ill, p. 83; see
also Abdur Rahim. The Principles ofMuhammadan Jurisprudence, Lahore, 1911, p. 323.
5 Udovitch, Partnership, p. 24; Idem, "The Merchant in Medieval Islam", in Ann K. S. Lambton, Theory
and Practice in Medieval Persian Government, London, 1980, p. 122.
6 Al-Quduri, Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Jacfar (d. 428/1037), Mukhtasar, Istanbul, 1319/1901.
7
Mabsup Vol. XL p. 151: Cf KasanT, Vol. VI, pp. 56, 65 - 66; Hiddyah, Vol. II, p. 296; Coulson,
Commercial Law, pp. 23 - 24 opines that there are two types of a!-sharikah\ sharikat al-amwdl (partnership
in property) and sharikah al-dmal (partnership in work). In partnership in property, the partners contribute
their work or expertise, but if the contributions involve a different nature, such a partnership is not
recognised by Islamic Jurisprudence.
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are considered to be property as the capital in any business transactions or work or
with regard to two or to all three of these values.8
Discussions of partnership in all schools except the Shaffi, while covering the
the topics of joint ownership and common property, are concerned almost entirely
with commercial forms of partnership (sharikat al-uqud). In this regard, Udovitch
states:
The primary connotation of the term shirkah or sharikah for the
Hanafi and Maliki jurists was a contractual partnership involving
joint investment and joint sharing of profits and risks. Proprietory
partnership appears almost as a peripheral notion .... The essence of
proprietory partnership is common ownership of property.9
The basis of a contract of partnership consists of offer (ijab) and acceptance
(,qabul), express or implied. For example, A informs B that he has become his partner
whereby they will carry on business with a certain amount of capital. B agrees. An
express partnership has been formed by offer and acceptance. If one gives to the
other £1000 and requests the other to give £1000 also and buy certain property, and
the other does so, a partnership has been formed by this implied acceptance.10
According to Sayyid Sabiq,11 the origin of the concept of sharikah is from the
verse : "But if more than two, they share (shuraka'j in a third".12 In its strict
*
Kasani, Vol. VI, pp. 56 - 57; Muhalla, Vol. VIII. pp. 123 - 124.
9 Udovitch, Partnership, p. 24.
10 Cf Maj. lAdliyyah, art. 1330.
"
Sabiq. Fiqh al-Sunnah. Vol. III. p. 258.
12 Q. 4 : 12.
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meaning, the word sharikah from the above verse, connotes partnership which
implies equalization (taswiyah) in rights.11 Al-Tabari, however, held that the above
word implies khulfah, literally means "mixing (of the investment)".14
Khulfah is the common sense of the word sharikah which implies one in which
the contractors offer the various services in equal or unequal shares and partake in
profit or loss in proportion to their investment.15
1.2. Legitimacy of Sharikah
According to some jurists,"5 the legal theory of sharikah is based on the verse of
the Qur'an which reads : "Truly many are the partners (in business) (khulafa^ who
wrong each other; not so do those who believe and work deeds of righteousness, and
how few are they?"17 In this verse, the word al-khulafa' refers to associates in a
partnership18 who have the right of equal co-ownership.
Khulfah is a partnership which is different from the conventional type of
13
Mabsuf, Vol. XI, pp. 169 - 170.
14 al-Tabari, Jam? al-Bayan, Vol. XX, pp. 178 - 179; According to Lane, khulfah is the state of two
properties being so mixed that they cannot be separated. See Lane, Vol. 1, p. 789; See also S. D. Goitein,
" Commercial and Family Partnership in the countries of Medieval Islam", IS, Vol. 111(3), 1964. pp. 317 -
318.
15 S. D. Goitein (1964), op. cit., pp. 317 - 318.
16
e.g. Ibn Qudamah (Mughni, Vol. Ill, p. 3), Sayyid Sabiq (Fiqh al-Sunnah, Vol. Ill, p. 258), Wahbah aL
Zuhayli (Wahbah, Vol. IV, p. 793). Cf. M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 211; Mabsuf, Vol. XI, p. 151; al-Nawawi,
Rawdat al-Talibin, Vol. Ill, p. 503.
17 Q, 38 : 24.
al-Tabari. Vol. XXIII, p. 145.
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partnership. In khulfah, every associate or partner contributes his respective capital,
for instance, livestock (mashiyah) and one of the partners works individually or they
amalgamate their capital and work together to gain profits. The distribution of profits
in this partnership is on the basis of the capital and the work which each individual
partner has invested and the profits which he has made.19 This practice is supported
by a Tradition from the Prophet :
And there is a share between two partners (khalifayn) in a co-
ownership, and whenever they withdraw from partnership, their
properties are to be divided equally (in accordance with their
respective participation).20
The acceptability of the practice of sharikah is found in several Traditions,
among which are :
1. The Prophet is reported to have said:
God says : I am the third partner (thalith al-sharikayri) ( i. e. I will
bless the two partners) as long as each of the two partners does not
betray his partners; but when one of them becomes dishonest, I will
leave both of them.21
2. The Prophet is reported to have said:
A partner has a greater right of pre-emption (shufah) than the owner
of an adjoining property.22
3. It is reported that the Prophet decreed the right of pre-emption for partners,
"
Muzani, Vol. VIII, pp. 138 - 139; Ibn al-Athir, vol. II, p. 63; Qas{allani, Irshad al-Sari li Sharh Sahih
al-Bukhari, Vol. IV, p. 284; Cf. Lis'an, Vol. VII, p. 295; Taj, Vol. XIX, p. 259.
20 Muzani, Vol. VIII, p. 138; See also al-Tabari, Jamf al-Bayan, Vol. XV, p. 179.
21 Abu Dawud, Sunan, Vol. Ill, p. 348; al-Daraqupii. Sunan, Vol. Ill, p. 28 (no. 2911); Awfar, Vol V, p.
390.
22 Muw. Sh., p. 305.
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in the case of property which had not been divided up."
4. The Prophet is reported to have said in relation to pre-emption:
Whoever has a share in a piece of land or houses, is not permitted to
sell it until his partner (sharikuh) gives his permission. If the partner
wants, he can take (buy) it, and if he wishes, he can leave it, i.e., he
can allow it to be sold to others.24
5. The Prophet is reported to have said:
The partner or co-owner (sharik) is the one with the right of pre¬
emption (shaff) in everything.25
The above traditions apply to a partner who is in joint or collective ownership.
These accounts indicate that the Qur'an and the Prophet approved of the concept of
commercial partnership (sharikat al-uqiid), and sanctioned it and its practice. He
himself had engaged in commercial partnership before his prophethood.26
There are various reports that show that sharikah was widely practised in pre-
Islamic times. It was reported that Nawfal b. al-Harith b. cAbd al-Muftalib became
the partner of al-cAbbas b. cAbd al-Muftalib in an unlimited partnership (sharikat al-
mufawadah).27 Sayfi b. cA'idh became a partner of the Prophet before his
23
Muw. Y., p.466; Cf. Dawud, Sunan, Vol. Ill, p. 387 (no. 3514).
24 Muslim, Vol. I1IA, p. 63; Nasa'i, Sunan, Vol. VII, p. 320; See also al-Darimi, Sunan, Vol. II, p. 188;
Muhalla, Vol. IX, p. 606.
25 Muhalla, Vol. IX, p. 606..
26 Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah al-Nabawiyyah, Vol. II, p. 254; Isabah, Vol. II, p. 8; Cf. Awfar, Vol. V, pp. 390 -
391; Fath Q„ Vol. VI, p. 153.
27 Mufassal, Vol. Ill, p. 407.
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prophethood in the trade in the Yemen.28 Al-Sacib b. al-Harith b. Sabirah was also
a partner of the Prophet in the pre-islamic period in Mecca.29
It was reported that the merchants of the Yemen used to go to Mecca and Medina
and that they engaged in such partnerships in pre-islamic times.30 It was also reported
that al-cAbbas b. Mirdas al-Sulami was the partner of Harb b. Umayyyah31 and al-
cAbbas b. Anas was a partner of cAbd Allah b. cAbd al-Muf{alib (the father of the
Prophet) in pre-islamic times.32
From the historical evidence, it would seem that the Arabs used to write down
their agreements of partnership in business transactions in the form of written
documents which stated the agreed terms of their partnerships. Such partnerships took
the form of sharikah and mudarabah. In the latter case, the capital would be provided
by one or more partners, and the work would be carried out by another. The
distribution of profits or losses from the business activities would be incurred among
them in accordance with the agreement. Such partnership was normally undertaken
by traders from Mecca to the Yemen and al-Sham (Syria).33
28
Abu cUmar Yusuf b. cAbd Allah b. Muhammad, Ibn cAbd al-Barr (d. 463 A. H.), Kitab al-lstfab fi
Ma'rifat al-Ashab, on the margin of Isabah, Vol. II, p. 101.
2'' The Prophet praised his sincerity and easy disposition in their partnership. See : Ibn Hisham, Al-Sirah
al-Nabawiyyah, Vol. II, p. 254; Isabah. Vol. II, p.8.
30 Mufassal, Vol. II, pp. 407 - 408; Cf. Mahmood Ibrahim, "Social and Economic Conditions in Pre-Islamic
Mecca", 1JMES, Vol. XIV, 1982, pp. 344 - 345.
31 habah. Vol. II, p. 172 (4511).
32 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 270 (4505).
33 Mufassal, Vol. VII. p. 406.
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From the above discussion, it may be concluded that there is a difference
between sharikah in general and mudarabah. In the case of partnership based on
sharikah, capital would be provided by one or more partners, whether in the form of
immovable property or cash. The profits and losses would be divided among them
in accordance with the agreement.34 In a mudarabah partnership, however, any loss
would be shouldered by the owner of the capital (rabb al-mal; sahib al-mal) and not
by the agent-manager,35 because he has no capital in the partnership.
1.3. Classification of Commercial Partnership (Sharikat al-Uqud)
Commercial partnership in Islamic law is usually divided according to the subject
of the partnership, the subject of partnership being capital or labour or credit, into
three kinds, namely;
1. sharikat al-amwal (partnership in capital)
2. sharikat al-acmal (partnership in labour)
3. sharikat al-wujiih (partnership in credit).36
Sharikat al-amwal is further classified into two types, i.e. sharikat al-mufawadah
34
Muhatla, Vol. VIII. p. 124.
35 Mabsut, Vol. XI. pp. 156 - 157; VoL XXII, pp. 17 - 18; Biddyah, Vol. II, p.303; M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p.
309; Zurqani, Vol. Ill, p. 158; Mughni, Vol. V, pp. 31 - 32 and 38; al-Nawawi, al-Majmvf, Vol. IX, pp.
64 - 65; S. Mizan, Vol. II, p. 92; Muhatta. Vol. VIII, p. 126; Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 109; N. Minhaj, pp. 64 -
65; Wajiz, Vol. I, p. 187; Schacht, Introduction, pp. 156 - 157; J. A. Wakin, The Function ofDocuments
in Islamic Law, Albany, 1972, pp. 130 131; Idem, "Mudaraba", in : EI(2), Vol. VII, 1990. pp. 284 - 285;
See also : A. A. Hasan, "Al-Mudarabah (Dormant Partnership) and Its Identical Islamic Partnerships in
Early Islam", HI, Vol. XII (2), 1989, pp. 11 - 38.




1.3.1. Sharikat al-Mufawadah37 (universal or unlimited investment partnership)
(a) Definition
Mufawadah has a literal meaning of musawat (equality).38 The legal term of
mufawadah is derived from al-tafwid (delegation of authority),39 for each partner
empowers his colleague to act freely with the entire partnership's capital.40
Sharikat al-mufawadah may be best translated as a universal or unlimited
investment partnership.41 Technically, mufawadah partnership is a partnership which
is essentially based on three features; complete equality of the partners in all aspects,
37
This type of partnership is strongly disapproved of by al-Shafici mainly because the equality it advocates
cannot be implemented in practice. Besides that, there is a possibility that one partner might be able to
drive an unjustified and undeserved benefit from the extrapartnership income involving , for example, the
discovery by the other partners of a treasure trove or their receiving a gift. Both sources of wealth have
no connection with the partnership, as such, and should not become part of the social_capital, see : Umm,
Vol. Ill, p. 306; M. Muhtdj,Vo\. II, p. 215; see also ; Minhaj N., pp. 132 - J33; Shirazi, Vol. I, p. 245;
It is disowned by Abu Hanifah and recognised by Abu Yusuf, al-Shaybani and Ibn Abi Layla. See ;
Mabsuj, Vol. XI, p. 153; W. Heffening, "Sharika", in : EI(1), Vol. IV, 1913 - 1934, p. 381.
38 See for example Lisan, Vol. VII, p. 210; Mabsu(, Vol. XI, p. 152; Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 58; Fath Q., Vol.
VI, p. 156.
39 See refs. no. 37; Fath Q., Vol. VI, p. 156.
4" Lane, Vol. II, p. 2459; W. Heffening, op. cit., p. 381; Udovitch, Partnership, p. 44; Al-Sarakhsi's neat
definition of mufawadah states that it is derived from tafwid (delegation of authority), for each partner
empowers his colleague to act freely with the entire partnership's capital. It has also been said that it
derivation is from the idea of dispersal, as it is said :"The water overflowed (fada)", meaning that it spread
out and dispersed or "the bounty is spread out (yastafidu)", meaning, it is distributed widely, since this
contract is based upon the dispersal of authority for all the transactions. It has also been associated with
fawda. which means equality of investment and profit, and therefore it is called mufawadah. See : Mabsuf,
Vol. XI. p. 152; see also : Lane, Vol. II, p. 2459.
41 Ibn al-Athir, Vol. Ill, p. 479; Taj, Vol. XVIII, p. 479; Lane. Vol. II, p. 2459; Udovitch, Partnership,
p 40; Cf. Haim Gerber, "The Muslim Law of Partnership in Ottoman Court Records", SI, Vol. 53, pp. 113-
114.
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the inclusion of all trade activities within its scope, and the mutual agency and surety
of the partners.42 Complete equality in all financial matters is an indispensable
condition of the unlimited partnership. Any deviation from this value, whether in
respect of each partner's contribution to the joint capital or to the share of profits and
losses is regarded as making this partnership invalid.41
In Maliki doctrine, the mufawadah is transformed into an entirely different
institution. It connotes a general mandate partnership, i. e. an arrangement in which
each party confers upon his colleague full authority to dispose of their joint capital
in any manner intended to benefit their association. The emphasis is on the tafwid,
i. e., on the delegation of discretionary authority to conduct trade with each other's
capital. Each partner is his colleague's agent and can act in all commercial matters
with respect to his own and his colleague's property without the latter's approval. Any
obligation incurred on behalf of the partnership toward a third party by one of the
partner can be claimed in full from any of the other partners. Each of them is liable
for any obligation undertaken by his colleagues in connection with their work.44
From the above discussion, it can be said that according to the Maliki concept
of mufawadah partnership, the implication of the term mufawadah for partnership is
confined to the nature of the relationship between the partners and does not extend,
42
Mabsuf, Vol. XI, p. 152; Hidayah, Vol. Ill, p. 4; Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 70; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 30; Lane,
Vol. II, p. 2459.
43 Muhammad al-Shaybani. "Kitab al-Asl. Kilab al-Sharikah", fol. 68b. II, pp. 15 - 17; The only dissenting
view is that of Ibn Abi Layla who holds that a slight inequality in the investment does not invalidate the
mufawadah contract. This view is probably due to a difference in construction of the term mufawadah. See
Abu Yusuf, IkhtilafAbi Hanifah wa Ibn Abi Layla. Cairo, 1938, p. 93; see also Faih Q., Vol. VI, pp. 156
- 157.
44 Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 68 - 70; Bidayah.yo\. II, pp. 191 - 192; Ibn Juzayy, op cit., p. 244; see also cAli
al-Khafif, Al-Sharikdt fi al-Fiqh al-Islami. 1962, p. 34.
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as it does in Hanafi law, to any other aspect of the association. Moreover, according
to the Maliki concept, there is no requirement for equality in the personal and
financial status of the rerspective partner; nor does the Maliki mufawadah insist on
the inclusion of all eligible capital within the partnership.45
(b) Legitimacy of mufawadah partnership.
The legitimacy of a mufawadah partnership is based on modification of strict
legal standards by means of the application of juristic preference (istihsan),46 The
reason given for the exercise of juristic preference is the Prophet's statement :
"Fawidu (enter into partnership by reciprocity), for it is most conducive to prosperity
(barakah)".47 Also, men have had transactions together in this manner with no
person forbidding them. Morever, the exercise of juristic preference is followed in
permitting the mufawadah partnership because of "the custom of the merchants"
adat al-tujjar) or " the need of the merchants for it".48
For this reason :
Each partner has the right to deposit goods belonging to the partnership; for
depositing is one of the customary practices of merchants (cadat al-tujjar). It
47
Sahnun, Vol. Xll, p. 70; Bidayah, Vol. II, pp. 191- 192.
46 It is said that if mufawadah partnership is based on analogy (qiyas), it would not be permissible. The
reason given is that on the basis of analogy (qiyas). this form of partnership would comprehend the power
of wakcdah (agency) with respect to unknown subjects and the obligation of kafalah (surety) with respect
to a thing undefined, and each of this individually is not permissible. See for example Hidayah, Vol. Ill,
p. 4
47
Mabsup Vol. XI. p. 153; Hiddyah, Vol. Ill, p. 4; Fath Q., Vol. VI, p. 157.
48 Mabsu(, Vol. XI, p. 80. The notion of cadal al-tujjar has also been used as an argument to justify some
practices in mufawadah contracts. Those cases are like the case of pledge (al-rahn) which is governed by
the same rules as those of deposits, the case of loan whether in form of Lariyah (loan for use) or qard (loan
for fungible commodities), practice of purchase, sale and debt and expenses for execution of mufawadah
operations. See Udovitch, Partnership, pp. 104 - 112.
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is also one of the necessities of trade and one which is indispensable to the
merchants. He has need of this transaction in many situations which are likely
to occur. Since a partner has the right to pay a fee to have a deposit taken
care of, he has this right when no compensation is involved.49
(c) Equality of mufawadah partnership,
i. Equality in person (personal status)
According to Hanafi jurists equality of person in all respects is one of the
prerequisites for a valid mufawadah partnership. This applies not only to the amount
of each partner's investment and to the division of profits and losses between them,
but also to the personal status of the partners. They also hold that a mufawadah
partnership which is based on the idea of mutual surety is valid only if it is
contracted between two free people.50
In this regard, the slave, the mukatab slave and minors even with the permission
of their parents or guardian cannot make a mufawadah partnership with a freeman,
since they do not possess complete freedom of action in commercial matters.51
Moreover, a slave cannot provide surety for another person, nor is he fully
responsible for his own action as the master can circumscribe the rights of his slave.52
A universal partnership between a freeman and those category of people would create
4''
Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 68.
50 Mabsut, Vol. XI, p. 198; Hidayah, Vol. Ill, p. 4; Fath Q., Vol. VI, pp. 158 - 159.
51 Mabsut, Vol. XI, p. 198; Hidayah, Vol. Ill, p. 4.
52 Mabsut, Vol. XI, p. 198; Fath Q„ Vol. VI. p. 159.
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severe inequality, for the former would be liable for his own and the latters' actions.53
Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybani, two disciples of Abu Hanifah, however, held that
a mufawadah partnership contracted between two mudabbar slaves (who will
automatically attain their freedom upon their master's death) is valid.54
The demand for equality of person between two partners in a mufawadah
(universal) partnership extends to religious affiliation as well. The mufawadah
partnership, covering as it does, all commercial transactions of the partners, yet,
certain business transactions permissible for a non-Muslim,55 may not be so for a
Muslim, thus disqualifying the latter from full participation in a "mixed
mufawadah" ,56
Although Abu Yusuf permits a mufawadah partnership between a Muslim and a
dhimmi, he considers it a makruh57 arrangement, that is, disapproved or reprehensible
but not forbidden. He justifies his idea on the the basis of the elements of mutual
surety and mutual agency, of which a dhimmi like a Muslim is capable.58
3
Mabsul. Vol. XI, p. 198; Fath Q., Vol. VI, pp. 160 - 161.
54 Al-Shaybani, "Kitab al-AsI, Kitab al-Sharikah", Fol. 68b. 11. 12 - 14; Idem, al-Makhdrij fi al-Hiyal, p.
59.
55 This includes a Christian, Jew. Zoroastrian and dhimmi.
ih Mabsul, Vol. XI, pp. 196 - 197.
57 Makruh (disapproved) is a demand of the lawgiver which requires the mukallaf to avoid something, but
not in strictly prohibitory terms. Since makruh does not constitute a binding law, It is merely said that
omitting something which is makruh is preferable to committing it. See for example cAbd al-Wahhab
Khallaf, dim Usui al-Fiqh. Kuwait, 1978,p. 114; Abu Zahrah, Usui al-Fiqh. Cairo, 1958, p. 36; Aghnides,
p. 89; Coulson, History, p. 84.
58 Mabsul, Vol. XI, pp. 196 - 197; Kasani. Vol. VI, p. 61.
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On the other hand, Maliki law holds that any legally competent person capable
of disposition of property (tasarruf) and of conferring a mandate can be a partner in
a mufawadah partnership contract. This requirement excludes minors, mentally
incompetent people and slaves acting without their master's authorization. Slaves
upon whom their masters have conferred the right to engage in trade (al-ma'dhun
lahu fi al-tijarah) are, however, fully eligible to enter into partnership contracts.59
Maliki law also holds the opinion that a partnership between a Muslim and a
non-Muslim is valid on condition that the former supervises all the commercial
transactions. This requirement is, of course, intended to prevent any usurious
transaction or any trading in commodities which are forbidden to a Muslim.60
This means that Maliki law does not demand equality in personal status as a
prerequisite for a valid mufdwadah partnership. In short, mufawadah partnerships are,
according to Maliki law, permissible between any legally competent Muslim, male
or female, as well as slaves who are authorized to engage in trade and, under the
proper condition of supervision, between those and a non-Muslim.
59
Sahnun, Vol. XII. p. 70.
60 Ibid.
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ii. Equality of investment, profit and loss
According to Hanafi law, the partners in a mufdwadah parnership must share
equally in their investment (capital), profit and loss.61 Any deviation from this rule,
whether in respect to each partner's contribution to the joint capital or to the share
of profits and losses assigned to him, immediately renders the mufdwadah partnership
invalid.62 Thus to constitute a mufdwadah partnership, each partner must invest an
equal amount of joint capital and accept equal distribution of profit and loss in the
venture.
In contrast to the above principle, Maliki law does not require complete equality
of investment (capital), profits and loss in a mufdwadah partnership. The distribution
of profits and loss is in accordance with the partner's respective capital.63
Investment (capital)
All Muslim legal authorities are in full agreement concerning the acceptability
61
Al-Shaybani, "Kitab al-AsI, Kitab al-Sharikah", fol. 68b, II. 15 - 17; Mabsuf, Vol. XI, p. 177.
62 Mabsu(. VoL XI, p. 177; The requirement of equality of persons and of investment is best summed up
by al-Shaybani himself: "A mufawadah partnership can be contracted only by two free muslims who_are
both of age, or between two dhimmis. It cannot be contracted between a Muslim and a dhimmi. A
mufawadah can be contracted only if the capital of each partner is equal. If one of the partners comes into
an inheritance or receives a gift in the form of goods, it belongs exclusively to that partner and it does not
invalidate the mufdwadah. If, however, he inherits or receives dirhams or dinars, the mufdwadah is
invalidated". Al-Jamt al-Saghir, Cairo, 1302/1884, p. 10
63 Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 45. Malik said : "Loss is in accordance with their respective capital, and profit is
in accordance with their respective capital". Ibid., pp. 59 - 60.
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of gold and silver (dinar and dirham) currency for partnership investment.64 The
legal problems which do arise in this regard are the acceptance of copper coins as
capital in the mufawadah partnership. The question of a partnership with copper coins
{fulitsf5 as capital in the partnership investment is not treated in Maliki law. For a
mudarabah partnership, however, investment in copper coins is absolutely
disqualified.66 The wide margin between the intrinsic and the face value of copper
coins and the fact that their value and acceptance varied widely from place to place,
caused uneasiness among the jurists and cast doubt on the validity of their use for
partnership and other investment.67
In this regard, Abu Hanifah and Abu Yusuf deny copper coins the status of
currency because on the whole they are not completely interchangeable as are
standard gold and silver coins, but resemble commodities in that each individual
copper coin or type of coin may differ in value and acceptance from time to time and
place to place.68 If they are permitted as capital in mufdwadah partnership, this will
lead to uncertainty as to the amount of each partner's capital at the time of the
division of profit.69
64
Kasani, Vol. VI, pp. 60 - 61; Mabsu[, Vof XI, pp. 159 - 160 and 178; Bidayah, II, p. 190; Sahnun, Vol.
XII. pp. 63 - 65; Minhaj N.. p. 132; Mughni. Vol. V, pp. 16 - 18; Fath Q„ Vol. VI, p. 168; Hiddyah, Vol.
Ill, p. 6; al-Qayrawani, al-Risalah, p. 476.
65 Singular : fals. The fals was a token coin and was never recognized as legal tender comparable to gold
and silver. See A. L. Udovitch, "Fals", E/(2), Vol. II, 1965, pp. 768 - 769.
66 Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 65; Fath Q„ Vol. VI, pp. 168 - 169.
67 Kasani, Vol. VI, pp. 59 - 60; Mabsuf, Vol. XI, p. 160.
f's KasanT, Vol. VI, pp. 59 - 60; Fath Q., Vol. VI, p. 168.
Mabsut. Vol. XI, p. 160; Fath Q„ Vol. VI, p. 169.
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Al-Shaybani, however, holds the view that as long as copper coins {fulus) are in
circulation, they are in the category of an absolute currency. In his view, they are
suitable for capital in partnership investment like all other absolute currency, viz.
dinars (gold) and dirhams (silver).70
Maliki law does not permit a cash (dinar or dirham) partnership which has the
element of sarf (exchange). This contract does not arise when each partner's
investment consists of coins of the same metal, but when they are of varying types
or coins of different metals.71 For example, one partner invests only dinars and the
other only dirhams. These two types of coins have a different exchange rate and if
they form a partnership dividing the work and profit equally between them, this will
mean that the capital of one of them may exceed that of his partner. Furthermore, a
partnership in which the capital of one partner is greater than that of his partner is
not permissible unless the profit and work are divided according to their respective
shares in the joint capital.72
Of the schools of Islamic law, only the Maliki school recognizes the validity of
a partnership investment in the form of goods.73 All licit goods are eligible to become
part of the joint capital of a partnership.74 The only goods which Maliki law does not
countenance for the formation of a partnership are foodstuffs that are measurable or
70
Ibid: Kasani, Vol. VI, pp. 59 - 60; see also Fath Q., Vol. VI, p. 168.
71 Sahnun, Vol. XII, pp. 62 - 63; Cf F. H. Ruxton, Maliki Law, London, 1916, p. 159.
72 Sahnun, Vol. XII, pp. 63 - 64; Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 191.
73 Sahnun, Vol. XII, pp. 54 - 55.
74 Ibid., p. 56.
30
weighable.75 According to them, this type of partnership is formed on the basis of the
value of each partner's contribution (merchandise) and on condition that each of them
will share in the work, profit and loss in accordance with his respective capital's
value.76
Malik refuses to accept the validity of a partnership in which each partner's
capital consists of foodstuffs of the same type, quality and quantity.77 Ibn Qasim, a
disciple of Malik, however, considers this type of arrangement should be allowed if
it is formed on the basis of weight of foodstuffs, and not according to their value.78
Concerning the mufawadah partners, al-Kasani, the Hanafi jurist, wrote: "They
are in reality two persons, but from the standpoint of the principles of commerce,
they are like a single person".79 This means that all the eligible capital of the partners,
as well as all their commercial activities (transactions), is included the mufawadah
partnership.80 By virtue of this inclusiveness, each partner is fully liable for the
actions and commitments of the other in all commercial matters. The claims of third
parties are thus actionable against either partner; and conversely, either partner can
make a claim against a third party, regardless of whether or not he was actually
involved in the transactions which gave rise to that claim. As far as third parties are
"
This applies if the investments are of different types of foodstuffs, even if they are of equal value. In
their view, the status of these goods in sale approaches that of sarf. Ibid., p. 56.
76 Ibid., pp. 54 - 55.
77 Ibid., p. 58; al-Qayrawani, al-Risalah, p. 476.
7S Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 58.
7" Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 73; Cf. Mabsuf, Vol. XI, pp. 174 and 190.
B" KasanT, Vol. VI. p. 62.
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concerned, dealing with any of the mufawadah partners is equivalent to dealing with
the partnership firm.81
The relationship between the partners themselves and between them and third
parties in a mufawadah partnership can be summarized as follows: in all partnership,
including the mufawadah, the liability is unlimited. In mufawadah partnership liability
toward third parties is both several and joint.82 A liability is said to be joint and
several when creditors may sue one or more of the parties to such liability, either
separately or all together, at his discretion.83
Liability in the mufawadah, as well as the rights, privileges and duties of the
partners with respect to each other is in accordance to the two fundamental legal
principles upon which this partnership is based. The first is mutual agency (al-
wakalah) which in Hanafi law is the basis of all forms of contractual partnership.
This means that, within the scope of their joint undertaking, each partner is
considered to be an agent of his colleague.84 The second principle and the one which
is unique to the mufawadah in Hanafi law is that of mutual surety (kafdlah).
According to this principle, a partner is not only his colleague's agent, but also
guarantor (kafil) for all his colleague's actions connected with the partnership.85
81
ibid.
82 Kasani, Vol. VI, pp. 60-61; Hash A., Vol. Ill, p. 369; W. Heffening, op. cii., p. 181.
83 See Henry Campbell Black. Black's Dictionary of Law, St. Paul, 1933, p. 1020.
84 Kasani, Vol. VI, pp. 60 - 61; Hash A., Vol. Ill, p. 369; Hidayah, Vol. Ill, p. 4 ; CfW. Heffening, op.
cit., p. 381.
85 See refs. no. 81, above.
32
According to Maliki law, however, members of a mufawadah partnership are
presumed to have discretionary powers in the administration of their capital. They
delegate to each other the authority to transact business with the common capital
which is recognized as a usual part of trade.86 Each partner can act independently in
the name of the partnership without exposing himself to any liability greater than that
which would normally be his share.87
(d) Conduct of mufawadah partnership.
i. Deposits and pledges in mufawadah
A deposit88 is classified as an amanah and involves no payment of a fee or any
other compensation to either party.89 A partner in a mufdwadah partnership would
place money or goods in the custody or safeguarding of the depository, whose task
is to safeguard them. The ownership of property and risks remains with the depositor.
Any loss of or damage to deposited partnership property is borne by the partnership,
and no individual liability attaches to the partner who arranged for the deposit. Either
86
Sahnun. Vol. XII, p. 75.
87 Ibid.
88 A deposit (wadfah) is a contract (fiduciary relationship or trusteeship) (al-amanah) whereby a property
is remitted to a trustee (depository). The proprietor of the thing (depositor) to be kept, often gratuitously,
by the latter, and the latter returns to its owner on demand. The property so remitted is held in trust {qabd
amanah). A trustee (depository) is liable for the loss or misappropriation in that property only if he
commits an act of transgression (ta'addi) such as using the property for his own use oiynegligence (tafrif)
such as storing the property in an unsafe place from where was stolen. See Mughni, Vol. VI, p. 382;
Mabsut. Vol. XI, p. 109; M. Muhtaj, Vol. Ill, p. 79;al-Ramli, Nihayah al-Muhtaj, Vol. V, p. 87; Fath Q.,
Vol. VIII, p. 485 ; Hash A, Vol. IV. p. 515; Umm, Vol. IV, p. 142; Muhalld, Vol. VIII, p. 277; Wajiz,
Vol. I, pp. 84 - 87; Shirazi, Vol. I. p. 500; Schacht. Introduction, p. 157; Lane, Vol. II, p. 3051; Otto
Spies. "Wadia", EI(I), Vol. IV, 1934, pp. 1079 - 1081.
89 Mabsu/, Vol. XI. p. 109; Muhalla, Vol. VIII, p. 277; Umm, Vol. IV, p. 142; Shirazi, Vol. I, p. 501; al-
Nawawi, Rawdat al-Talibin, Vol. V. p. 289; Cf. Schacht. Introduction, p. 157.
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partner is entitled to retrieve the deposit and either one can bring the suit against the
depository in the case of the latter's negligence.90
The depository could be held liable only in the case of negligence and all
obligations are extinguished with the return of the deposit to the depositor.91
The use of pledges92 (rahn) on behalf of partnership transactions is governed by
the same rules as those of deposits. Both partners have the right to give a pledge as
guarantee of payment for credit extended to the partnership or take a pledge as
security for payment of a debt owed to the partnership.93 In short, in either case, both
partners are equally bound by the contract.
According to Hanafi law, a partner in a mufawadah partnership can also entrust
money or goods belonging to the partnership as a bidetah94 to another person within
90
Shaybani, op. cit., fol. 65b, I. 16 - fol. 66b, 1.4.
91 Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 68.
92 Plegde (rahn) or security means to pledge or lodge a real or corporated property of material value in
accordance with the law as security for a debt, so as to make it possible for the creditor to regain the debt
or some portion of the goods or property. (Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 135; al-Qur(ubi, al-Jam'f li Ahkam al-
Qur'an, Vol. Ill, p. 409; Schacht, Introduction, p. 139; J. Schacht, "Rahn", EI(I), Vol. Ill, 1934, p. 1105).
The Prophet is reported to have bought some foodstuff on credit for a limited period and to have given his
armour as a security for it. (Abu Hanifah, Musnad, p. 164; Ibn Hanbal, Musnad, III, p. 355; Umm, III, pp.
141 - 142).
93 Ibid.
94 This practice can be illustrated by the example of a merchant (the mubd'f), who is unable personally to
attend a business affair, hands over some of his property to another party (the muslabd/*: the one who
receives it), so that the latter will take care of it for him. Upon completion of his task, the outside party,
without receiving any commission, profit or compensation in any other form, returns the proceeds of the
transaction to the merchant whose bidding he has done. See Mabsu[, Vol. XI, p. 181; Kasani, Vol. VI, p.
68. It might best be described as a type of quasi-agency. S. D. Goiten has described this practice as
"informal commercial cooperation". See A Mediterranean Society, the Jewish Communities of the Arab
World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza, Vol. I, Economic Foundations, Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1967. pp. 164 - 169.
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the bounds of fidelity (amanah).9i Should any loss occur, neither partner is
responsible for the ibdct (the mubdf ; neither the owner of the goods) nor the quasi-
agent (the mustabdf : the one who receives goods) bears any liability. Such loss is
borne by the partnership, as would any other financial loss resulting from transactions
personally conducted by either of the partners.96
On the other hand, Maliki law holds that members of a partnership do not
possess the right to deposit any portion of the common property with a third party
because deposits are not considered to be a part of trade.97 If one partner deposits any
portion of the common capital (property), he is fully liable to his partners for the loss
unless he can prove that there were compelling circumstances for his action.98
ii. Loans in mufawadah partnership
Islamic law distinguishes between two types of loans. One, the qarcf9 (loan of
a fungible object for consumption), involves the loan of fungible commodities, that
is goods, which may be estimated and replaced according to weight, measure and
number.100 According to Ibn Hazm (d. 456 A.H.), a qard which also implies future
95
Shaybani, op. cit., fol. 62, Ii. 20ff.
96 Ibid.
97 Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 77.
98 Ibid, pp. 75 - 76.
99
Literally, aqradahu means, he cuts off for him a portion to be requited or recompensated for it. Legally,
it signifies, he granted him a loan {gard) or the like. See Lane, Vol. II, p. 2515; Mughni. Vol. IV, p. 313;
M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 117; Dusuqi, Hashiyah. Vol. Ill, p. 222; Hash A, Vol.IV, p. 179.
100
Mughni. Vol. IV, p. 314; Shirazi. Vol. I, p. 303; M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 118; Hash A, Vol. IV, pp. 179
- 195.
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obligation (dayn) is a good deed involving the lending of a fungible object such as
money, an animal, houses, lands or others, whether movable or immovable properties,
by one to another person on condition that the borrower is responsible for returning
the equivalent or the like of that which he has received, either immediately or at a
specified time.101 In this case, the borrower takes the same object or the like of what
he has borrowed without any premium on the property, which would, of course, be
construed as interest.102 It is also known as salaf.m
The second type of loan is the cariyahm (loan for use) which transfers the
usufruct of property gratis to the borrower. The ownership of the object of the loan
remains that of the lender, and the borrower is not liable for any destruction of the
loaned property or any diminution of its value except in the case of negligence.105
The borrower is entitled to make use of the loan without compensation in accordance
with the conditions of the contract or of custom.106 The borrower may lend the
borrowed object to a third party, but he must not hire it out or give it as a security
and he must meet the maintenance expenses of the property while it is in his
""
Muhalla, Vol. VIII, pp. 77, 79 and 82; Cf Schacht, Introduction, p. 157.
102 Transaction, pp. 199 - 200.
103 Ibn al-Athir, Vol. II, p. 390; Mughni, Vol. IV, p. 313.
104 Literally, cariyah means what is taken by persons by turn. Legally, cariyah is defined as putting one in
possession of the use of a thing without anything given in exchange or putting another temporarily and
gratuitously, in possession of the use of a thing, the substance of which is not consumed by its use. See
Bidayah, Vol. II, pp. 235 - 236; Umm, Vol. IV, p. 37; Sab, Vol. Ill, p. 239; Al-Nawawi, Rawdat al-
Talibin, Vol. IV, p. 70; Muhalla, Vol. VIII, p. 168; Lane, Vol. II, p. 2195; Coulson, Commercial Law, p.
24; Schacht. Introduction, p. 157.
"*
Muhalla, Vol. VIII, p. 168; Sab, Vol. Ill, p. 239; Schacht, Introduction, p. 157; Coulson, Commercial
Law, p. 24.
106 Bidayah, Vol. 11. pp. 235 - 236.
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possession.107 The owner may, demand the return of the object at any time or at the
termination of the loan, according to the contract.108
Neither partner has the right individually to grant a qard loan from the common
funds because the bonds of mutual agency and surety between the partners extend
only to matters connected with trade. A qard loan can be given with the full
agreement of both partners.109
If a partner, individually, grant a loan for use (Lariyah) to a third party such as
a pack of animals belonging to the partnership which collapses under the borrower,
then by analogy, he is liable for half the value of the animals to his partner."0
However, a partner can, individually, grant a loan for use from the partnership
property (common funds) which is intended to apply primarily to what al-Sarakhsi
calls "the accompaniments of trade (tawabf al-tijarah) from which the merchant
(partner) finds no escape.1" A partner can also make use of partnership property for
loans and other generous purposes conditioned by practice of the merchants (min
sanic al-tujjar).u2
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108 Transaction, p. 199; Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 235.
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"" However, on the grounds of istihsan (juristic preference). al-Shaybani holds that he (a partner)jioes not
become liable if the animal borrowed died while in the possession of the borrower. Al-Shaybani, "Kitab
al-Sharikah", fol. 62b. Ii. 1 - 3.
111 For example, if someone with whom he is doing business approaches him, he has no alternative but to
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112 Ibid, p. 193.
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By contrast, no liability attaches either to the lender (partner) or borrower if the
partnership property is destroyed while in the possession of the borrower, lent out
with full agreement of the partners.111
However, according to Malik, neither partner is allowed to take or grant a loan
for use (Lariyyah) from the partnership funds in connection with the pursuit of the
company's business except for some trivial things114 or matters which are intended to
benefit the partnership with the permission of his colleague.115 If either partner takes
or grants a loan for use (Lariyyah) without his colleague's permission, he alone is
responsible for the full extent of any damage that might befall the borrowed object.116
The argument given by Malik is that, he (a partner) can constitute an injury to
his colleague if he borrowed, for example, the pack of animals or the ship whose
value is one hundred dinars, when he could have hired them at a fee of one dinar.117
iii. Purchase, sale and debts of the mufawadah partners
The liability for obligations arising from the commercial activity of the
mufawadah's partners is joint and several. In this regard, any business purchase made
by either of the partners such as merchandise, houses or whatever, belongs in equal
113
Al-Shaybani, op. cit.. fol. 62b, II. 1 - 3.
114 For example, ordering a servant to water their partnership's animal so as to benefit their trade.
1,5 Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 79.
116 Ibid, pp. 78 - 79.
1,7 Ibid.
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shares to each of them. However, this partnership purchase does not apply equally
if either partner purchases cloth, food and other household necessities for the
consumption and ownership of the partner's families."8 The mufawadah partners are
regarded as one individual concerning the rights and obligations arising from any
purchase or sale with their joint capital."9 The price of a purchase made by one of
them can be collected from the other. Either partner may cancel a sale or purchase
made by the other, and either one may return any defective merchandise bought by
the other.'20 Similarly, any defective merchandise sold by any one of them can be
returned to either of the partners.121 Both partners also have the right to sell the
mufawadah merchandise on credit even if this right is not explicitly stated in the
partnership contract.122 Moreover, both of them can buy goods on credit provided the
amount involved in these purchase is not in excess of the total amount of the joint
capital.123
The rights and obligations arising from any sale or purchase on credit is also
binding on both partners.124 In this regard, a distinction should be made between the
payment and collection of a debt owed by one partner and debt owed to one of
118
Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 71; Bidayah. Vol. II, p. 193; Kasani, Vol. 6, p.74; Shaybani, "Kitab al-Sharikat",
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119 Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 69.
1211 KasanT, Vol. VI, pp. 70 - 71 and 75.
121 Sahnun, Vol. XII. p. 81.
122 Ibid., p. 71.
123 Ibid.
124 Shaybani, "Kitab al-Sharikah", fol. 74, 1.2; Hash. A., Vol. Ill, p 369.
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them.'25 Money owed by one of them can be collected from either, because a
commitment made by one partner is binding on the other. This includes all debts
except those arising from criminal liability (jinayah) or from marital obligation such
as the amount due for a dowry (mahr) because they are beyond the bounds of the
mutual surety comprehended by the mufawadah partners.126
The situation is different in the case of debts owed to one of the partners because
not all the debts in this category can be collected by his partner from the debtor.127
i. e. the difference would seem to be between debts owed to the partnership
(company), and debts owed to the individuals, for example, the proceeds from the
sale of property inherited by one of the partners. Consequently this debt is not part
of the joint capital and can only be collected by the partner concerned.
Each of the mufawadah partners has the right independently to grant a
postponement of the payment of the debt owed to the partnership or to offer a
discount on goods whose sale has already been negotiated by the partners. However,
if either of the partners, motivated only by business considerations, granted a
postponement of the debt or discount of sale of goods in order to cultivate good will
and attract customers, his partner can raise a complaint against him, and if this was
done as a personal favour, his partner can demand the immediate payment of his
share of the debt or the discount.128 In this case, the reason given is that a partner is
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Hash A., Ill, p. 369; Wahbah, Vol. IV, p. 822.
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not entitled to special consideration in the price of any joint property he wishes to
purchase or sell exclusively for himself.129
iv. Expenses in mufawadah partnership
All business expenses connected with the pursuit of trade are to be covered from
partnership capital. These include living expenses while traveling on business, fees
to cover the hiring of help and equipment for the transportation and handling of
merchandise, taxes and customs expenses and maintenance of company property. All
money expended or debts incurred by one of the partners for such activities can be
taken out from the joint capital.130
All personal and family's regular expenses incurred by one of the partners can
also be taken out from the partnership capital.131 Personal expenses covered by the
partnership account include only food, clothing and any other regular and necessities
expenditure bought by either of the mufawadah partners for his own and his family's
use.132 Concerning the purchase by one partner of cloth, if the garments are of the
kind that are not used in daily wear such as fine linen and silk brocade garments, this
expenditure cannot be taken out from the partnership capital because they are
classified as luxury items.133
129
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v. Investment with third parties
The mufawadah partner may, without the prior consultation of his colleague,
invest cash or goods from their common funds in a mudarabah contract or accept
capital from outside parties as a mudarabah. Any profits or losses resulting from such
enterprise are reckoned to the partnership capital and are shared equally by both
parties.134
Either mufawadah partner may also, on his own initiative and without the prior
consent and knowledge of his colleague, form an cinan partnership with a third party,
whether in a single venture partnership (al-inan al-khass) or a more inclusive type
of association (al-cinan al-amm). In both cases, his partner is bound to the
commitment of one mufawadah partner of the joint capital.135
The one type of association which neither partner can contract with a third party
unless he has the prior consent and full and express agreement of all his colleagues
is a second mufawadah partnership. If either partner does so, the contract is
considered as null and void, and is treated as an cinan partnership.136
vi. Limit of mutual surety
The mutual surety existing between the mufawadah partners is confined only to
134
Al-Shaybani, op. cit., fol. 70b. II. 14ff; Sahnun. Vol. XII, p. 78.
135 Al-Shaybani, op. cit., fol. 70, I. 18.
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their business-connected activities.137 The limit of their mutual surety is not extended
to activities which are not directly related to their trade affairs such as their personal
expenses'38 and criminal acts.139
The personal expenses include all financial obligation connected with the
marriage and family life of the partners such as the payment of the dowry and other
mandatory payments which a marriage contract (caqd) might give rise to, and are
borne solely by the partners involved.140 Similarly, if one of the partners commits a
crime, in error or by premeditation, whether it was intentional or unintentional or
whether or not it took place in the course of some commercial activities, no liability
attaches to his partner. Any indemnity for which one of the partners may be liable
as a result of any criminal action (jinayah) is borne solely by him, and not by his
partner.141
The following topics will discuss the principles of wakalah and kafalah which
are related to the limit of mutual surety in a mufawadah partnership because each of
the mufawadah partners is both an agent (wakil) and guarantor (kafil) for his
colleague.
a. Concept of wakalah (agency; procuration)
In the course of doing business, a merchant may appoint another party to perform
137
Kasani, Vol. VI. p. 73.
I3ii Shaybani, op. cit., fol. 71b, II. 4-6; Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 84.
139 Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 84.
140 Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 841; KasanT, Vol. VI, p. 73.
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certain tasks such as sale and purchase of commodity on his behalf. In the fiqh
literatures, wakalah is explained as a legal relationship in which an agent (wakil) is
authorised by the principal (muwakkil) to execute a permissible and determined right
of disposition (tasarrufja'iz maclum)142 or to perform some service for him.143 Al-
Shafici elaborates this in the following way : "Agency is a contract when a person
delegates (the function) he is supposed to execute, to an agent in matters where
delegation is allowed (min ma yaqbal al-niyabah) due to be performed during his
lifetime".144
Ibn cArfah said that agency arises when one party authorizes another to replace
him in the exercise of civil dealings. In that sense, an agent may be entrusted with
all acts which can be done by a representative, such as concluding a contract,
collecting a sum due, assigning a debt or discharging a debtor and others.145
According to jurists146 the legality of the contract of wakalah is found in the
verses of the Qur'an which read: "Send one of your number with this money of yours
to the city",147 and "then send an arbitrator (negotiator) from your family and an
142
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arbitrator from his family".148 According to jurists, these verses are the authorisation
for the contractof wakalah,149
The legalization of the practice of wakalah can also be found in several
traditions, for example, the Prophet authorised Hakim b. Hazm to purchase a
sacrificial lamb,150 and on another occasion the Prophet appointed cAmr b. Umayyah
al-Damri as his wakil at his marriage with Umm Habibah,151 From the above
evidence, it can be said that the representation through the contract of wakalah has
legal effects between the principal, the agent and the third party.
It has also been noted by the jurists that one of the major reasons for the
acceptance of the contract of wakalah is an urgent necessity for man, since man is
sometimes not in a position to administer his own property when on a journey or on
the pilgrimage, or to manage his estate on account of his lack of ability or his great
wealth.152 By wakalah he can appoint his agent to perform the above tasks on his
behalf.
Concerning the commercial practices that can be delegated, it is established that
any person may appoint any other person as his agent to perform any act which he
l4l(
Q. 4:39.
149 See for example Mabsuf, Vol. XIX, p. 2; M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 217; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 87.
1511 Abu Dawud, Sunan, Vol. Ill, pp. 384 & 427; Ibn Majah, Sunan, Vol. II, p. 73; Mabsuf, Vol. XIX, p.
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can himself perform. For example, a principal can appoint an agent for buying and
selling, giving and taking hire (ijarah), giving or taking a pledge (rahn), giving and
taking a deposit (wad?ah), receiving payment of debt and others.153 What is
important is that the subject-matter of the agency must be known.154
As in other transactions, the usual formalities of ijab and qabiil should have to
be observed by the parties in order to establish a legal relationship between them.155
That process will allow the principal to inform the agent that he has appointed him
as agent (wakil) for a certain purpose by using any expression indicating that
intention.156 An offer can be treated as valid only if it is in the form of permission
and ratification.157
As regards conditions of agency, it is required that the principal and agent must
be of sound mind and understanding, and both persons must be able to dispose of
their property (iflaq al-tasarruf) and in such a degree the agent may be able to know
and execute the business to which he has been appointed.158 In this regard, a minor
153
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(.sabi). a lunatic (majnun), a slave (cabd) or any one who is mahjur cannot be either
principal or agent.159
The agent is considered as a trustee (amin) as regards the delegated undertakings
when a wakalah contract is concluded. If he acts gratuitously and does not exceed
his power, he is not liable for loss or accidental deterioration, except in the case of
tacaddi and tafrif, similar to that of wadfah. On that basis his testimony is
admissible.160
Another aspect which is worth noting is that the appointment of an agent may
be unspecific (tafwid Lamm; general) or a specific delegation (tafwid khass) as that
will be an important characteristic for the determination of liability. The agent of
unspecific delegation is contracted by using the words, "Act at your discretion".161 In
this case, the agent's act includes what is susceptible for delegation (niyabah) in
financial matters {al-umur al-maliyyakfbl and even others if it has been so agreed,
except in the case of the principal's divorce and the sale of his house.163 Normally,
however, it is of a specific delegation where his task is to do a particular thing164 and
its contents must be clearly defined.165 In this case, the agent powers are limited by
159
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his principal's instruction and he is bound not to exceed them in any way.166
Wakalah in sale
If contract of wakalah in sale (bayc) is concluded without any clear instruction
in respect of price or mode of payment, the agent is not allowed to sell the
merchandise except at a standard market price (thaman al-mithl) and by cash. If the
agent sold the merchandise by instalment (mu'ajjalan), the sale would not be allowed
unless the principal endorsed it.167 This is decided so because the agent's action is
likely to infringe the principal's interest and thereby his approval needs to be sought.
If the agent is appointed based on unspecific delegation (wakalah muflaqah), it
does not amount to allowing the agent total freedom in his action but rather expects
that the agent will discharge his tasks guided by the accepted customary commercial
practices and what is beneficial and favourable to the principal.168 This view is the
prefered one even though there are dissenting views which hold that the action of the
agent should be treated as totally unspecific and thus can be executed accordingly.169
On the contrary, in the case of specific delegation in which the terms and
166
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conditions of the contract are well-defined (wakalah muqayyadah), the agent is bound
by the instruction set by the principal. In other words, the agent is not allowed to sell
the merchandise against the instruction given unless it would be advantageous to the
principal. For example if the agent is instructed to sell merchandise at a certain price
but sells it at a higher price, the transaction is valid. However, if the merchandise is
sold at a lower price than the thaman al-mithl or the price set for him, the transaction
is considered valid but he is liable for daman al-naqs (compensation for reduction).170
Wakalah in purchase
In wakalah in purchase (wakalah fi al-shirdc), the principal is required to state
the nature of the commodity to be purchased and the price of it, in order that the
agent may know the nature of the act for which he has been appointed and then
become capable of executing it. If he is appointed as an absolute (muflaqah) agent
by saying to him, "Purchase for me whatever thing you may judge advisable", in this
case, the explanation of the nature of the commodity is unnecessary.171
As in the case of bayc, the agent is bound by the principal's instructions. If he
acts in contravention of that instruction as to the nature of the merchandise
purchased, he is bound thereby,172 however, more advantageous the thing may be.
The merchandise is considered to has been bought by the agent for himself, not for
1711
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If a dispute arises between the principal and his agent as to the essential nature
of an appointment, for example, if the agent maintains that the principal instructed
him to sell merchandise on credit or to buy it for certain price, while the former
contends that it was to be sold for cash or bought for certain other price, the
presumption is in favour of the principal if he takes the oath.174 Further, if the dispute
arises between them regarding the purchase of a specific merchandise, the declaration
of the agent must be credited.175
b. Concept of kafalah (suretyship)
In the classical works of Islamic law, kafalah is treated as a gratuitous contract
('aqd al-tabarruf. It is also known as unilateral contract, a disposition that may be
completed by unilateral will (iradah munfaridah), and not dependent on the acts of
both parties as in a bilateral transaction faqd al-muLawadah). It is considered as a
good deed and subservience to God (Jacah) that will be rewarded, simply because the
guarantor or surety (kafiP) is willing to act as such, without any pecuniary return or
in legal terms known as without any consideration.
Generally, the legal manuals have adopted this notion of kafalah as being
gratuitous. However, the change of time and circumstances has brought about a
173
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change of atitude towards kafalah, from being accepted as just a gratuitous contract
to being considered as a burden and liability whereby the guarantor has undertaken
to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person. In this regards, the
guarantor is taking responsibility for the due performance of the obligation of another
person (whether imposed by the law or contract) in the event of that person failing
to perform that obligation as required.
Literally, kafalah means responsibility, amenability or suretyship,176 and
technically, it is the pledge given by the guarantor or the surety (kafil) to a creditor
(.makful lah; da'in) on the behalf of the principal debtor Q'asil; makful canh), to secure
that the guaranteed (makful bih), i.e. the debtor will be present at a definite place, e.g.
to pay his debt or fine or in the case of retaliation, to undergo punishment.177
The legality of kafalah is recognised by the Qur'an and the Prophet. A verse of
the Qur'an says: "(Jacob) said: never will I send him with you until ye swear a
solemn oath to me, in God's name, that ye will be secure to bring him back to me".178
According to al-Qur(ubi, this verse is the basis for the legality of kafalah for a
person (kafalah bi al-nafs)}79 It is also known as hamalah involving the corpus of
a property or capital asset (cayn) and the security or suretyship (wathiqah).m
176
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According to al-Kasani, hamil means the one or person who is responsible for
suretyship and may also connote kafil.m Another verse says "For him who produces
it, is (the reward of) a camel-load; I will be bound by it".182 According to al-Tabari
the word zacim in this verse implies kafilm
In the Traditions, the Prophet is reported to have said, concerning kafalah: "The
surety (zcfim) is a guarantor {gharim)" ,m To support the justification or legality of
kafalah, al-Shafici reported a tradition which recounted how, when Qubaysah ibn al-
Mukhariq had a suretyship, the Prophet told him: "O Qubaysah (Ibn al-Mukhariq)!
requesting (things) is forbidden except in the three things, first, when a man has a
suretyship then request for it is permissible ".,85 According to al-Muzani (d. 264
A.H.),186 in the above first tradition, zacim implies kafil (the surety; guarantor),187 and
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Scope of personal guarantee (kafalah)
Generally, the subject of kafalah is divided into two categories in Islamic Law.
Firstly, al-kafalah bi al-nafs (suretyship for the person) which is also known as
daman al-wajhf° This type of kafalah is associated with the obligation to secure the
appearance of the guaranteed person (debtor) or his agent in a court proceeding or
in an extra-judicial arbitration at the stipulated time at the request of the creditor.191
The guarantor, in this case, shall be released if he delivers the person guaranteed
to the creditor in a place where settlement or if it is adjudication, as the case may be,
can take place. If it is stipulated that the guarantor must deliver the guaranteed person
in the court of law, the guarantor must do so and he is not allowed to deliver the
guaranteed person to any other place. This type of kafalah is annulled by the death
of the guarantor or the guaranteed person. However, it will not be the case upon the
death of the creditor (beneficiary), where heirs shall have the right to require the
guarantor to deliver up the guaranteed person at a specified time.192
Secondly, al-kafalah bi al-mal (surety for the claim) means that the surety
(guarantor) stands as a pledge to the creditor (makful lahu) that the obligation of the
principal debtor will be fulfilled. In this case, it is required that the secured obligation
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486; Jaziri. Vol. Ill, p. 224; Sabiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah, Vol. Ill, p. 337.
191 Al-Nasafi. \s(Hahat al-Hanaftyyah. cited in Chafik Chehata, Theorie generate de L'obligation en droit
Musulman Hanefite, Paris, 1969, pp. 231. See also Mabsuf. Vol. XIX, p. 177; ai-Nawawi, Rawdat. Vol.
III. p. 486; Schacht. Introduction, p. 158.
192
Schacht.Introduction, pp. 158-159; Maj. "Adliyyah, art. 642; Muhammad Fawzi Fayd Allah, Nazariyyat
al-Daman ft al-Fiqh al-lslami, Kuwait, 1983, p. 37.
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must be a liability of the principal debtor (madmun cala al-asil) and the obligation
of the surety (kafil) is dependent (tabf) on the liability of the principal debtor.193
Suretyship for the claim can be independent or additional to suretyship for the
person; if the guarantor stipulates that the debt of the principal debtor de remitted,
its effect is that of hawalah.m
Legal consequences of a kafalah contract
A kafalah contract which is concluded by a person of full capacity (ahliyyah
kamilahy95 and executed by an offer (ijab) from the guarantor and acceptance (qahul)
from the guaranteed person196 will bring about legal values (ahkam), for example,
establishing the right to demand from the guarantor (kafil) what is liable on the
193
Maj. "Adliyyah, art. 613; Schacht. Introduction, p. 158.
194 Hawalah is a way of extinguishing an obligation by transforming it into a new one. Literally it means
transfer, see Lisan, Vol. XI, p. 190; Lane, Vol. I, p. 677; Legally, hawalah is an agreement by which a
debtor is fred from a debt by another becoming responsible for it or transfer of a claim of a debt by
shifting the responsibility from one to another, see Mughni, Vol. IV, p. 83; Fath Q, Vol. V, p. 443; M.
Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 193; Hash A., Vol. IV, p. 300; Ai-Buhuti, Kashshafal-Qincb, Vol. Ill, p. 370; Mabsuf,
Vol. XIII, p. 28; Muhalla, Vol. VIII, p. 108. In its modern usage, it is suggested that the availibity of the
institution of bawalah has extended a great deal of facilities to cope with the burden of commercial
transactions and provide new ways of satisfaction of debt and giving security which corresponds to the
currently used negotiable instruments such as bill of exchange and letter of credit.
195 Mughni, Vol. V, p. 78.
196 Abu Hanifah and one of his disciples, Muhammad al-Shaybani held that the basic constituents of
kafalah are offer and acceptance. See Hash A., Vol. IV, p. 261; However, Abu Yusuf, supported by other
schools of law, opined otherwise, saying that mere offer will render a kafalah contract valid. See M.
Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. \98 jMughni, Vol. V, p. 72. A kafalah contract is valid and effective if pronounced by
a special expression (sighah mu"ayyanah). and the wordings to be employed, according to Hanafis and
Shaficis, can either be expressed (sarih) or implied (kinayah). This simply denotes any utterence that
signifies an obligation in the custom and usage of a society. See Kasani, Vol. VI, pp. 2-3; Fath Q., Vol.
V, p. 292.
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principal debtor (,asil)}97 What is demanded at this stage will depend on the type of
kafalah concluded by the parties. If the kafalah concluded involves kafalah bi al-
mal, the guarantor can be required to satisfy the entire debt if he is the only surety.
If there are two sureties, both of them will share the burden equally provided that
there are no specific terms on the matter, as both of them are on the same standing
as far as the kafalah is concerned. The creditor will have to take into consideration
the division of obligation (al-inqisam) by which he has to apportion his right of claim
(haqq al-mufalabah).]9i
On the other hand, if the contract involves kafalah bi al-nafs, the guarantor is
duty bound to ensure the attendance of the guaranteed person, if that can be done.
If he is not available, the guarantor can ask for some time until his attendance can
be assured. If he has not produced the guaranteed person during the stipulated time
and there is no evidence of his inability to do so, the qadi can have him arrested
until the satisfactory evidences of his failure based on circumstances, testimonies and
others can be produced. He will only be released and allowed deferment only after
he is in the position to produce the guaranteed person.199
The majority of jurists200 say that a kafalah contract will give the favoured party
a right (haqq) to claim from the guarantor what he is entitled to. This right,
197
Maj. 'Adliyyah, art. 634 says " The effect of a contract of guarantee is a claim. This is to say, it consists
of the right of the person in whose favour the guarantee is made to claim the subject matter of the
guarantee from the guarantor".
I9K Kasani, Vol. VI. p. 10; Mabsiq, Vol. XIX, p. 162.
199 KasanT. Vol. VI. p. 10.
20,1
Among others are Sufyan al-Thawri, Awzaci, Abu cUbayd and the three imams Abu Hanifah, al-Shafici
and Ahmad b. Hanbal. See Muhalld, Vol. VIII, p. 526.
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nevertheless, will not relinquish the right of the creditor to claim from the debtor. He
can claim from anyone he wishes, or both provided that the claim is within the extent
of his entitlement.201
In the case of the liability (dhimmah) for paying the debt, which has been
debated among the jurists, whether or not the principal debtor (ay/7) will be released
from the obligation, the Hanafis rule that the liability will be on the guaranteed
person, but the creditor can make his claim from either person.202 Al-Shafici is of the
opinion that a kafalah with a condition for release of the principal debtor from
liability is not permitted because it is a condition which contradicts the exigency
(muqtada) of daman,203 Malik is of opinion that the debtor cannot claim from the
kafil except when claiming from the guaranteed person has become impossible. He
stresses that kafalah is a security (wathiqah), and the satisfaction of the obligation
will not be demanded from the guarantor except when the principal debtor has failed
to do so.
It seems that the the above opinions are of the same philosophy with some
variation in the details. The views expressed are that kafalah will not give rise to
bara'ah (release) of the guaranteed person. Kafalah is the fusion of the dhimmah of
a person to another in the sense of mufalabah, and bara'ah is contrary to it. If
kafalah is for the purpose of releasing one's liability, for example debt, it is then
21,1
Al-Dardir, al-Sharh al-Saghir, Vol. II, p. 105.
202 "The person claiming under the guarantee has the option to claim either against the guarantor or against
the principal debtor. The exercise of his right against the one in no way destroys his right of claiming from
the other. He may claim, first, from the one and then from the other, or from both simultaneously", Maj.
cAdliyyah, art. 644.
2,13 ShirazT, Vol. I. p. 415; M Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 207.
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hawalah.
Hawalah is the transference of a debt from one person to another. Hawalah,
literally, means transfer204 or turn.205 Legally, Hawalah is an agreement by which a
debtor is freed from a debt by another becoming responsible for it or transfer of a
claim of a debt by shifting the responsibility from one to another.206
The legal evidence for the hawalah is the hadith of the Prophet pertaining to the
obligation to repay one's debt; "Procrastination in paying debt by a wealthy man is
injustice. So, if your debt is transferred from your debtor to a trustworthy rich debtor
(,mail'), you should agree".207 This tradition indicates that the order of the Prophet to
accept hawalah by a rich debtor is a recommendation, as was held by the majority
of jurists. This contract is considered as a worldly beneficial matter and therefore
considered as performance of a good deed (ihsan) to the debtor. By doing this, he
will release the debtor from his legal obligation for the debt.208 No matter how
diverse kafalah and hawalah may be, there are many points of similarity between
204
Lisan, Vol. XI, p. 190; Lane. Vol. I, p. 677.
205 Ch. Huart, "Hawala" in EI(2), Vol. Ill, 1971, p. 292.
206 MughnL Vol. IV, p. 528; M. Muhtdj, Vol. II, p. 193; Qinff, Vol. Ill, p. 370; Hash. A., Vol. IV, p.300;
Fath Q., Vol. V, p. 443; Muhalla. Vol. VIII, p. 108; "The Hanafis ruled that hawalah is tranfer of right
of claim (mu(alabah) from the dhimmah of the debtor (madin) to the dhimmah of an assignee (multazim).
In this respect, it differs from kafalah as it involves fusion (damn) of liability in the process of claim
(mu/alabah) and not in transfer. In the hawalah deal, the debtor (madin) will not be demanded after the
contract is concluded. It is said in manuals of this school that hawalah is shifting (tahwil) of a debt from
the liability of principal debtor to that of a delegated payer (muhal calayh) as a means of security
(tawaththuq). Hawalah is a contract permissible in all debts (duyuri) but not in goods (acyan). It is founded
on constructive transfer (naql hukm) not physical". See Mughni, Vol. IV, p. 83.
207 Muw Y, p. 562; Bukhari, Vol. VIII, p. 270; Dawud. Vol. Ill, p. 337 (no. 3345); Ibn Majah, Sunan, Vol.
II, pp. 73 - 74; al-Nasa'i, Sunan, Vol. VII, p. 317; see also Umm. Ill, p. 233; Musannaf, Vol. VIII, pp. 316
- 317.
2m Al-Sulami, cIzz al-Din cAbd al-Salam, Qawabid al-Ahkam fi Masalih al-Anam. Cairo, 1934, p. 160.
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them and they can become complementary to each other insofar as settlement of
loans is concerned. As kafalah in its modern usage became extended to new
transactions, so did hawalah.109 It is suggested that the availability of the institution
of hawalah has extended a great deal of facilities to cope with the burden of
commercial transactions and their diverse practices. It can provide new ways of
satisfaction of debt and giving security which correspond to the currently used
negotiable instruments.
vii. Dissolution of mufawadah partnership
There are two types of circumstances which affect the termination of a
contractual partnership. The first is the death,210 or the apostasy2" or the loss of
mental competence by one of the partners.212 These circumstances cause immediate
termination of a partnership regardless of whether or not the surviving partner is
aware of the circumstances.213
The second circumstance is the unilateral abrogation (naskh) by one of the
Muhammad Ahmad Sarraj in his book, al-Awraq al-Tijariyyah fi al-Sharkah al-Islamiyyah, Cairo,
1988, p. 82, writes : "The law has ordered giving security for debts (tawlhiq al-duyun) for a variety of
purposes like protection of rights, avoiding disputes (niztf), guarantee (daman) for payment of the debt and
the creditor's right of priority over the estate of the debtor with others possessing such a right. The method
of security rests in, among others, the documentation (kitabah) of the loan, certification of a notary
(shahadah), pledge (rahn), transfer of obligation (hawalah) and guarantee (kafalah)".





partners2'4 and the lapsing of equality in eligible capital of one of them.215 In these
cases, however, the dissolution of the partnership does not become effective until the
other partner becomes aware of it.216
Maliki jurists, however, do not mention whether the factors which lead to the
termination of a partnership take effect immediately or not. Rather, they merely say
that a mufawadah partnership is terminated by the mutual consent of the partners, by
the accomplishment of its aim, by the expiration of the term stipulated in the contract
or upon the death of one of the partners.217
1.3.2. Sharikat al-Inan (limited investment partnership)
(a) Definition
Sharikat al-cInan signifies a limited investment partnership. Literally, cInan means
the rein of a horse, which is held by only one hand of a rider, so that the other hand
is free.218 Similarly, each of the partners transfers to his colleague the rein of the
disposition. It could be derived from the fact that a pack animal has two reins, one
of them longer and the other shorter. According to Hanafi law, this type of
partnership is permissible both with equal or unequal shares in investment and profit
214
Ibid, pp. 77 - 78.
215 Ibid, pp. 78 - 79.
2,6 Ibid., pp. 77 - 79.
217 Sahntin, Vol. XII, p. 84.
2IS Mabsut, Vol. XI, pp. 151 - 152.
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on the part of the partners, and is. therefore, designated cinan?]9
Legally, an Linan partnership220 can be described as a contractual or commercial
partnership (sharikat al-aqd) whereby two or more partners contribute to a capital
fund, either in money or in kind or in labour or in combining all or some of these
-)-) i
investments.
(b) Legality of cinan partnership.
It is recorded that such partnership was practised in pre-Islamic times.222 In this
regard, W. Heffening suggests that, historically, this partnership was the older form
of partnership.223
Although the term cinan for this partnership was not used by Malik, Ibn Rushd,
the Maliki jurist, states that all Muslim jurists are agreed on the validity of the cinan
partnership "even if some of them did not use this term and even if they differed
2"
Mabsut, Vol. XI, pp. 151 - 152; M. Muhtdj, Vol. 11, p. 212; Fath Q, Vol. V, p. 20; Kasani, Vol. VI,
p. 57; Hash A, Vol. Ill, p. 373; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 31.
220 In the Mudawwanah, this form of partnership is not designated by any special term and can best be
described simply as a non-mufawadah partnership, " A Partnership which is not a mufawadah partnership,
as when two people form a partnership in one commodity or something similar". Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 78.
221 Biddyah, Vol. II. pp. 252 - 255; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 13; JazirT, Vol. Ill, pp. 68 - 79; Hiddyah, Vol. Ill,
p. 6; M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, pp. 212 - 213; Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 62; Mabsut, Vol. XI, p. 153.
222 Musannaf, Vol. VII, p. 409, Vol. VIII, pp. 258 - 260; Mabsut, Vol. XI, p. 57. Evidence of it appears
in a poem by al-Nabighah al-Jacdi : "And we share with Quraysh in their property, and in their several
grounds of pretension to respect with a sharing exclusive of their properties". See Mabsut, Vol. XI, p. 151;
Lane. Vol. II. p. 154; Lisdn, Vol. XIII. pp. 292 - 293.
223 W. Heffening. op. cit.. p. 293.
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concerning some of its rules".224
(c) Classification of Hnan partnership.
cInan partnerships are divided (on the basis of its scope) into two general
categories: specified (khass) and general (Lamm).225 A general cinan partnership is
formed for the purposes of general business with no restrictions with respect to the
commodities that can be dealt with or transactions that can be negotiated.226 In other
words, any legitimate business activity designed to bring profit to the partnership
comes within its purview. In this respect, it resembles the mufawadah partnership.
The only limitation to which the partners in a general rinan partnership are subject
is the extent of their joint capital.227
The specified cinan partnership is formed for the purposes of a specified business
transactions. In this partnership, the partners' transactions are confined to a certain
category of goods defined in the contract. This arrangement could be a continuing
one, enduring over a considerable period of time and involving numerous
transactions, or it could be limited to a single venture such as the purchase of
specified merchandise and its subsequent resale. The mutual agency (wakalah) of the
partners in a specified cinan partnership extends only to those commodities or areas
~24
Biddyah, Vol. II, p. 249.
225 Al-Kasani opines that it is permissible in its general form, that is, when two people form a partnership
for general trade; and it is permissible in its specified form, that is, when two people form_a partnership
for specific category of merchandise, as, for example, cloth or silk or garments, etc. Kasani, Vol. VI, p.
62.
226 Ibid.
227 Udovitch. Partnership, pp. 123 - 124.
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of trade agreed upon.228 For example, if the contract specified a certain type of goods,
each partner is a stranger in relation to any goods purchased by his colleague other
than those specified. The purchase or sale for cash or credit by one of the partners
is binding on his colleague. If, however, one of the partners buys or sells for cash
and credit something outside of the specified goods, it belongs exclusively to him.229
(d) Conduct of cinan partnership
i. Personal status
An Linan partnership can be formed by any person meeting the minimum
standards of legal competence. There are no restrictions with respect to personal
status that are peculiar to this contract. Any person who is of age (baligh) and in full
possession of his mental faculties (caqil) may legitimately contract an cinan
partnership.230
The several categories of person excluded because of some limitation in their
personal status from participation in a mufawadah partnership are eligible as partners
in an cinan partnership. Similarly, a difference in personal status between prospective
partners does not constitute a barrier to the formation of a valid cinan partnership.
In this regard, the formation of an cinan partnership between two minors with the
explicit approval of their guardian is valid, as is a partnership between a free Muslim
228
Mabsul, Vol. XI, pp. 173 - 174.
229 Mabsul, Vol. XI, pp. 173 - 174..
230 These two characteristics possessed by any person of either sex, are the minimum requirement for legal
competence in all transactions. See Wahbah, Vol. IV, p. 122; Udovitch, Partnership, p. 125.
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and a dhimmi.231 Abu Hanifah, Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybani are of the opinion that
an cinan partnership between a Muslim and a dhimmi is only permissible, if it is the
Muslim who oversees the selling and purchasing.232 In this case, exclusive supervision
of the joint venture by a Muslim would remove any possible objection to a Muslim
non-Muslim partnership by preventing transactions and business with commodities
prohibited to a Muslim.
ii. Form of investment
Capital for an cinan partnership investment can take the form of cash (gold or
silver coins).233 All Muslim jurists are agreed concerning the acceptability of gold and
silver coins for partnership investment.234 It is also permissible for one partner to
invest silver coins (dirhams) and the other gold coins (dinars).235 The legal problems
which arise in connection with these denominations are, as in the case of copper
coins [fulus). Copper coins do not have the status of currency because on the whole,
they can be particularized by specification. Furthermore, the value of their acceptance
may differ from time to time, and from place to place. Therefore, if it is accepted as
a valid capital in the cinan partnership, this will lead to uncertainty as to the amount
of each partner's capital at the time of the division of profits.236
231 Shaybani, "Kltab al-Sharikah"„ fol. 69, II. 2 - 6; fol. 77, II. 19-21.
232 Ibn Qutlubugha, Qasim b. Qu(lubugha (d. 879/1474), Taj al-Tarajim ft al-Tabaqat al-Hanafiyyah,
Baghdad. 1962. p. 24.
233 Mabsu/. Vol. XI. pp. 158 - 161 and 178; Kasani, Vol. VI,j). 160 - 161; Fath Q, Vol. VI, p. 167;
Sahnun, Vol. XII, pp. 63 - 65; Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 190; Mughni, Vol. V, pp. 16 - 18; N. Minhaj, p. 132.
234 Ibid.
235 Al-Quduri, Mukhtasar, p. 53; al-Shaybani. al-Makharij fi al-Hiyal, pp. 57 - 58.
236 Mabsut. Vol. XI, p. 160.
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According to al-Kasani, the majority of jurists do not permit the validity of
goods as partnership investment because it leads to ignorance regarding the profit
at the time of division of profits, since the amount of the investment will consist of
the value of the goods and not of the goods themselves, and this value will be
unknown except by conjecture and estimate. The amount of profits will, therefore,
be unknown and this will lead to dispute among the partners at the time of
division.237
iii. Expenses
Hanafi jurists assert that an cinan partnership is contracted in accordance with
the custom of the merchants and in recognition of the necessities of commerce.238 In
this regard, hiring services and equipment for the care and transportation of
partnership property is considered to be such a necessity and is an independent right
possessed by both cinan partners. Therefore, like a mufawadah partner, an cinan
partner could, when necessary, use partnership funds to pay for the transportation of
merchandise, with or without the express permission of his colleague. In the case of
mishap, the loss is borne by the partnership as a whole.239
Concerning the travel expenses, each cinan partner is granted the freedom to
travel with partnership property for trade purposes, even without the express
237
Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 59.
23l< See for example Kasani, Vol. VI. p. 69.
23" Ibid., pp. 69 - 70
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permission of his colleague.240 Since they are allowed the right to travel, they are also
allowed to recover all their travel expenses such as fees of leasing, cost of travel,
food and sustenance from the joint capital.241
iii. Distribution of profit and liability for loss
The distribution of profit in an cinan partnership is in accordance with the
agreement between the parties involved242 or in accordance with the proportion of the
capital invested,243 and loss will, therefore, be distributed in proportion to the invested
capital and will be borne by the owners of that capital.244
This implies that no supplier of capital can escape his liability for the loss on his
proportion of the total capital and that any party who has not invested any capital
will not be liable to any loss of capital. In this regard, Abu Hanifah say:
If two partners in an cinan partnership agree that the profit and loss
follow their respective investments, this is permissible. If one of them
stipulates for himself a share in the profit proportionally larger than
that of his colleague, this is also permissible. If , however, one of
them assumes a share of the loss proportionally larger than that of the
240
Ibid., p. 71.
241 Ibid., pp. 71 - 72.
242 This is the opinion of Hanafis, Hanbalis and Zaydis, see Mughni, Vol. V, p. 27; Hidayah, Vol. Ill,
p. 7; Mabsul, Vol. XI, p. 157; Fath Q, Vol.VI. p. 177; Qinaf, Vol. Ill, p. 497; al-Shaikh Zayn al-Din, Ibn
Nujaym, al-Bahr al-Ra'iq, Vol. VI, n. d., p. 188; cAla' al-Din al-Samarqandi, Tuhfat al-Fuqaha', Vol. Ill,
Damascus, 1397/1958, p. 71.
243 This opinion is held by Shafi'is, Malikis, Zahjris^ Imamis and Zufar from the Hanafis. See M
Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 216; Bidayah. Vol. II. p. 325; Shirazi, Vol. I, p. 454.
244 Mabsu/, Vol. XI. p. 156; Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 303; Zurqani, Vol. Ill, p. 158; Jaziri, Vol. Ill, p. 34; M.
Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 309; Hidayah, Vol. III. pp. 202 - 215.
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other, this is not permissible.245
The Hanafi principle is based on numerous legal traditions and is epitomized in
one attributed to the fourth caliph, cAli b. Abi Talib, " Profit follows the conditions
agreed upon and loss follows the capital".246
iv. Differences between mufawadah partnership and cinan partnership
It is only its structural features which distinguish the cinan partnership from the
mufawadah Partnership. Each of the mufawadah partners is both an agent (wakiT) and
guarantor {kafil) for his colleague.247
Each partner in the cinan partnership is only an agent (wakil) and not a guarantor
{kafil) of his colleague; and this mutual agency is valid only in the area of commerce
covered by their partnership or to the extent of their joint capital. In contrast to a
mufawadah partnership, this difference confines the partner's freedom of action with
in the conduct of business and severely curtails the rights and claims of third parties
toward the partnership.248
245
Al-Shaybani, op. cit., fol. 61, 11. 16 - 18.
246 Ibid.-, see also M. N. Siddiqi, Banking Without Interest, Lahore, 1983, p. 129.
247 Mabsuf, Vol. XI, p, 174; Kasani, Vol. VI, p, 62; Schacht, Introduction, p. 156; W. Heffening, op. cit.,
p. 381.
24l< AI-Quduri in his works p. 53 stated that :"As for a limited investment partnership Cinan), it is
contracted on the basis of mutual agency, but not mutual surety. It is valid in the case of a disparity
between each partner's investment, and it is valid when they invest equally, but share the profit unequally.
It is further permissible for either of the parties to invest only a part of their property, while the rest
remains outside the partnership. The form of capital with which it is permissible to contract a limited
investment is the same as that which was indicated as permissible in mufawadah .... the price whatever
either of the partners buys for the partnership can be claimed from him alone. He may, then, demand
remuneration from the other partner for the latter's share in it. If the entire partnership capital, or the capital
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1.3.3. Sharikat al-Acmal (labour partnership)
Labour or work partnership in artisans usually involves a skill in certain kinds
of manufacturing such as tailoring, carpentry, dyeing, weaving and the like.249 The
classical works have mentioned this type of venture in several ways such as sharikat
ft al-camal bi aydihima (partnership of work with their hands), al-sharikat hi al-amal
(partnership in work), sharikat al-abdan (partnership of bodies), sharikat al-sana'f
(partnership of craft)250 and sharikat al-taqabbul (partnership of acceptance).251
This type of partnership is contracted when two or more professionals, labourers
or craftmen form a work partnership without pooling any cash or goods; their sole
asset consists of their particular skills.252 In other words, they become partners and
agree to work according to their particular skills and then share their earnings.253
of one of the partners is lost before everything is bought, the partnership is nullified. However, if one of
them purchases something with his own share of the capital and the other partner's share is lost before
everything is purchased with it, the purchased merchandise is common property in according with their
partnership agreement. The one who laid out the money may demand remuneration from his partner for
the latter's share of its cost".
249 Fath Q., Vol. VI, p. 186; Udovitch, Partnership, p. 65.
250 Mabsut, Vol. XI, p. 152; Kasani, Vol. VI. p. 56; Hidayah, Vol. Ill, p. 10; Abu Yusuf b. cAbd_Allah b.
Muhammad b. cAbd al-Barr al-Qupubi (d. 1477 AD.), al-Kaft ft Fiqh Ahl al-Madinah al-Maliki, Beirut,
1982. p. 392; See also A. L. Udovitch. "Labor Partnership in Early Islamic Law", JESHO, Vol. X, 1967,
pp. 64 - 80.
251 A partnership of acceptance is contracted when two craftmen form a partnership in the acceptance of
work such as tailoring, fulling and the like. It is also designated as the partnership of bodies, because they
work with their bodies, and as partnership of craft because their craft is their capital. See Mabsut, Vol. XL
p. 152; Hidayah, Vol. Ill, p. 10; Fath Q„ Vol. VI, p. 186.
252 Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 43; al-KdJi, p. 392.
253 Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 57; Mabsut, Vol. XI, p. 154; Fath Q, Vol. V, p. 28; Hash A, Vol. Ill, p. 380;
Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 252; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 3.
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Al-Sarakhsi holds that this type of partnership is legal because labour can be
equated with money as a source of profit.254 He establishes a qiyas (analogy) on the
basis of mudarabah to justify his opinion that there is a common cillah between the
two cases and that claiming profit based on one's work and craft therefore has a
cogent legal foundation.255
Historical evidence has also shown that people have been conducting their affairs
through this form of partnership without disapproval or criticism or admonition since
the time of the Prophet.256 For example, the Prophet approved of two of his followers
having a partnership in what they gained in the battle of Badr.257
According to Hanafi and Maliki laws, the basis for the permissibility of this type
of partnership depends on the same or equal share or reward received by the
partners.
1.3.4. Sharikat al-Wujuh (Partnership in Credit)
This type of partnership is based on reputation, where partners do not provide
anything but their good reputation. They start their business (partnership) by buying
254
Mabsut, Vol. XI, p. 155; Shaficis, Imamis, Zahiris and Zufar from the Hanafi school disapprove the
validity of this kind of partnership because it depends on labour only. According to the Shafi'is, the basic
principle of partnership is proprietory (sharikat al-amwaf), an element which is not found in this particular
partnership. They also argue that intermingling of labour is not realizable. See M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 212;
see also Fath Q, Vol. V, p. 31.
255 Mabsut, Vol. XI, p. 155.
256 Ibid., pp. 151 - 220; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 3; Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 279; Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 59.
257 Abu Dawud, Sunan, Vol. Ill, p. 349; Ibn Majah, Sunan, Vol. II, p. 43; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 3.
2511 Mabsut, Vol. XI, p. 155; al-Kafi, p. 393.
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goods on credit, reselling them and share the profit among themselves (partners).259
The Hanafi and Hanbali jurists have, in fact, regarded credit as a form of wealth,
for like skill in sharikat al-cfmal, it is used for the production of more wealth.260
According to them, this kind of partnership is valid on condition that each partner
receives the same or an equal share of the profit from the business transactions.261
Conclusion
The above discussion has mentioned the four forms of commercial partnership
in Islamic law, i.e. sharikat al-mufawadah, sharikat al-nan, sharikat al-amal and
sharikat al-wujuh. In practice, however, the partners may contribute not only capital
in the form of finance, but also labour, management and skills, and credit and
goodwill, although not necessarily equally. The cinan partnership which implies
unequal shares seems to be the most popular. In a partnership with mixed
contributions (shares) of the partners, the profits accrued would be divided in
accordance with a contractually agreed proportion, since Islamic law admits an
entitlement to profit arising from a partner's contribution to any one of these three
business assets, i. e. capital in the form of finance, labour, management and skills,
and credit and goodwill. However, Islamic law makes it absolutely imperative that
~5'
Mabsu/, Vol. XI, p. 154; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 12; Fath Q, Vol. V, p. 30; Kasani, Vol. Vi, p. 57;
Schacht, Introduction, p. 156.
2f'° Bidayah, Vo[. II, p. 212; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 12; Fath Q, Vol. V, p. 30; Mabsut, Vol. XI, p. 154; see
also AI-Shacrani, Al-Mi:an al-Kubra, Vol. I, p. 83.
261 Mughni. Vol. V. p. 12; Mabsut, Vol. XI. p. 154; Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 57; Schacht, Introduction, p. 156;
Fath Q. Vol. V, p. 30.
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losses be shared in proportion to the contribution made to capital. This is because




AS A MODE OF FINANCING
CHAPTER TWO : MUDARABAH (DORMANT PARTNERSHIP) AS A
MODE OF FINANCING
2.1. Definition
Mudarabah or dormant partnership is synonymous with two other Arabic terms
which are used to designate this kind of business organization, qirad and muqaradah.
These three terms are interchangeable with no essential difference in meaning or
connotation among them.1 The divergence in terminology was probably originally
due to geographical factors. The terms qirad and muqaradah apparently originated
in the Arabian Peninsula, especially the Hijdz,2 and the term mudarabah was of
Traqi provenance.1 Subsequently, the difference was perpetuated by the legal schools,
with the Malikis4 and Shaffis5 adopting the term qirad and, to a lesser degree
muqaradah, and the Hanafis6 and Hanbalis7 adopting the term mudarabah.
According to the Hanafi jurist al-Sarakhsi, the term mudarabah is derived from
the expression "making a journey" ( al-darb fi al-ard). This term is used because the
agent-manager (mudarib) is entitled to the profit by virtue of his effort and work.
1
Lisan, Vol. VII. pp. 217 - 218; Taj, Vol. XIX, p 19; Udovitch, "Qirad", EI(2), Vol. V, p. 130.
2
Fa'iq, pp. 11 and 339; Ibn al-Athir, Vol. IV. p. 41; see also Udovitch, "At The Origin of The Western
Commenda: Islam, Israel. Byzantium?", Speculum, Vol. XXXVII, 1962, pp. 202 -207.
3 Zurqani, Vol. Ill, p. 345; Ibn Juzayy, al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah, p. 242.
4
Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 303; Jaziri, Vol. Ill, p. 42.
5 M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 309; ShTrazT., Vol. I, p.505.
"
Hiddyah. Vol.111, p. 202; Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, p. 18.
7
Mughni, Vol. V. p. 26; Qind, Vol. Ill, p. 507.
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Indeed, he is regarded as the partner of the investor (rabb al-mal/ sahib al-mal) in
matters relating to the profit, the capital used on the journey and expenses of an
ancillary nature.8
The people of Medina called this contract muqaradah ( or qirad), based on a
report concerning cUthman b. cAffan, the third Caliph, who entrusted funds to a man
in the form of a muqaradah contract.9 This term derives from qard meaning cutting;
for in this contract, the investor cuts off the disposition of a sum of money from
himself and transfers its disposition to the agent-manager. It is, therefore, designated
by that name (muqaradah).10 The other term, mudarabah, corresponds to that which
is found in the Qur'an: "While others travel in the land (yadribuna ji al-ard) in
search of God's bounty",11 that is to say, travel for the purpose of trade or
commerce.12
The basis of a mudarabah contract is an offer and acceptance. For example, If
the owner of the capital (rab al-mal) says to the person to take the capital and use
it and to share the profits between them equally ("Take this capital and do the work
and labour in return, on terms that profits are to be divided between us, half and half,
or, as two to one") or in ratio of two thirds and one third, or says something
indicative of an intention to form a mudarabah as when he asks such person to take
s
Mabsu(, Vol. XXII, p. 18; Cf. Udovitch, "Qirad', EI(2), Vol. V, pp. 129 - 130.
l)
Mabsu(, Vol. XXII, p.18; M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 309.
10 Mabsul, Vol. XXII, p. 18; Zurqani, Vol.Ill, p. 345; M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 309.
" Q, 73 : 20.
12 Mabsul, Vol. XXII, p. 18; Cf. M. Muhtaj, Vol. II. p. 309; Fath Q„ Vol. VIII, p. 445.
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so much money and use it as capital and share the profits with him in a certain ratio
and the latter (agent-manager/mudarib) accepts, a contract of mudarabah is
concluded.13
Generally, mudarabah or muqaradah connotes a fiducial contract or an
arrangement in which an investor (rabb al-mal) or group of investors (arbab al-
amwal) entrust capital or merchandise to an agent-manager (camil, mudarib, muqarid)
who is to trade with it and then, without delay, return to the investor(s) the principal
and a previously agreed share of the profits.14 As a reward for his labour and
management, the agent-manager receives the remaining share of the profits.15 Any
loss resulting from the exigencies of travel or from an unsuccessful business venture
is borne exclusively by the investor(s); the agent-manager is in no way liable for a
loss of this nature, losing only his expended time and effort.16
The agent-manager's complete freedom under normal trading circumstances from
any liability for the capital in the event of partial or total loss and the disjunction
between the owners of the capital and third parties are distinctive features of
mudarabah and made it an ideal instrument for the purposes of long-distance trade
"
Cf Maj LAdliyyah, art. 1407.
14 Mabsut, Vol. XXII, p. 22; Bidayah. Vol. II, p. 303; M. Muhtdj, Vol. II, p.309; Fath Q., Vol. VIII, p.
447; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 26; Ibn Juzayy, op cit., pp. 242 - 243; Abdur Rahim, The Principles of
Muhammadan Jurisprudence, Lahore, 1911, p. 324; A. Gaiani, "The Judicial Nature of the Moslem Qirad",
East and West, Vol. IV, (July, 1953), p.81; A. L. Udovitch, "Qirad", EI(2), Vol. V, 1980, p. 129.
15 Mabsut,_Vol. XXII, p. 22; Ibn al-Athir, Vol. Ill, p. 79; Taj, VoLJ, p. 349; Muhalla, Vol. VIII, p. 247;
cAla' al-Din al-Samarqandi, Tuhfat al-Fuqaha', Vol. Ill, p. 3; Jaziri, Vol. Ill, p. 34; Fath Q., Vol. VIII,
p. 447.
Mabsu\, Vol. XXII. p. 22; Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 303; M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 309; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 58;
Jaziri, Vol. Ill, p. 34; Muhalla, Vol. VIII, p. 247.
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and of obtaining a profitable contract.17 This type of contract was, therefore, widely
recognized and practised in pre-lslamic times and afterwards.
2.2. Legitimacy of Mudarabah
Although the validity of the mudarabah contract is not mentioned in the Qur'an,
Islamic law justifies it on the religious grounds of the traditional practice of the
Prophet (,surtnah), consensus (ijmac) and, more interestingly, on the practical grounds
of its economic function in society.
It is unanimously agreed by jurists that the legal validity of the mudarabah
contract is derived from the traditional practice of the Prophet.18 There are numerous
traditions which attribute its practice to the Prophet, before his prophethood, and to
his leading companions.
According to Ibn Ishaq, the Prophet himself, prior to his prophethood, had acted
as an agent-manager in a mudarabah contract with an investment provided by
Khadijah bt. Khuwaylid, a merchant woman of dignity and wealth who later became
his wife.19 He took her goods to Syria and traded with them. He sold them at a profit
17
Udovitch, Partnership, p. 171; Idem, "Qirad", EI(2), Vol. V, 1980, p. 130.
'* Bidayah. Vol. II, p. 178; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 26; Mabsut, Vol. XXII, p. 18; The ShafTis add a third
traditional ground for the mudarabah's permissibility, that of analogy (qiyas) with the agricultural lease
contract, musaqat. See M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 309.
19 Ibn Ishaq said that Khadijah used to hire men to carry merchandise outside the country for a share of
the profits a profit (mudarabah). According to him, when Khadijah heard about the Prophet's truthfulness,
trustworthiness and honourable character, she sent for him and proposed that he should take her goods to
Syria and trade with them. See Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah al-Nabawiyyah, Vol. I, pp. 171 - 172; see also Tabari,
Tarikh al-Rusul wa al-Muliik. Vol. II, p. 280; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat Ansab a!-cArab. ed. unidentified editors,
Beirut, 1983, p. 16.
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and it amounted to double or thereabouts.20
From this evidence, it appears that this form of commercial association was
popularly practised in pre-lslamic trade between the Quraysh and other tribes,21 and
continued to be practised throughout the early centuries of the Islamic era as the
mainstay of caravan and long-distance trade.22
Another tradition attributed to Muhammad an unequivocal endorsement and
approval of those engaging in trade by means of mudarabah. The Prophet was sent
at a time when people were using mudarabah in their dealing and he confirmed them
in this practice.23
cA'ishah and cAbd Allah b. cUmar are reported to have invested the money of
orphans and other money left in their safe keeping in mudarabah contracts.24 cAbd
2"
See refs. no. 18.
21 Ibn Hazm. al-lhkam ft Usui al-Ahkam, Vol. II, p. 95. For the use of mudarabah in pre-lslamic Arabian
trade between the Quraysh and other tribes, see M. J. Kister, "Mecca and Tamim", JESHO, Vol. VIII,
(Leiden, 1965), pp. 117ff.
22 Salih al-cAli, Al-Tanzimat al-ljtimffiyyah wa al-Iqliyadiyyah fi al-Basrah fi al-Qarn al-Awwal al-Hijri,
Baghdad, 1953, pp. 242 - 243; cAbd al-cAziz al-Duri, Tarikh al-LIraq al-lqtisadi fi al-Qarn al-Rabf al-
Hijri, Baghdad, 1948, p. 121 ff; see also. L. Udovitch, "The "Law Merchant" of The Medieval Islamic
World", in G. E. Von Grunebaum (ed.), Logic in Classical Islamic Literature, Wiesbaden, 1970, pp. 115 -
117; Eric R. Wolf. "The Social Organization of Mecca and The Origin of Islam", Southwestern Journal
ofAnthropology. Vol. VII (4), Albuquerque, 1951, pp. 330 -337; A. A. Hassan, "The Arabian Commercial
Background in Pre-lslamic Times", IC. Vol. 61 (2), 1987, pp. 70 - 83; Ziaul Haque, "Inter-Regional and
International Trade in Pre-lslamic Arabia", IS, Vol. VII (3), 1968, p. 207 - 232; W. M. Watt, Islam and
Integration ofSociety, London, 1961, p. 14; S. M. Imamuddin, "Commercial Relation of Spain with Iraq,
Persia, Khurasan, China and India in the Tenth Century A. C.", IC, Vol. XXXV (3), 1961, p. 177; Raef
T. A. Husein, "The Early Arabian Trade and Marketing", IQ, Vol. XXX (2), 1986, pp. 109 - 117.
23 Mabsu/, Vol. XXII, p. 19.
24 Al-Shaybani, " Kitab al-Asl. Kitab al-Mudarabah", MS. Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyyah, Fiqh Hanafi 491,
fol. 42b, II., pp. 11 - 14 ( hereinafter referred to as Shaybani); Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, p. 18.
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Allah b. Mascud, a prominent companion of the Prophet25 and al-cAbbas b. cAbd al-
Muftalib, the uncle of the Prophet, engaged in mudarabah contracts,26 the latter
having obtained the Prophet's approval for the conditions he imposed upon his agent-
manager to whom he entrusted his money.27
Further, according to the Hanafi jurist al-Kasani, the practice ofmudarabah was
carried out by the Companions, and no disapproval was ever stated by the Prophet.28
The above traditions indicate that the Prophet approved of engagement in trade
in the form ofmudarabah, and this approval amounts to his acknowledgement of the
legality of mudarabah. This contract also constituted one of the most widespread
tools of commercial activity from the pre-Islamic Arabian caravan trade to the early
centuries of the Islamic era.
It has also been noted by the jurists that one of the major reasons for its
acceptance is the resulting ease and efficiency achieved in the functioning of the
economic system. In this regard, al-Sarakhsi notes that this contract is allowed
because "people have a need for this contract. For the owner of capital may not find
his way to profitable trading activity, and the person who can find his way to such
activity, may not have the capital, and profit cannot be attained except by means of
both of these, that is capital and trading activity. By permitting this contract, the goal
25
Shaybani, fol. 42a, II, pp. 8-12.
26 Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, p. 18.
27 Ibid.
2* Kasani. Vol. VI. p. 79; See also Ibn Hazm, al-lhkam fi Usui al-Ahkam, Vol. II, p. 95.
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of both parties is attained".29
Moreover, this type of business arrangement has a very healthy effect on the
position of the labourers. They feel happy and satisfied with the share of the profit.
They will feel encouraged to work harder because every increase in the gross profits,
increases their share at the termination of business.
2,3. Investment Form
All forms of Islamic partnership capital, with the sole exception of the credit
partnership {sharikat al-wujuh), require that the investment be on hand (al-mal
hadirah) in order for the contract to be valid and effective. The situation is somewhat
more flexible in a mudarabah because the contract is still valid even if the capital is
not in the investor's hand but is on deposit with someone or owed to him by another
party.30
In the case of deposit, the investor may instruct the agent-manager to collect his
money from the depositor and use it as capital for mudarabah or he may directly
arrange with the depositee to change the status of his capital from that of deposit to
that of a mudarabah investment.31 Similarly, in the case of a debt, the investor may
empower the agent-manager to collect it from the debtor and to use the money
Mabsuf, vol. XXII, p. 19; al- Sawi, Bulghat al-Salik, Vol. Ill, p. 79.
30 Mabsut, Vol. XXII, p. 29; Wahbah, Vol. IV, p. 845.
31 Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, p. 29.
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collected as a mudarabah investment.32
It is not permissible if a creditor asks the debtor to use the amount of money
owed as a muddrabah investment, because a muddrabah contract cannot be formed
with a debt. A muddrabah contract can be formed only on the basis of capital whose
origin is absolutely free of liability.33
Maliki jurists, on the other hand, consistently reject the conversion of a deposit
into a muddrabah investment or the collection of a debt owed to the investor in order
to use the collected money as a basis ofmuddrabah investment .This is because they
consistently disqualify the formation of the muddrabah contract from another
commercial arrangement such as loans and deposits. In other words, they do not
allow any extraneous operations and procedures in the formation of the muddrabah
contract.34
Investment in cash.
All jurists are unanimous concerning the eligibility of dinars (gold) and dirhams
(silver) currency in whatever shape or form for investment in a muddrabah contract
32
Ibid, pp. 29. 58 - 59; Wahbah, Vol. IV, p. 845; This arrangement combines a transfer of debt contract
(hawalah) with that of muddrabah. Al-Hawalah, literally, implies "transfer". Legally, it is an agreement
by which a debtor is freed from a debt by another becoming responsible for it, or the transfer of claim of
a debt by shifting the responsibility from one person to another. See Lisan, Vol. XI, p. 190; Lane, Vol.1,
p. 677; Muhalla, Vol.VIII, p. 108; Sahnun. Vol. XIII, pp.288 - 294; Bidayah, Vol.II, pp. 224 - 225; Fath
£?.,Vol. V, p.443; Hash. A., Vol. IV, p. 300; M. Muhtaj, Vol.11, p. 193; Mughni, Vol. IV, p.528; Qincf,
Vol. Ill, p. 370; Schacht, Introduction, p. 148.
33 Shaybani. Asl. fol. 48a; Wahbah, Vol. IV, p. 845.
34 Sahnun. Vol. X_II. p. Mukhtasar. p. 189; Bidayah. Vol. II. p. 179; See also Ibn Juzayy, al-Qawanin,
p. 243; al-Ququbi, al-Kafi. p. 384.
78
just as in the case of the investment form of partnership contract.35 The validity of
a mudarabah contract with dinars and dirhams is accepted because they possess
intrinsic value and as such are recognizable as legal tender at all times and in all
places.36 It is, therefore, self-evident that they should be eligible for investment in any
and all commercial transactions.
Al-Shaybani, however, on the basis of istihsan (juristic preference) is of the
opinion that a mudarabah contract can be formed with fulus (copper coins) just as
with gold or silver currency since the former are currency comparable to dinars and
dirhams,37 and because they are in circulation and accepted as currency.38
Based on this consideration, non-circulation copper coins are excluded from
eligibility as capital in mudarabah investment. Furthermore, they are held to be
commodities and not currency and hence ineligible for mudarabah investment.39
From the above principle, any type of currency that is accepted and recognized
as a medium of exchange in the economic transactions is valid for investment in
mudarabah contract.40 Thus, for example, zuyuf and bahraj coins41 were valid for
15
Mabsuf. Vol. XXII, p. 21; Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 178; Mukhtasar, p. 189; N. Minhaj, p. 154; Wahbah, Vol.
IV, p. 843; Udovitch, Introduction, p. 152; Kasani. Vol. VI, p. 82.
36 Mabsul, Vol. XXII, p. 21; Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 82; Wahbah, Vol. II, p. 843; Udovitch, Partnership, p.
177.
37 MabsuU Vol. XXII, p. 21.
3t! Ibid.
39 Mabsup Vol. XXII, p. 21; Maliki and Shafici jurists absolutely disqualify copper coins (fulus) for
mudarabah contract Jrecause they are not accepted as currency. See M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 310; Sahnun,
Vol. XII. p. 86; Wajiz, Vol. II, p. 221.
40 KasanT, Vol. VI, p. 82.
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investment in a mudarabah contract because they were accepted as a medium of
exchange and a system of currency.42 On the other hand, lead dirhams was invalid
for that purpose since they are counterfeit, spurious coins which was in fact
commodities, of the same category as raw lead or raw brass. For this reason they are
unacceptable as a medium of exchange for any transaction.41
Investment in goods (curud)
There are two general considerations underlying the rejection of goods and
commodities for investment in a mudarabah contract.44 The first is the opposition to
uncertainty and unjustified enrichment which permeates the entire Islamic law of
obligations.45 The second consideration is that the object of any contract must be
determined (maclum), i. e. clearly known and defined.46
In explaining the inadmissibility of goods and commodities as capital in a
mudarabah contract, al-Kasani says that mudarabah with goods leads to uncertainty
concerning the amount of the profit at the time of division. This is so because the
value of the goods is known only by estimation, chance and conjecture and will differ
41
The Lisan al-'Arab describes both type of currency as bad and sub-standard dirhams (silver coins).
However, :uyufand bahraj dirhams, while debased coins of low and poor silver content, were nevertheless
accepted for most transactions. Lisan. Vol. II, p. 217.
42 KasanT, Vol.VI, p. 82.
43 Kasani. Vol. VI. p. 82.
44 For the inadmissibility of goods as capital for mudarabah investment, see Mabsuf. Vol. XXII, p.33; Muw
pp. 450 - 451; Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 87; Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 82; M Muhtaj, Vol. ii, p. 310.
45 Schacht, Introduction, p. 114.
4(' Ibid, p. 147; Wahbah. Vol. IV, p. 844.
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with the difference of those who do the estimating. Furthermore, uncertainty in the
value of goods leads to the undesirable possibility of dispute and discord between the
investor and the agent-manager.4.
Besides that, the possible fluctuation in their value may lead to the even more
undesirable result of inequitable advantage to one of the parties and disadvantage to
the other.48 Since the profit in a mudarabah arrangement emerges only after the
capital has been returned to the investor, any marked rise in the market value of
goods serving as the basis of the mudarabah contract would cancel out any profit for
the agent-manager. At the same time, if the market value of the goods droped, it
would put the investor at a disadvantage and provide the agent-manager with
unjustified profit.49
The legal school which purportedly permitted goods as mudarabah capital is that
of Ibn Abi Layla,50 although a similar position is attributed by al-Sarakhsi to Malik.
Malik said:
Mudarabah with goods is valid because a commodity is an estimable property
which is usually relied upon in trade. As far as the purpose of the mudarabah
is concerned, it is equivalent to currency. For just as it is permissible at
completion for the capital to be in the form of goods, so it is permissible for
it to be in this form at its beginning.51
Flowever, no source is given for this opinion and in al-Muwa({a' and in subsequent
47
See Kasani. Vol. VI. p. 82; see also Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 178; Wahbah, Vol. IV, p. 843.
4* Sahnun. Vol. XII, p. 87.
4" Mabsut. Vol. XXII, p. 33.
50 Ibid, p. 38; Bidayah, Vol. II. p. 178.
51 Mabsut, Vol. XXII. p. 33; Cf. Kasani, Vol. VI, p.82.
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major works, the opposite position is taken. Malik said:
The qirad (muddrabah) is valid only if the investment is in the form of either
gold or silver. It may not consist of any goods (vurud) or merchandise (silac).52
According to Maliki law, as well as in Hanafi law, it is possible to form a
muddrabah contract with merchandise and goods by means of a simple legal device,
namely that an investor may entrust goods to an agent-manager and instruct him to
sell them and use the cash realized from the sale as the capital in a muddrabah
investment at a mutually agreed division of the profit.53
This solution all but nullifies the force of the prohibition against goods as capital
in the muddrabah contract. The exceptional case is that in which the invested goods
are not to be sold, and proceeds of their sale employed in further trade, but are
instead to be used in some manufacture or service capacity.
2.4. Conduct ofMudarabah
The most problematic aspects of the operation of the muddrabah received in the
legal sources are those concerned with the agent's conduct of muddrabah trade. By
far the largest portion of the legal discussion is devoted to elaborating and defining
the extent of the agent-manager's freedom of action and clarifying his relationship to
the investor and to third parties. These discussions take place within the same
52
See Muw Y., p. 448.
53 Muw Y., Vol. II, p. 451; Mabsu/, Vol. XXII. pp. 22. 36 - 37; Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 87. Al-Khassaf also
makes a suggestion that the investor can sell his goods for cash to a party whom he trusts, and then hand
over the proceeds to the agent-manager who can immediately repurchase them for a muddrabah contract,
see Kitab al-Hiyal wa al-Makharij. Edited by J. Schacht, Hanover, 1923, p. 27
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framework of those concerning the rights and duties of a partner in his conduct of
partnership business.
It is interesting to note that there are a number of guidelines on the agent's
freedom of actions. Generally, his actions must be consonant with the overall purpose
of the contract, namely, that of achieving of profit and it must fall within the bounds
of recognized and customary commercial practice.
More specifically, his freedom of action depends on the type of mandate he
receives from the investor and whether or not any specific conditions or limitations
are imposed at the time the contract is negotiated. An agent's conduct of mudarabah
trade can be in the form of a limited or unlimited mandate.
2.4.1. Unlimited Mudarabah
In the case of unlimited mudarabah, the investor (rabb al-mal) authorizes the
agent to act completely at the latter's discretion in all business matters. Such
authorization is conveyed by the investor's statement to the agent: "Act with it (the
investment) as you see fit".54
There are nine types of business activities authorized to the agent-manager in
unlimited mudarabah mandate, as follows;
1. To buy and sell all types of merchandise as he sees fit;
2. To buy and sell for cash and credit;
54
Mabsuf. Vol.XXII. pp. 39 - 40; Cf. Maj 'Adliyyah, arts. 1416 and 1417.
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3. To leave goods as a deposit or pledge (rahn);
4. To hire helpers as needed;
5. To rent or buy animals and equipment;
6. To travel with capital;
7. To mingle the mudarabah capital with his own resources;
8. To invest the mudarabah capital in a mudarabah with a third party;
and
9. To invest the mudarabah capital in a partnership (sharikah) with a
third party.55
In other words, an unlimited mudarabah mandate is when the agent-manager
(.mudarib) is authorized to do everything necessitated by the mudarabah56 in the
ordinary course of business or the customary practice of the merchants.57 Such a
contract does not specify the period, the place of business, the specific time of
business, nor the industry or service and the suppliers or customers to be dealt with.
Al-Sarakhsi notes that the agent-manager thereby has the right to engage in a
mudarabah contract with a third party and to mingle the mudarabah capital with his
own capital, because this is the practice of the merchants.58
Unlimited mudarabah authorizes the agent-manager to use the widest techniques
55
See refs. no. 54. above; For details, see cAli Haydar,_Durar al-Hukkam Sharh Majallat al-Ahkdm.
(Translated into Arabic from Turkish by Fahmi ai-Flusayni), Baghdad and Beirut, n.d., pp. 465 - 469.
56 A loan is excluded from the practice of the merchants, because it is regarded as a favour on the part of
the lender, not as a commercial transaction from which some advantage can be expected. See Mabsuf, Vol.
XXII, pp. 39 - 40.
57 Ibid.
5# Ibid; See also Kasani, Vol. VI, pp. 7-8.
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of commerce he may employ in the pursuit of profitable trade. He is permitted to
transmit this unlimited mandate to a second agent-manager, and the second agent-
manager is equivalent in this respect to the original agent-manager.59
This type of unlimited mudarabah contract opens the way for its use as an
instrument of financial entrepreneurship. Capital could be entrusted to a well-known
and experienced trader (agent-manager) who could then skillfully reinvest it with
others, sharing in the profit.
In the absence of any blanket authorization, the agent-manager's freedom of
action is somewhat restricted, especially with regard to transactions with third parties.
If the investor does not use the phrase, "act according to your judgement" or a
substitute phrase conveying the same intention, the agent-manager may engage in all
business transactions as long as the goal is the achievement of profit, except in any
practice involving mingling the capital with his own resources, investing it in a
mudarabah or partnership with a third party.60
In this regard, The Malikis rule that the agent-manager is entitled to invest the
capital with any party on mudarabah contract only with the permission of the
investor.
Malik spoke about an agent-manager who took qirad money from a man (the
investor) and then gave it to another man (the second agent-manager) to use
as a qirad without the consent of the investor. He said :"The agent-manager
is responsible for the property. If it is decreased, he is responsible for the
loss. If there is a profit, the investor has the stipulation of the profit and then
59
Mabsul, Vol. XXII, pp. 39 - 40.
60 Mabsu/. Vol. XXII, pp. 38 - 39.
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the agent-manager has the stipulation of what remains.61
The ShafTis have a different regulations on the question of the two-tier
mudarabah, whereby the agent-manager is not allowed to enter into a mudarabah
contract with another party regardless of getting express permission or not of the
investor. The contract is regarded as void if it has been done.62 Despite the general
trend of the Shaffis school to disallow this kind of arrangement, there are certain
ShafTi jurists such as al-Shirazi who held that such practices were be allowed.63
2.4.2. Limited Mudarabah
In a limited mandate mudarabah contract, the agent-manager's freedom of action
is regulated by the terms and conditions set by the investor. For example, the
agreement may specify the period or the place of business or the specific line of trade
or industry or service or the supplier or customers to be dealt with by the agent-
manager. The agent-manager must respect those restrictions imposed by the investor.
If the agent-manager goes beyond what is permitted and acts contrary to the
restrictions imposed, he alone is responsible for the consequences.64
Thus, even in a limited mandate mudarabah contract, the agent-manager's
freedom of action extends almost unto the commercial horizons in which he
functioned. The only criterion for the legitimacy of the agent-manager's actions is the
61
Muw Y, p. 452.
62 IVaji:, Vol. I, p.223.
63 Shirazi, Vol. I, p. 540.
64 Mabsul, Vol. XXII. p. 47.
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customary practice of the merchants.67
This standard is applied with remarkable consistency to all the agent-manager's
activities even to the point of bending and adopting rules of law to the requirements
of the marketplace. For example, the agent-manager possesses the right to pay off a
mudarabah debt with the mudarabah capital, so too does he possess the right to give
it as a pledge (rahn),bb for this is part of the practice of the merchants. In other
words, as long as matters are part of the practice of the merchants, the agent-
manager's freedom of actions concerning the disposition of the mudarabah capital
is in the same category as that the owner of the capital (investor).67
Al-Sarakhsi points out that the conditions governing the muddrabah agent-
manager's actions differ from those applying to others who are entrusted with the
safekeeping and welfare of property other than their own. For example, a guardian
of the property of minors is restricted in the disposition of their property to
transactions which are unequivocally in the minor's better interests. The guardian or
father is not permitted to take risks in disposing of any of their property by accepting
65
Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, p. 47.
66 Al-Rahn (security; pledge; pawn) literally means readiness or immutability and durability. It also implies
that a thing is inseparable from or tied up with its acquisition, earnings and deeds. (See : J. Schacht,
"Rahn", EI(1), Vol. Ill, 1936. p. 1105; Lisan, Vol. XIII, pp. 188 - 189; Taj, Vol., XI, p. 221; Lane, Vol.
I, pp. 1172 - 1 173; Schacht, Introduction, p. 8). Legally, al-Rahn means to pledge or lodge a real or
corporeal property of material value, in accordance with the law as security for a debt or pecuniary
obligation.so as to make it possible for the creditor to regain the debt or some portion of the goods or
property. See : al-Tabari, Jami al-Bayan, Vol. XXIX, p. 165; al-Qur(ubi, al-JdmT li Ahkdm al-Qur'an,
Vol. XIX, p. 85; Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 135; Origin, p. 186; Umm, Vol. Ill, pp. 141 - 142; Ibn Athir, Vol.
I, p. 422; I'lam, Vol. 1, p. 478; Muhalla, Vol. VIII, p. 88; Biddyah, Vol. II, pp. 204 - 205; Sahnun, Vol.
XIV, pp. 296 - 340.
67 Mabsuf, Vol. XXII. p.47.
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a hawalahb% with a person who is less prosperous than the purchaser. This is because
the transactions of the guardian or father are restricted by the condition of that which
is best and most advantageous.69 By contrast, a mudarabah agent-manager is not
restricted by any similar condition, but only by that which is the customary practice
of the merchants.70
The Hanafis' concept of the scope of the agent-manager's freedom of independent
action with the mudarabah capital as discussed above is different from other schools
of Islamic law. According to the Malikis71 and Shaficis,72 the agent-manager's task
is the achievement of profit primarily by means of buying and selling for cash. In
their view, the right to engage in any other transactions73 does not inhere in the
mandate the agent-manager receives from the investor.74 In other words, if engaging
in any other transactions relating to business without getting prior express permission
from the investor, the agent-manager is subject to liability for the investment in case
of loss.75
6S
See refs. no. 32, above.
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MabsuU Vol. XXII. p. 47.
70 Ibid.
71 Sahnun, Vol. XII, pp. 103 - 123.
72 M. Muhtdj, Vol. II, p. 315.
73 Without the express permission of the investor, the agent-manager is not permitted: (a) to sell mudarabah
goods on credit; (b) to accept a hawalah in payment for them; (c) to entrust them as a bidetah to outside
parties; (d) to invest mutjarabah capital in a mudarabah or partnership with third parties; and (e) to leave
mudarabah capital as a deposit in extreme and extenuating circumstances. See Sahnun, Vol. XII, pp. 103 -





Commenting on business methods, al-Dimashqi said concerning mudarabah that
the agent-manager is not bound to idemnify the investor for accidental loss of the
investment so long as he does not go beyond the localities agreed upon.76
This does not apply to all mudarabah, it is only true for cases in which a
geographical limitation on the agent-manager's activities is specifically included in
the agreement. There are a number of specific restrictions that the investor could
impose on the agent-manager.
These specific limitations could appear in a limited as well as in unlimited
mandate mudarabah contract, and could be related to the place, object and method
of trade. The only requirement is that the restriction be a "beneficial stipulation",
(.sharf mufid), that is, a useful and beneficial condition from the investor's point of
77
view.
Al-Sarakhsi notes that the imposition of, for example, a geographical restriction
fulfils the notion of "beneficial stipulation", since the investor might consider it
desirable to have quick and direct access to his capital. In such a case, the agent-
manager may not move the capital out of the restricted area or transfer it to anyone
7,1
Abu Fadl Ja'far b. cAIi al-Dimashgi, Kitab al-Isharah Ila Mahasin al-Tijarah wa Mcfrifat al-Acrad wa
Radi'iha wa Ghushush al-Mudallasin Fiha. (Edited and Introduced by Fahmi Sa'd), Cairo, 1983 (First
edition 19620), pp. 1 - 30.
77 Mabsul, Vol. XXII. p. 40.
89
else who would do so. If he does so, he becomes liable for any loss.78
An explicit restriction to work only in a specific market or specific place in the
market is construed in an economic and not strictly geographic sense, i. e. as an
injuction to trade only at the general price level of that market. In this regard al-
Sarakhsi notes:
If the investor (sahib al-mal) entrusts him with a mudarabah on a
condition that he works with it in the market of Kufah, and the agent-
manager works with it in Kufah, but not in that place, then according
to analogy (qiyas) he is a violator and liable because he violated the
stipulation imposed upon him by the investor. But by istihsan, his
transactions are effective in mudarabah and he is not liable, because
a stipulation which is not beneficial is not taken into consideration,
and there is no benefit in confining his transactions to the market, for
the investor's intention applies to the price level of Kufah, not the
market itself; in any place in Kufah in which he transacts business, his
transactions conform to that which the investor has stipulated. If the
investor instructs him to work with the investment in the changer's
market and he work in a different market, or if he instructs him to
work in the house of so and so, and he works in some other place,
will he be liable? He will not be liable for anything in this connection
by reason of the unity of the city.79
In addition to this, the investor also has the right to impose restrictions on the
agent-manager's trading activity and trade policy. In the case of trading activity, the
investor may limit the agent-manager to buying and selling only a specific
commodity such as wheat and barley or to a category ofmerchandise such as textiles,
foodstuffs, etc.80 The general rule in a restricted mudarabah of trading activity is that
7*
Ibid.
79 Ibid., p. 45.
8(1 ShaybanT. fol. 58b; Mabsuf, Vol. XXII. p. 24.
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the agent-manager may do "anything that merchants engaged in that branch of trade
do".81
A restriction by the investor on the agent-manager's trade policy, for example,
designate the parties from whom the agent-manager is to buy goods and to whom he
is to sell them.82 Al-Sarakhsi notes that the imposition of binding restrictions on the
agent-manager's trade policy is a "beneficial stipulation" because people differ from
one another regarding their trustworthiness and reliability in fulfilling obligations, and
the investor has the right to protect his investment by confining the agent-manager's
transactions only to people in whom he has confidence.83
2.4.4. Two Agent-Managers.
The basic model for a mudarabah contract is an arrangement between one
investor and one agent-manager. There is no barrier, however, to a multiplicity either
of investors or of agent-managers in the same contract. In the latter case, the agent-
managers are considered as one with respect to the conduct of the mudarabah
business. If an investor hands over the capital to two agent-managers, instructing
them to "act in it according to their judgement", the agent-managers may act only in
accordance with mutual agreement and approval.84
1,1
Shaybani, fol. 61a, I. 16.
82 If the investor designates the agent-manager to sell only for credit, and not for cash, this restriction is
not binding. If the agent-manager then sells for cash, he does not become liable for the capital in his trust,
"because he has done better than he was asked. Moreover, al-Sarakhsi says that selling for cash is a more
efficacious means of attaining the primary purpose of the mudarabah. Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, p. 44.
83 Ibid. Vol. XXII, p. 46.
84 Ibid, p. 44.
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According to al-Sarakhsi, if either agent-manager acts independently without his
colleague's permission, he becomes liable to the investor for any loss. The rationale
underlying this rule, according to him, is that the investor, in choosing two or more
agent-managers, is entrusting his capital to their joint discretion, and since "the
opinion of one is not like the opinion of two",85 no independent unauthorized action
on the part of either agent-manager is permissible.86
Al-Shaybani notes that the only circumstance in which one agent-manager can
act without his colleague's permission is if he obtains permission from the investor,
for "the permission of the investor in this regard and the permission of the other
agent-manager are the same".87
2.4.5. Purchase and Sale
The agent-manager's freedom to invest and otherwise dispose of the mudarabah
capital is predicated on the assumption that this will be done responsibly and
reasonably. The agent-manager cannot be held liable for any loss resulting from a
reasonable use of the mudarabah funds. If, however, loss results from some
unreasonable transaction on the part of the agent-manager, he bears the liability for
that loss. In the case of buying and selling mudarabah property (capital), the criterion
of reasonableness is that by which people will be fooled.88 For example, if the agent-
85
Ibid.
86 Ibid. p. 46.
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Shaybani, fob 66b.
88 Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, p. 54.
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manager uses £1000.00 to purchase a commodity worth only £500.00 on the market
he becomes liable, because the difference between the purchase price and the worth
of the commodity is more than that by which people would normally be deceived.89
On the other hand, if the agent-manager uses the same sum (£1000.00) to
purchase goods worth nine hundred and fifty pounds, he is not held liable for the
difference because this is a slight deception {ghabnyasir) and is a misjudgement that
is easy to make.90
The same judgement also applies to the sale of mudarabah goods by the agent-
manager, that is, the difference between their original purchase price must not be
greater than the amount the people would normally be fooled by; otherwise, the
agent-manager is liable for the difference.91
The Malikis do not apply the standard of ghabn yasir to the agent-manager's
buying and selling activity. According to them, it is expected that he will exercise all
the skills necessary to protect the capital entrusted to him. If he is clearly negligent
in this respect, he will become liable for any loss that might occur; for example, if
an agent-manager purchases some merchandise and pays the seller for it, and then,
when he wishes to take possession of the goods, the seller denies that he has received
the price from him, the agent-manager becomes liable on the ground that he caused
8"
Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, p. 54.
90 Ibid: Mughni, Vol. V, p. 43.
91 This opinion is held by Abu Yusuf, al-Shafici and al-Shaybani. Abu Hanifah, however, is of the opinion
that any sale by the agent-manager is valid and binding on the mudarabah. See Shaybani, fol. 70a;
Mughni, Vol. V, p. 43.
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the loss of the investor's capital by failing to have the sale witnessed when he paid
the price.93
From the above, it is apparent that any other clear-cut cases of negligent and
careless business transaction would also make the agent-manager liable.
The agent-manager who is regarded as "representative in trade" possesses the full
range of options that any buyer or seller trading with his mudarabah capital would
have. In this regard, if the agent-manager sells some merchandise in which the
purchaser finds a fault, he has the right:
a. to deny that the fault exists;
b. to contest it, claiming that the fault came about after the goods were
sold; and
c. to appease the buyer either by reducing the price or by offering him
additional goods.93
In the case of absence of any fault or claim of fault from the buyer, the agent-
manager cannot offer a reduction from the regular price because according to al-
Shaybani, this is not part of trade; it is rather in the category of gift.94 If he does so,
he becomes liable and accountable to the investor, and the amount of the reduction
92
Sahnun. Vol. XII. p. 123.
93 Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, p. 57.
94 See Al-Shaybani, fol. 64b, 1.6. A gift is defined as an immediate and unqualified transfer of ownership
of a determinate object in the lifetime of the transferor without an equivalent ("iwad). See for example, M
Muhtaj. Vol. II, p. 396; Hash. A., Vol.IV, p. 530; Fath Q„ Vol. V, p. 113; Bidayah. Vol. II, p.248 - 249;
Vesey-Fitzgerald, S., Muhammadan Law : An Abridgement. Oxford and London, 1931, p. 201.
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is regarded as a debt of the agent-manager to the investor.95
2.4.6. Expenses.
The agent-manager is allowed to deduct all legitimate business expenses from the
capital entrusted to him to cover his personal needs such as food and clothing. The
limits of his freedom of deduction ofmudarabah capital are defined by its conformity
to the two criteria of customary commercial practice and the pursuit of profit. The
entire discussion of an agent-manager's personal expenses assumes that he will, in
fact, travel on behalf of the mudarabah investment. If the agent-manager does not
travel with the investment, but stays in his native town or with his family, he is not
entitled to cover any of his personal expenses from mudarabah funds.96 Since he does
not travel with it, his personal expenses are to be borne by himself.97
On the other hand, if the agent-manager travels with the mudarabah capital
entrusted to him to another place for the purpose of trading with it, then all his
personal expenses such as clothing, food and the cost of travel are to be taken from
the mudarabah investment.98 The duration of the travel and sojourn may last from six
months to several years or only from one to three days.99 In other words, the duration
of the travel of agent-manager depends on the completion of the business purposes.
95
Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, p. 47.
96 See Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 181; al-Qayrawani, al-Risalah, p. 477.
97 Shaybani. fols. 76a.l0 - 76b. I. I; Mughni, Vol. V, pp.41-42.
98 Hash. A., Vol.IV. p. 512; Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 106; Biddyah, Vol. II, p. 181; Qinff, Vol. II, p. 265.
99 Mabsuf, Vol. XXII. pp. 62 - 63; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 64.
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The rationale behind this procedure is custom, for the agent-manager's departure
and travel are on behalf of the mudarabah capital. He may not normally undertake
this kind of hardship for the sake of an uncertain profit which he may or may not
achieve, and then pay his personal expenses from his own money. However, he is
willing to undertake such hardship with a view to the benefit that might accrue to
him. This will not come about except by taking the sufficient personal expenses from
the mudarabah investment.100
The explanation of the agent-manager's right to personal expenses from the
mudarabah investment reflects one of the basic features of the contract which make
it a practical and efficient instrument for profitable long-distance trade and business.
While every agent-manager in a mudarabah contract is entitled to have his
expenses for food, clothing and cost of travel covered by the mudarabah capital by
virtue of commercial custom, the quality of the food and clothing, and the comfort
with which he travels are determined by his social status.101 Examples of how the
agent-manager's social status affect his expenses are not elaborated in the legal texts.
Nevertheless, the social and commercial standing of the agent-manager must have
been of considerable practical importance vis a vis his expenses.
The jurists are thoroughly consistent in their view of the division of the risks and
investment in the mudarabah contract and it must be carried out to its ultimate
conclusion. In this regard, al-Sarakhsi responds that if the agent-manager is not given
l0"
Mabsuf, Vol. XXII. pp. 62 - 63; Wahbah, Vol. IV. p. 865.
101 Sahnun, Vol. XII, pp. 92 - 94; Mabsu/, Vol. XXII, p. 63; Wahbah, Vol. IV. p. 866; Udovitch.
Partnership, p. 233.
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his personal expenses from the mudarabah capital while engaged in trade and travel
on behalf of the mudarabah investment, the distribution of risks between the parties
involved would less equitable. As a result, the mudarabah arrangement will become
a less attractive and practical instrument for combining the capital and skills
necessary for the success of the business and trade.102
2.4.7. Invalid Mudarabah
Any invalid mudarabah (mudarabah fasidah) is treated as a hire contract
(ijarah); all profits accrue to the investor and all losses are borne by him.103 The
agent-manager's personal expenses, but not his business expenses are borne solely by
him, who in turn, as an employee, is entitled to an equitable wage (ajr al-mithl)}w
The grounds for declaring a mudarabah invalid are numerous, and can be
connected with almost any aspect of the contract. These include provisions for a non-
proportional division of profit, non- alienation of the investment on the part of the
investor (sahib al-mal), the agent-manager's violation of a legitimate restriction
placed on him by the investor, as well as many other circumstances. In all such cases,
the nature of the contract, i.e. the relationship of the parties involved has been
transformed. The investor's position becomes that of an employer and he is
responsible for his goods and property and all profit from the investment fully
102
Mabsu[, Vol. XXII, p. 67; Cf Sahnun, Vol. XII, pp. 92-94.
103 Al-Dardir, Al-Sharh al-Kabir, Vol. III. p. 519; Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 108; Mabsu{, Vol. XXII, p. 22;
Mughni. Vol. V, p. 65; M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 315; Hidayah, Vol. I, p. 388.
"M Mabsut. Vol. XXII, p. 67; Fath Q.. Vol. VII. p. 60; aj-Dardir, al-Sharh al-Kabir. Vol. Ill, p. 517; M.
Muhtaj. Vol. II, p. 313; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 34; al-Ramli, Nihayah al-Muhtaj ila Sharh al-Minhaj, Vol.
IV, Cairo, 1967, p. 165.
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accrues to him. On the other hand, the agent-manager's role is changed to that of a
simple employee and he is entitled to remuneration for his time and effort regardless
of whether his exertions on behalf of his employer are successful.105
2.4,8. Dispute Between Parties
If the agent-manager claims, without any evidence, that he has brought the profits
with the capital, the statement or testimony of the investor who claims that the agent-
manager has not yet returned the capital is accepted and the latter is entitled to
receive his capital. This, however, does not apply if the agent-manager is able to
provide evidence in support of his claim. In the latter case, the claim of the agent-
manager will be accepted.106
The claim of breach of contract by the investor or of being afflicted by a disaster
by the agent-manager is not accepted until evidence is produced.107 If the agent-
manager transgresses the contract, he is liable for repaying or replacing the capital
to the investor. It is considered that liability for repayment or replacement falls on
the agent-manager because he has been trusted to carry out the work.108 In this case,
if profits have been accrued in the business, they are to be shared as originally agreed
by both parties.109 It is also held that neither of them has the right to retain the
105
Mughni, Vol. V, p. 72; Wahbah, Vol. IV. pp. 851 - 852.
106 Musannaf Vol. VIII^p. 251; Muhalla, Vol. VIII, p. 249: Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 107; Mabsu/, Vol. XXII,
pp. 20 and 105: Mughni, Vol. V, p.54; Hash A., Vol. IV, p. 511.
107 Musannaf, Vol. VIII, p. 252.
108 Sahnun. Vol. XII, p. 116; Mughni, Vol. V, pp. 54 and 77; Musannaf Vol. VIII, pp. 252 - 253 & 255.
Mughni, Vol. V. p. 54; Musannaf, Vol. VIII, p. 252.
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profits from the venture in order to avoid further disagreement between the parties."0
If the investor sets conditions such as that the agent-manager should not make a
transaction involving certain conditions, and then the latter does not follow these
instructions for the best interest and benefit ofmudarabah transaction, he is not liable
for any repayment or replacement of the capital."1
2.5. Distribution of Profits and Liability for Loss
2.5.1. The Proportional Division of Profits.
The condition concerning how the proportion of the share of profits in a
mudarabah contract is to be divided between the parties involved is on the basis of
mutual agreement. Juridical precedent for these conditions is reported by Ibn Ishaq.
According to him, Khadijah proposed to the Prophet, before his prophethood, the he
should take her goods to Syria (al-Sham) and trade with them. She agreed that she
would pay him more than she paid others."2 This is evidence that the distribution of
profits in mudarabah contract between the investor and the agent-manager is in
accordance with what has been agreed upon by both parties at a specific point in
time.
This action was later conventionally recognized and followed in the case of
""
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111 Mughni, Vol. V, p. 54.
112 Ibn Hisham. al-Sirah al-Nabawiyyah, Vol. I, p. 172.
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mudarabah contracts. The proportional division ofprofits was followed and continued
by the Companions. cUmar b. al-KhaJtab, the second Caliph, made a contract of qirad
(mudarabah) with his sons , cAbd Allah and cUbayd Allah, by taking the principal
or capital and a half of the profit and giving them the other half of the profit.113
cUthman b. cAffan, the third Caliph, used to provide some money to his agent-
manager (mudarib) in a qirad transaction and they shared the profit between them.114
cAli b. Abi Talib was of the opinion that the proportional division of profit should
be divided in accordance with what had been agreed by the two parties in the
contract (al-ribh Lala al-mustalaha calayh).U5
In the fiqh literature, it is stated that all jurists are unanimous concerning the
distribution of profits in a mudarabah contract. They held that any proportional
division of profit agreed upon between an investor and agent-manager is
acceptable.116 The only requirement of a valid mudarabah contract is that the profit
should be distributed between both parties on the basis of proportions agreed upon
by them in advance as simple proportions of profit, i. e. one-half, one-third or one-
fourth, or a percentage, for example, 50 : 50; 70 : 30; 40 : 60 and 25 : 75.117
111
Muw Y. p. 446; Umm, Vol. IV, pp. 34 - 35; Suyuf, Tanwir al-Hawalik, Vol. II, p. 88; Cf Muzani,
Vol. VIII, p. 221.
114 Muw Y, p. 447; Suyuf, Tanwir, Vol. II, p. 88.
115 Musannaf, Vol. VIII, p. 248; Ibn Abi Shaybah, al-Musannaf, Vol. IV, p. 268; Muhalla, Vol. VIII, p.
126; Cf Mughni, Vol. V, pp. 30 - 31.
Jaziri. VoMII, discussion on mudarabah, (Hanafi view), p. 37; (Malik) view), p. 37; (Shafici view),
p. 46; (hanbali view), p. 43.
117 Zurqani, Vol. Ill, p. 158; Mughni, Vol. V, pp. 30 - 31; Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 303; al-Nawawi. al-
MajmiT, Vol. IX, pp. 64 - 65; S. Mizan, Vol. II, p. 92; al-Dardir, al-Sharh al-Saghir, Vol. II, p. 327.
100
If either party fixes a certain amount of profit for himself instead of a
proportional share of profit, for example £1000.00 out of profit or less than that or
more than that, and the rest is for the other party, the mudarabah contract will stand
nullified.118 The reason given is that such an arrangement easily leads to an
inequitable situation in which one party would get most or all the profits and the
other little or none."9
If a mudarabah contract is regarded as invalid because of either party fixing a
certain amount of profit, it is treated as regular hire (ijarah).no In this case, the agent-
manager is entitled to an equitable remuneration (ajr mithlihi) for his work, but
thereby disqualified from any share in the profit.121
According to Maliki law, if one person supplies capital to another in a
mudarabah arrangement and agrees that some of the profit will be exclusively for
himself and not for the agent-manager, the arrangement will not be valid, even if the
sum were fixed at only one dirham. The only valid form of agreement is that he
agrees to one-half or one-third or one-fourth or smaller than it or larger than it, for
IIK JL-.JIbid.
1,9 Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, p. 22.
120 Ijarah. literally, means substitute, compensation, recompense, idemnity, consideration, return or counter
value Ciwad). (See : Lane, Vol. I, p. 24; E. Tyan, "Idjara", EI(2), Vol. Ill, 1978, p. 1017). In Islamic law,
ijarah is a contract of proposed and known usufruct with a specific and lawful return or compensation for
the effort or work which has been expended). See : al-Qas(allani, Irshad al-Sari, Vol. IV, p. 126;
Zurqani, Vol. Ill, p. 368; Muw Y,_p. 578; Muhalla, Vol. VIII, pp. 182 - 183; Umm, Vol. IV, p. 26;
Kasani, Vol. IV, p. 174; al-Qur(ubi, al-Jamf li Ahkam al-Qur'an, Vol. XIII, pp. 270 - 271; Schacht,
Introduction, p. 154; Coulson. Commercial Law, p. 22; M Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 338; al-Qarafi, al-Furuq,
Vol. IV, p. 4; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 398; Qinff, Vol. Ill, p. 537; Hash A., Vol. IV, p. 110; Awfar, Vol. V,
p. 146.
121 Shaybani. fol. 43b, II. 13 - 14.
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himself and the remainder for the agent-manager.122 In this regard, al-Ghazali, the
Shaffi jurist, says:
If any of the two parties settles for a fixed sum of dirhams under
Sharikah (partnership) or mudarabah it shall not be legitimate.123
The provision of profit in the mudarabah agreement must be clearly spelled out.
However, Hanafi jurists exhibit a degree of flexibility in this regard, and validate
some such arrangements on the basis of istifjsdn.m For example, if a mudarabah
agreement mentions only the investor's share of the profit, but not that of the agent-
manager, it is acceptable on the basis of istihsan and the remainder of the profit is
distributed to the agent-manager.125
If no definite division of profit is mentioned, but the investor merely says to the
agent-manager, "On the condition that whatever God, may He be exalted, grants us
122
Sahnun. Vol. XII, p. 109.
123
Wajiz, Vol. I, p. 187; This is also the opinion of other Shaffi jurists that, when one party provides
capital and the other employs it in business : "it is necessary that the profit be reserved for them alone and
that they share it the share of every party is fixed as a given proportion of the whole ... if ten (dirhams)
have been agreed for one party, or if profit is agreed for him out of the gains from some particular
merchandise, the agreement shall become void". See for example Minhaj N, pp. 64 - 65.
124 Istihsan, literally, means to approve or to deem something preferable. In its juristic sense, istihsan
(juristic preference) is a method of exercising personal opinion in order to avoid any rigidity and unfairness
that might result from the literal enforcement of the existing law. It involves a departure from qiyas in
favour of an alternative ruling which serves the ideals of justice and public interest in a better way or
dispels hardship (raf al-haraj) and brings about ease to the people in achieving the objectives of the
SharTah. The departure to an alternative ruling in istihsan may be from an apparent analogy (qiyas jali)
to a hidden analogy (qiyas khafi), or to a ruling which is given in a nass, i. e. the Qur'an or the Sunnah
or the Consensus of community (ijmtf ) or custom of public interest. See Ibn al-cArabi, Ahkam al-Qur'an,
Vol. 11^Cairo. 1350 A. H., p. 57; Al-Shapbi. al-Muwafaqat fi Uful al-SharTah, Cairo^n. d., p. 208; Al-
Ghazali. al-Mustdjfa min 7Im al-Usul, Vol. I, Cairo, 1937, pp. 137, 138 - 139; al-Amidi, al-Ihkam fi Usui
al-Ahkam, Vol. IV, 1982, p. 157; Abu Zahrah. Usui al-Fiqh, Cairo, 1958, p. 207; Khallaf, 7Im Usui al-
Fiqh, Kuwait, 1978, p. 82; Agnides, Mohammedan, p. 73; Ahmad Hasan, The Early Development of
Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamabad, 1970, pp. 145 and 352; R. Paret, "Istihsan and Istislah", EI(2), 1978,
p. 256.
125 Shaybani. fol. 45a.
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will be between us", or if he says, "On the condition that we be partners in the
profit", then the mudarabah contract is valid and the profit is distributed equally
between them.126 Any unassigned portion of the profit will automatically revert to the
investor since it is profit on his capital. So, for instance, if one-half is agreed upon
to be distributed to the investor and one-third to the agent-manager, and no mention
is made of the disposition of the remaining one-sixth of the profit, it is given to the
• 127
investor.
A multiplicity of agent-managers or investors in one mudarabah contract does
not affect the principle of profit-sharing, as long as the flexibility of the proportion
of the division of the profit is assigned as in a simple mudarabah contract, i. e. with
one investor and one agent-manager.128 In a mudarabah contract with a multiplicity
of agent-managers, it is assumed that each of them will invest an approximately equal
amount of work and receive between them, an equal share of profit. This principle
is-applied in order to avoid one agent-manager receiving unjust profit from the work
of his colleague.129
However, in the case of a bilateral mudarabah, i.e. one in which both the agent-
manager and the investor contribute to the trading capital, the flexibility in assigning
the division of the profit is somewhat restricted. The investor's share must be limited
only to his contribution to the total capital, since there is no basis on which he can
126
Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, pp. 54 - 55; This is the opinion of Abu Yusuf; On the other hand, al-Shaybani
disagrees considering such an agreement invalid and treating it as a hire contract (ijarah). Ibid.
127 Sahnun, Vol. XII, pp. 89 - 90.
1211 Shaybani. fols. 49b - 50b.
I2" Sahnun. Vol. XII, p. 90.
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claim profit on capital he did not invest and with which he did not work. On the
other hand, the agent-manager is entitled to the entire profit on his own share of the
capital in addition to a share of the profit from the investor's contribution
(investment).130
2.5.2. Liability for Loss
Loss refers to a diminution or destruction of part of the property or capital and
will therefore be borne by the supplier of the capital (investor ; sahib al-mdl).m In
the event of loss incurred in the mudarabah contract in the ordinary course of
business, it must be charged against profits before it can be charged against the
equity of the investor.132
The concept of the agent-manager as a trustworthy party ( amin) is the
cornerstone upon which the structure of equity within the mudarabah contract rests.
He is required to work with honesty and sincerity and to exercise the maximum
possible care and precaution in the exercise of his functions.133 Any arrangement
130
Al-Dardir, al-Sharh al-Saghir, Vol. II, p. 231; Jaziri, Vol. Ill, p. 69.
131 Mabsu/, Vol.II, pp. 156-157; Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 178; Mughni, Vol, v, p.38; M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p.
309; al-Shaybani, al-Makharij fi al-Hiyal, p. 76; see also Ahmad al-Sharbasi, al-Mucjam al-Iqtisadi al¬
ls/ami, Cairo, 1981 p. 131.
132 Muw Y., p. 448; M.Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 309.
133 In the words of ai-Jaziri. the agent-manager should discharge his duties like "A muslim who does not
commit a breach of trust, does not lie and does not act insincerely; such is the man with whom the investor
will be at ease and in whom he will have confidence for the safety of his investments The investor
should not give his capital (funds) to someone who is unwary, spendthrift or untrustworthy, because the
care and safety of wealth are imperatives and its waste and dissipation are prohibited". See Jaziri, vol. Ill,
pp. 48 - 49.
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involving the agent-manager's liability for the loss would be void and
unenforceable.134
The general principle is that under a mudarabah contract, a working partner
(agent manager/ mudarib) who is not investing his capital in the business is not
liable for any loss.135 This means that the investor gets the profit by risking his
capital in the venture while the agent-manager gets the profit by risking his time and
effort. This is probably the reason why mudarabah is sometimes referred to as
"partnership in profit" or "profit-sharing".136
There is no difference of opinion among jurists regarding the liabilities for loss
in mudarabah contracts. The Malikis,137 Hanafis,138 ShafTis139 and Hanbalis140 are
unanimously agreed on the principle that the man who actually engages in business
('amil; mudarib/) will not be made liable for the loss of any part of the capital
invested, on condition that the loss is not due to any misdeed on his part.141
134
Mughni, Vol. V, p. 76; Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 178.
135 Muw Y„ p. 450.
136 See the suggestion and comment made by M. N. Siddiqui on "The Report of The Pakistan Council of
Islamic Ideology on The Elimination of Interest from The Economy", in Ziauddin Ahmad, et. al.(eds.),
Money and Banking In Islam, Islamabad, 1983, p. 225.
137 See Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 178; see also Zurqani, Vol. Ill, p. 158.
13,1 Mabsul, Vol.XI, pp. 156-157; For a greater details given by Hanafi jurists, see Kasani, Vol.VI, pp. 82-
84: Hiddyah. Vol. III. pp. 202-215.
I3'' See for example M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 309; Minhaj N., p. 156.
I4" Mughni, Vol. V, p. 38.
141
Bidayah±Vo\. II, p. 178; M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 309; Mabsul, Vol. XI, pp. 156-157; Jaziri, Vol.11, p.
34; Mughni. Vol. V. p. 38.
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Behind this principle lies the idea ofjustice and fairness for the purpose of labour
and business efforts joining hands with capital invested by the investor.The penalty
for causing a loss to the invested capital cannot justly be charged to the party
making the business effort. The agent-manager's loss lies in the fact that the failure
to add to the invested capital denies him all rewards for his business and management
efforts which have been wasted.
Once the original investment has increased as a result of the agent-manager's
activities, the latter is considered a part-owner (sharik) of the capital even if the
mudarabah is still ongoing. The agent-manager's ownership consists of that sum
which would constitute his share of the profit were the mudarabah to be concluded
at that moment. Consequently, in the case of loss , the agent-manager, not the
investor, would be liable for the share.142
The liability of the investor {sahib al-mat) in a mudarabah contract is limited to
the extent of his contribution to the capital only.143 This is an important point because
it would not be appropriate for the investor to be a 'sleeping partner' if his liability
were unlimited.144
As a matter of precaution, in order to ensure that the investor's liability does not
exceed the sum he has entrusted to the agent-manager, the agent-manager's trading
activities may be placed under certain restrictions. For example, the agent-manager
142
Sahnun, Vol. XII, p. 99.
143 Mughnl. Vol. V, p. 37 - 38 & 68.
144 Ibid.
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is not allowed to amplify or negotiate a loan for mudarabah (istidanah; incurrence
of debt).145
If the agent-manager exceedes these bounds by, for instance, negotiating a loan
(iistidanah)Ub for mudarabah over and above the capital invested by the investor, he
alone becomes liable for any sum in excess of the mudarabah capital and he is also
eligible for all the profits from his extra mudarabah commitment.147
Besides that, the agent-manager cannot, at the mudarabah's expense, alter or
improve any of the goods he has purchased if their acquisition alone has required all
the available capital.148 For example, if he invests the entire amount of capital in cloth
and then improves it by having it dyed or otherwise, he is regarded as having altered
the mudarabah's, expense.149
• The agent-manager is allowed to do istidanah (that is to incur debt in excess of
the mudarabah capital) only with an express authorization by the investor. However,
there is a difference between the status of goods (merchandise) bought with the actual
mudarabah capital and those procured above that amount. Goods bought on the
basis of credit authorized by the investor, above and beyond the total amount of
mudarabah capital are not subject to the principle of ownership and liability in
145
Mabsut, Vol. XXII, p. 75.
146 Istidanah is the commercial commitment of the mudarabah by the agent-manager in excess of the
capital entrusted to him by the investor.
147 Sahnun, Vol. XII. pp. 94-97.
14,1 Sahnun, Vol. XII, 94-97.
149 Mabsut, Vol. XXII. p. 75.
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mudarabah contracts.150 The ownership, risk and profit are jointly shared by the
investor and agent-manager, thus in practice constituting a credit partnership.151
Based on the above discussion, it can be said that with the investor's
authorization to engage in istidanah, the agent-manager would be in a position to take
advantage of various promising commercial opportunities that might require a larger
volume of capital than that furnished by the investor. By using the actual mudarabah
investment as a base, he would probably find himself in a more favourable position
to obtain credit and thus to increase the profitable returns of the business.
If the agent-manager also contributes a specified amount to the capital of the
mudarabah, he takes the entire profit related to his portion of the total capital, the
balance of the profit being as agreed. The loss, if any, would be divided between
them in proportion to their share in the total capital.152
2.5.3. Method of Settlement of Accounts
All jurists agree that normally the profit or loss in a mudarabah arrangement is
to be determined at the termination of the business, that is after the settlement of the
accounts and the original capital has been set apart.153 There is also no difference of
150 ShaybanT, fol. 175b, 11. 9ff.
151 See, A. L. Udovitch, " Credit as a means of Investment in Medieval Islamic Trade", JAOS, Vol. 87,
1967, pp. 260-264; Idem, "Reflections on The Institutions of Credit and Banking In The Medieval Islamic
Near East", SI, Vol. 41, 1975, pp. 5 - 23.
152 JazirT, Vol. Ill, p. 69.
Bidayah, Vol.II, p. 181; Mughni. Vol.V. p. 57; Mabsut, Vol.XXII, p. 20; Wajiz, Vol.1, pp. 225-226;
Jaziri, Vol. Ill, pp. 61 - 62.
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opinion among jurists that the agent-manager (mudarib) takes his share of the profit
only when all the capital invested in the enterprise has been repaid to the investor
(rabb al-maT) in the form of cash154 or in the form of a legal transfer.155
The question arises here whether it is legitimate or not to share out any profit
that appears before the termination of business, and whether any profit so shared out
becomes wholly and permanently the property of the party to whom it is given or is
only temporarily his property. In this regard, the majority of jurists hold that profit
is recognised and its ownership is proved only after the termination of business, the
settlement of accounts and the originally-invested capital has been returned to the
investor156 Accordingly, it is illegitimate to share out any profit that appears (in the
running business) before the settlement of accounts.
The principle mentioned is that the validity of distribution of profit is conditional
upon the repossession of the investor's original capital. Hence, the distribution of
profit before the repossession of the original investment by the investor is invalid. If
profit has been declared before this, any such distribution would be taken as only an
interim arrangement.157 The distribution of such profit would become valid only after
the investor's original capital had been repaid, otherwise it could be treated as void.158
IM
Bidayah, Vol. 11, p. 181; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 57.
155 cAli al-Khafif. al-Sharikat fi al-Fiqh al-Islami, p. 86.
156 This is the opinion of the majority of jurists. See, for example Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 181; Jaziri, Vol. Ill,
pp.61-62 ; Kasani, Vol. VI. p. 107; Mabsuf, Vo. XXII, p. 20.
157 Jaziri. Vol. 111. pp. 61 - 62.
158 Ibid.
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Hanbali jurists also agree with the principle stated above with minor differences
of emphasis. In their view too, profit should be distributed on the termination of
business and after the invested capital has been repaid to the investor (rabb al-
mal)}59 They, however, find that there is no fault if profit accrues during the running
of business, and with the consent of the investor, the agent-manager is given some
instalment of profit on an ad hoc basis.160 If there is a loss in the final accounting,
the agent-manager may, in order to make it good, have to surrender the ad hoc
payment of profit to the investor.161
In a case, where, in a mudarabah contract, profit has been shared out while the
working partner is still in possession of the originally-invested capital and that
mudarabah contract is terminated and replaced by a new mudarabah contract, at this
point the share out of profit already effected would be regarded as final and the
agent-manager would not be required to return what had been paid to him.162
In this regard, the author of the Hidayah writes:
If mudarabah operates as usual but the parties have distributed profit
and after that a part of the capital is lost, both must return the profit,
so that the capital-owner (investor) may be repossessed in full of his
investment. Distribution of profit before repayment of invested capital
is not correct. That is because capital is the basis of profit which rests
upon it and profit is subject to capital.163
I5)
Mughni, Vol.V, p. 57.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.\ cAli al-Khafif, al-Sharikat fi al-Fiqh al-Islami, p. 86.
162 JazirT, Vol. Ill, p. 61-62.
163 Hiddyah. Vol. III. pp. pp. 209 - 210.
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Some modern scholars164 opine that in the case of a mudarabah contract
continuing in operation for a long time, it would be easier and in the interest of the
parties themselves for the distribution of profit to be permitted before the termination
of the business, especially if the agent-manager is not able to continue the business,
(possibly his only source of income), if he gets nothing out of it for a long time.
From the above discussion, it is clear that there is nothing wrong if muddrabah
business is showing profit and some amounts are taken out of the profit with the
permission of the investor. This provisional payment given to the agent-manager is
subject to the final settlement of claims at the termination of the business.
The parties entitled to profit from a muddrabah business can claim their mutually
agreed share of profit only when the investor who supplied the original capital has
had his investment returned to him in full, whether in the form of cash or in the form
of legal transfer.165
Accordingly, the notion of restoration of the original capital to the investor before
the profit is to be distributed to the parties involved in a muddrabah contract is the
transformation of that original capital into cash given into the hands of the investor
that gives him the right to dispose it in any manner he likes,166 for example, to spend
it or save it or re-invest it by entering into a new muddrabah agreement with the
164
For example M.N. Siddiqui, Partnership and profit-sharing in Islamic Law, Leicester, 1985, p. 35.
165 Bidayah, Vol. II, p. 308; MughnJ, Vol. V. p. 57; Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, p. 20; KasanT, Vol. VI, p. 107;
Minhaj N., p. 155.
166 See for example, Mabsuf, Vol. XXII, p. 20; Jaziri, Vol. Ill, pp. 61 - 62; Kasani, Vol. IV, p. 77; al-
Dardir, al-Sharh al-Saghir. Vol. II, p. 235.
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same party or parties. This is the more practical view from the standpoint of business
efficiency and facility of transactions. Furthermore, it leaves no room for a dispute
to arise.
Most transactions in the modern age are done with money deposited into banks.
The amount of money that exists in a person's bank account is possessed by him
exactly as the amount that he has in hand . Based on modern business transactions,
if a person enters into a mudarabah contract with a bank, it would be sufficient, as
regards concluding the agreement and the distributing of profit, that the original
capital be credited to his account. The owner will be able, without withdrawing this
money and without taking physical possession of it, to enter a new mudarabah
contract with the bank. In our time, it is also possible for him to enter a sharikah or
mudarabah contract with this money with some other parties and direct the bank, by
means of a cheque, to transfer the money to the new business partner.
2.6. Termination of Mudarabah Contract
In the juristic sources, very little attention is paid to the manner in which a
mudarabah contract is to be concluded. The mudarabah contract would become
dissolved by means of its natural conclusion or at the completion of the venture for
which it was undertaken or the expiring of the specified time mentioned in the
agreement. In this case, the investor and the agent-manager presumably settle their
accounts, divide their profits and happily conclude their association.167
"'7
SeeyShaybani, fols. 134b - 135a;_M/M- Y.„ p. 455: M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 319; Mughni, Vol. V, p. 64;
Kasani, Vol. VI, p. 77 & 109; Jaziri. Vol. IV, pp. 872 - 873.
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In the case of unsuccessful business, the agent-manager would return to the
investor his capital or whatever portion of it was not lost.168 Beside this, there are a
number of occurrences which automatically and instantaneously put an end to a
mudarabah contract. Among these are the decision of either party to the agreement
to withdraw.169 death'70 and insanity.171
The majority of the jurists are agreed that a mudarabah contract automatically
terminates on the death of either party.172 The grounds for this termination are that
the capacity to own and transact business ends with the death of either party,
irrespective of whether the other party is aware of the death or not.173 Furthermore,
mudarabah contracts entail agency (wakalah) and the wak.il ends with the death of
the investor or agent-manager.174 Maliki jurists, however, hold that the death of either
party will not automatically terminate a mudarabah contract if it is continued by a
competent, honest and sincere heir of the deceased.17"
Right to terminate mudarabah contract
168
M. Muhtdj, Vol. II, p. 320; Mughni, Vol. V, pp. 66 - 67.
169 M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 319. Mughni, Vol. V, p. 64.
170 Mughni, Vol. V, p. 66.
171 Ibid, pp. 64 & 66.
172
IVajiz, Vol. I. p. 225; Mughni, Vol, V. pp. 64, 66 - 67; M. Muhtdj, Vol. II, p. 319; al-Dardir, al-Sharh
al-Saghir, Vol. II, p. 136.
172 KasanT, Vol. VI, p. 78.
174 Ibid, p. 172; Wahbah, Vol. IV, pp. 872 - 873.
172 Al-Sawi. Bulghal al-Salik, Vol. III. p. 99: see also Wajiz, Vol. I, p. 225; Wahbah, Vol. IV, p. 873.
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The majority of jurists also agree that in fixed term contracts or even before the
work of the agent-manager has actually started, either party has the right to wind up
the agreement at any time.176 Their view is not based on any explicit text in the
Qur'an or in the traditions; it is rather based on the convenience of the parties
involved and is meant to secure their freedom of transaction.177 Nevertheless, the
mudarabah contract can be continued as normal in favour of the remaining parties
despite the separation of one party in a mudarabah contract involving several parties
according to the predetermined conditions.178
The Maliki jurists, however, hold the view that completion of business is a
necessary condition for the termination of the contract. For example, if the agent-
manager is on a journey in order to sell his merchandise, the contract will be
terminated only after sale of the goods, as completion of the act of business, and
not before it.179
It seems that the view of the Maliki jurists who stipulate completion of business
as a necessary condition for the termination of contract cannot be agreed. The
principle to be upheld is that every party is always free to terminate the contract and
this freedom should be restricted only to the degree necessary to avoid prejudice to
the interests of other parties.
176
Mughni, Vol. V, p. 64-65; Kasani, Vol.VI, pp. 77 & 112; M. Mutjtaj, Vol. II, p. 319; QincF, Vol. II,
p. 269; Fath Q, Vol. VII, p. 74; Hash. A.. Vol. IV, p. 510; Mabsut, Vol. XXII, p. 19.
177 See refs. no. 176, above.
I7X cAli al-Khafif, al-Sharikat fi al-Fiqh al-lslami, p.140.
I7'' Malik b. Anas, al-Muwatta', Vol. II, ed. Muhammad Fu'ad *bd al-Baqi, Cairo, 1992, p. 532.
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Conclusion
As has been discussed in the previous chapter, sharikah or partnership may not
fall into any one of the specific models mentioned above and may be a combination
of all three forms, and mudarabah also may not fall into the classical model. In a
real world situation, an investment company may be a combination of mudarabah
and sharikah where all partners contribute to the capital but not to the
entrepreneurship and management. In this form of partnership, profits accrued in the
business are not distributed in accordance with capital contributions, but may be
shared in any proportion agreed upon by the partners, depending on their contribution
to the success and profitability of the business. It seems that the only requirement of
the distribution of profits would be justice, which would imply that the proportional
shares in profit must reflect the contribution made to the business by the partners'
capital, skill, time, management ability, goodwill and contacts. The losses must,
however, be borne in proportion to capital contribution and the stipulation of any
other proportion would be unenforceable.
2.7. Quasi-Mudarabah Transactions
This topic will highlight some of the contracts that appear to be semi -mudarabah,
i. e. bay' al-murabahah and samsarah (brokerage) because of the existence in them
of some of its features, characteristics and similarities.
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2.7.1. Bayc al-Murabahahm (A resale at a specified surcharge or rate of profit,
on the stated original cost which represents the profit)
The word murabahah is derived from ribh which means gain, profit or
addition.181 Legally, it means a resale of goods or merchandise at a specified
surcharge or rate of profit which is mutually agreed upon between the purchaser and
the vendor (seller).182 The payment the of sale price, inclusive of the agreed profit
margin, may be immediate or deferred and either in a lump sum or in instalments.183
This type of transaction, which was often practised in pre-Islamic times'84 was not
mentioned by the Prophet and he did not say whether it was permitted or not.
However, some of the Companions initiated a discussion about bayc al-murabahah
. Basically partnership between investors and borrowers in profit-sharing re-sales was
allowed by the Companions. But cAbd Allah b. Mascud held that in this contract, the
idea of taking profits by putting a high price on goods in order to cover the cost of
180
There are four types of bayc that may be described from the point of view of their original cost or price
(ra's al-mal). Such classification of bay includes bay al-musawwamah, bay al-tawliyah, bay al-wad'Tah
and bay al-murabahah. Among them, the most common and popular form of bayc is bay" al-musawwamah
which is an ordinary sale and signifies sale for a price which is mutually agreed upon between the vendor
and the purchaser without any form of reference to the purchase price. The second is bay al-tawliyah, i.
e„ resale at the stated original price (cost) with no profit or loss to the vendor. The third is called bay al-
wadtah which means resale at a discount from the original cost. The fourth is bay al-murabahahor fixed
profit sale since the original cost or purchase price is the starting point in this kind of bay. Jaziri, Vol.
II, p. 148.
m Lisan, Vol. II, pp. 442 - 443; Taj, Vol. VI, p. 380; Lane, Vol. I, p.1009.
182 Bidayah. Vol. II, p. 161; M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 77; Fath Q., Vol. VI, pp. 494 and 496; Schacht,
Introduction, p. 154.
183 Nabil A. Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law. Cambridge, 1986, p.94.
184 Mufassal, Vol. VII, p. 398.
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maintaining them is disliked.183
Furthermore, the legality of a murabahah is not questioned by any of the jurists
mentioned in the fiqh literature. In this regard this type of contract is unanimously
agreed by them without any rejection.186 However, the use ofmurabahah transactions
as a credit vehicle by the contemporary Islamic financial institutions has been
regarded with apprehension by some scholars, for instance, M. N. Siddiqi, who
contends that the simple fact that murabahah enables a buyer to finance his
purchase with deferred payment, as against accepting a mark-up on the market price
of the commodities, means that the financier earns a prederminated profit without
bearing any risk.187
It is said that the only factor which, in the opinion of the jurists, might transform
murabahah into a legal device (hilah) used to circumvent the prohibition of taking
interest is pricing the time factor. That occurs when, in addition to the initial price
of the commodities and other recognized expenses and legitimate profit, an increase
is accounted in order to compensate for the delayed payment of the murabahah
purchase price; otherwise murabahah should not, in principle, become suspicious for
185
Musannaf, Vol.VIII, pp. 231 - 232; M Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 77.
186 Sahnun, Vol. X, pp. 226 - 241; Bidayah, Vol. II, pp. 161 - 164; Mughni, Vol. VI, p. 199; M. Muhtaj,
Vol. II, p. 77; Hiddyah, Vol. Ill, pp. 56 - 57.
187 Siddiqi, Issues in Islamic Banking, Leicester. 1983. pp. 49 and 137ff. See also Muhammad Ayub, "Bayf
Murabahah As an Islamic Mode of Financing". Islamic Order. Vol. VII (2), 1985, pp. 50 - 58.
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it is a universally recognized concept under Islamic law.188
According to Udovitch, it may be speculated that the practice of bayc al-
murabahah was limited to particular circumstances, for example, a purchaser may
have been willing to pay a retailer, who was at hand, a specified surcharge on the
cost of certain goods in order to prevent himself from any trouble of buying them
from a wholesaler. It may also serve as a form of commission sale, when the
purchaser is permitted to obtain commodities on credit and resell them with the
surcharge at either a fixed price or a fixed rate of profit based on the original price.189
(a) Conduct of murabahah
The conditions concerning lawful murabahah transactions pertain to the
commodities, the original price paid by the vendor, any additional costs to compute
the total costs serving as the basis of a murabahah transaction and the margin of
profit charged on the cost as follows.
It is a pre-condition that the cost (price) paid to the vendor must be expressly
mentioned prior to the contract. In this regard, the vendor should say : "My capital
is so much" or "This commodity has cost me (for example £100.00) and I sell it to
11111
Nabil A. Saleh, op. cit., p. 95.
189 Udovitch, Partnership, pp. 220 - 221.
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you for the cost plus a profit (for example £10.00)".190 The vendor is also required
to state the additional expenses incurred on the sale item and he must be just and true
to his words. The additional expenses such as transportation, processing and packing
charges, etc, that enhance the value of the commodity in any way and that are added
as a customary practice of merchants at original price, can be added to the purchase
price to form the basis of a murabahah transaction. It is, however, required that the
vendor, in including such additions, should say, "This article has cost me so much".191
It is a pre-requisite that the cost (price) paid to the vendor must be expressed in
identical units such as dirhams and dinars or specific articles of weight or
measurement. If the original price is an article of which all the units are not similar
such as slaves or cattle, the exact price at which the vendor has become owner of the
article will remain unknown (majhul). Any goods with unknown price cannot become
a basis for murabahah as it involves the semblance of uncertainty which renders
murabahah sale unlawful.192
(b) Expenses in relation to murabahah
According to Maliki law, expenses which can be added to the capital (price) and
Sahnun, Vol. XX, p. 179; See also Ibn Rush, Abu al-Walid Muhammad b. Ahmad (d. 520/1126), Kitab
al-Muqaddimat al-Mumahhidat, (A supplement to al-Mudawwanah al-Kubra of Sahnun), Vol. II, Cairo.
1323 A.H., p. 592.
191 Ay/, pp. 155 - 156.
'',2 Hidayah, Vol. Ill, p. 56; Mabsu\. Vol. XIII, p. 184.
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constitute a basis for the calculation of the profit are those which have affected the
commodity itself, such as dyeing or tailoring a piece of material.19'' However, the
vendor is not allowed to add expenses to the capital which do not affect the
commodity itself and are incurred for services that the murabahah vendor could not
provide personally, such as the cost of transportation or storing the commodity in a
warehouse or in storage rented for the purpose mentioned.194
If the expenses do not affect the commodity itself and are incurred for services
that the murabahah vendor is in a position to render personally, such as a
commission paid to broker (simsar; dallal) or wages for folding pieces of material,
the vendor can neither add nor take into account for the calculation of the profit.195
The Hanafi jurists have a different approach to this case. According to them, a
murabahah vendor is entitled to add to the capital (price) all expenses accepted
normally by the customary practice of the merchants, whether such expenses have
affected the commodity itself such as dyeing or tailoring a piece of material or are
incurred on account of such commodity such as transporting goods, feeding animals
or paying a commission to a broker (simsar).196
193
Muw Y., pp. 556 - 557; Sabnun, Vol. X, p. 226; Biddyah. Vol. II, p.160.
194 Sahnun, Vol. XX, p. 226; Biddyah, Vol. II, p. 161; Ibn Rushd (d. 520/1126), Kitdb al-Muqaddimat al-
Mumahhidat. Vol. II, p. 592.
195 Biddyah. Vol. II, p. 161.
196 Fath Q, Vol. VI, p. 498; see also JazirT, Vol. II, p. 281.
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The Hanbali jurist, Ibn Qudamah, holds that all actual expenses incurred as
regards the commodity can be added to the original capital (price), provided that the
purchaser is made aware of the amount of those expenses and the original price.197
The Shaffi jurists, in this case, appear to have a similar opinion to the Hanbalis
with the requirement that the fee earned by the vendor or the fee that should have
been paid to the third party and is not voluntarily performed, cannot be added to the
murabahah price unless that is specifically accepted by the purchaser.198
It is unanimously agreed by the jurists that the margin of profit on the price so
reached should be mutually agreed upon between vendor and purchaser.'99 If the
contracted goods (merchandise) in a murabahah transaction belongs to two investors,
the profits will be shared between them in accordance with the different amounts of
capital they have invested.200 It is also held that if two investors provide the capital
in a murabahah transaction, the profits may be divided equally between them
provided the parties involved run the business collectively.201 However, if the
business is run individually, the profits could be divided equally between the parties
1,7
Mughni, Vol. IV, p. 201.
198 M. Muhtaj, Vol. II, p. 78; Jaziri, Vol. II, p. 280.
199 Sahnun, Vol. XX, p. 227; Shirazi. Vol. I. pp. 401-403; Mabsuf, Vol. XIII, p. 91; Bidayah, Vol. II, p.
161; Jaziri, Vol. II, (Malikis View), pp. 278 - 280; (Hanafis View), p. 280; (Shaficis View), p. 280;
(Hanbalis View), pp. 280 - 281.
200 Sahnun, Vol. XX, p. 235.
201 Musannaf. Vol. VIII, p. 229.
121
or in accordance with the capital invested by them.202 It is held that if a man buys
some goods on credit, and then sells them on the basis of murabahah, and the first
vendor later discovers this, he (the first vendor) is entitled to claim the profits.203
The purchaser in a murabahah contract has the right of option either to accept
or reject the bargain if he wishes in the following circumstances:
a. He discovers that the vendor has defrauded him by giving false statements
concerning the particulars of the goods, the price and additional expenses.204
b. The vendor himself has bought the commodity on a deferred payment basis
and sold it to his customer on prompt payment without informing him.205
c. A practice on the part of the vendor involves the semblance of an illegal
sale.206
(c) Option when a murabahah price may be inflated
If purchaser discovers that the murabahah price he has paid to the vendor
(seller) was unduly inflated, he has the option of either accepting the sale at the
stated price or rescinding (khiyar) it and taking back his money.207 However, it is
202
Ibid.
203 Ibid., p. 230.
204 Fath Q, Vol.VI, p. 500.
205 Al-Shaybani, al-AsI, Kitab al-Buyu1 wa al-Salam, p. 155.
m Ibid. p. 164; Fath Q. Vol. VI, p. 500.
207 JazTrT, Vol. II. pp. 281 - 282.
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held that if the purchaser is no longer in possession of the murabahah goods, he will
have no option but to confirm the sale.208
Some Hanafi jurists such as Abu Yusuf hold the view that the purchaser is, in
any circumstances, entitled to confirm the murabahah contract and claim back the
undue increase.209 The Maliki view on this case is that the purchaser has the option
either of keeping the murabahah goods in consideration of its real cost, i. e., the
price after devaluation of the undue increase, or of relinquishing the goods to the
vendor.210 The Shafici view on this case is that if the murabahah goods are still in
the murabahah purchaser's possession, he is entitled to give them back to the vendor
and have money in return or he can keep it and claim the undue increase.211
If the purchaser in a murabahah contract detects fraud after he has used the
commodity or it has been destroyed in his hands, he is not entitled to make any
deduction from the price on the grounds that the commodity against which he has to
practise his right of option (khiyar) does not exist.212 The other opinion held is that
deduction will be made even after destruction of commodity.213
208 ....
Ibid.
2m Fath Q, Vol. VI, p. 500; JazTri, Vol. II. pp. 281 - 282.
2I" Biddyah, Vol. II, p. 162.
211 Umm, Vol. Ill, p. 93; Cf. Mughni, Vol. IV, p. 199.
212 This opinion is held by Abu Hanifah and his disciple al-Shaybani. See Mabsul, Vol. XIII, p. 86.
213 This opinion held by Abu Yusuf and Ibn Abi Layla. See Ibid.
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The main purpose of murabahah contract (sale) is to protect unskilled general
consumers, lacking expertise and skill in various kinds of goods or commodities,
from the wiles and stratagems of shrewd businessmen.214 In this contract, the
purchaser is under the necessity of placing absolute confidence in the word of the
seller, who is skilful in the business. Therefore, it is incumbent on the seller to be
just and true in his word and to abstain from any fraud or its semblance.215 In other
words, by basing the sale price on the original cost of the commodities and goods to
the vendor (seller), the purchaser is provided with a medium of protection against
unfair exploitation by unscrupulous merchants.216
2.7.2. Al-Samsarah (Brokerage)
A Simsar (plural samasirah) is a middle-man or intermediary between a vendor
and a purchaser in the execution of a sale,217 or a broker who acts as an intermediary
between the seller and the purchaser.218 He is also known as dallal (commissioned
agent),219 who like the simsar is a man who mediates between the purchaser and the
214
Hidayah, Vol. III. p. 56.
215 Kasani, Vol. VI. p. 223.
216 Udovitch, Partnership, p. 220.
217 Lisdn, Vol. IV, pp. 380 - 381; Taj, Vol. XII, pp. 86 - 87.
2"( Lane, Vol. I, p. 1426.
219 Ibid.
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vendor (seller).220 A broker is described either as a dallal22] or simsar 212 and in most
cases these words ere used in an identical sense.223 According to Serjeant, in the tribal
areas of some Arab countries like those in Southen Arabia, a dallal is an intermediary
between the tribesmen and the shopkeeper. He is an interesting and important figure
in the economic life of the country.224 According to Becker, dallal was the popular
Arabic word for a simsar or sinsal in pre-Islamic times.225 It is, however, suggested
that simsar was Arabicized from Persian,226 in which (language) it means a well-
versed and skilful person.227
Traders were called samasirah in pre-Islamic times228 but the Prophet called them
~2"
Al-Samcani, Abu Sacd cAbd al-Karim b. Muhammad b. Mansur al-Tamimi, al-Ansdb, article "al-
Dallal", Vol. V, Hyderabad, 1966, p. 432; al-Jawaliqi, Abu Mansur Mawhub b. Ahmad b. Muhammad,
al-Mifarrab min al-Kalam al-Acjami Lala Huruf al-Mujam. ed. Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, Cairo, 1942,
p. 201.
221 Al-Samcani. Al-Ansab, article "al-Dalldl", Vol. V, pp. 430 - 432.
222 Jawaliqi, al-Mu'arrab, p. 201.
223 Ibid.. Al-Dimashqi frequently uses the word al-simsar or samasirah in the sense of broker. (See Abu
al-Fadl Jacfar b. cAli al-Dimashqi, Kilab al-Isharah ild Mahdsin al-Tijarah, Damascus, 1900, pp. 43 - 44).
C. H. Becker, following the author of the Taj al-cArus mentions that the words dallal and simsar are
identical. (See "Dallal". EI(!), Vol. I, 1913, p. 900) It seems that the words were not used as synonymous
terms, at least in early Islamic times. Perhaps al-samasirah acquired the meaning of a broker at a later time,
as is demonstrated by an earlier usage of the word conveying the sensey>f a trader. (See Aslam b. Sahl,
Tarikh Wasif, edited by G. cAwad. Baghdad, 1967, p. 155; also al-Jawaliqi, al-MuLarrab, p. 201).
224 R. B. Serjeant, "The Quarters of Tarim", Le Museon, Vol. LXIII, 1950, p. 278.
225 "Dalldl". E!(l), Vol.1, 1913, p. 900; Prof. Schacht mentioned that the term sensalis (sensale , sensal)
in Europe was derived from the Arabic word simsar (broker). See Introduction, p, 78.
226 Mufafsal, Vol. VII. p, 413.
227
Taj. Vol. III. p. 280.
228 Lisdn. Vol. IV, pp. 380 - 381.
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tujjar (traders or merchants).229 In pre-Islamic times, the contract of samsarah
(brokerage) was commonly practised between townsmen and villagers and was widely
practised in all aspects of business transaction.230 Consequently, this institution played
an important role in the economic affairs of the society.231 During the time of the
Companions and the Successors, this type of sale was also known as bayc al-qimah
(the sale of real value of goods; the sale of non-fungible goods).232 This contract
applies when an owner of capital says to the broker : "Sell this (commodity) at such
and such a price and anything above that is yours".233
The concept of an intermediary or middle-man (broker) in commerce is well
recognised in Islamic law, though the treatment in the legal manuals is very limited.
Most of the scholars quote a tradition on freedom of stipulation in support of the
practice. The tradition reads: "Muslims are bound by their stipulations except when
they permit the unlawful and prohibit the lawful".234 They also quote cAbd Allah b.
cAbbas as saying that there is no objection if a person says, "Sell this garment, for
229
Taj, Vol. VII, p. 167.
23,1 Mufassal, Vol. VII. p. 414.
231 Muhammad Abdul Jabbar Beg. " The Status of 'brokers' in Middle Eastern Society in the pre-modern
period", MW, Vol. LXV1I (2), 1977, p. 87.
232 Musannaf, Vol. VIII, p. 234.
233 Ibid.
234 Ibn cArabi, Shark Sahih aj-Tirmidhi, "Abwab al-Ahkam", Vol., VI, p. 104; Cf. Abu Dawud, Vol. Ill,
"Bab al-Sulh", p. 13; Bukhari, Vol. Ill, "Kilab al-Ijarah". p. 262; al-Darqupti, Sunan, Vol. Ill, p. 21 (no.
2869).
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whatever exceeds your price".235 However, he disallowed the broker to buy goods on
credit if the owner of the capital had ordered him to buy them in cash.236 Ibn Sirin
held that if a person says, "Sell (this) for such a price and any profit accruing from
it is either yours or to be divided between us", this is allowed.237
Concerning this contract, there are some jurists such as Ibrahim al-Nakhaci,238
Tawus and al-Hasan al-Basri,239 who disapproved of it. It can be suggested that such
a contract is disapproved of if it is considered as hiring of service. The person who
gave his capital is the hirer and the hirer should specify the amount of hire or
service owed to the broker. However, this contract is approved of if it is regarded as
contract through the employment of an agent (at the latter's disposal).
The dallal (broker) whose purpose is mediating between the purchaser and the
vendor, plays a role similar to that of a commission merchant or agent (wakil). He
holds the goods on behalf of the vendor, mediates between vendor and purchaser, and
sells for a fee which often takes the form of a commision. The factual description of
a dallaTs activities and his rights and duties confirms that he is an agent with the
main consequence that the principle is entitled to any sum in excess of the stipulated
~35
Bukhari, Vol. Ill, p. 262; See also Sabiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah, Vol. Ill, p. 141.
236 Musannaj.\ Vol. VIII, p.236.
237 Sabiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah, Vol. Ill, p. 159.
23s Bukhari. Vol. Ill, p. 262; Musannaj.\ Vol. VIII, p. 235.
239 Muhalla. Vol. VIII, p. 429.
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price and the dallal is not entitled to anything more than his brokerage fee.240
Muhammad Abd al-Jabbar Beg, in analysing the institution of brokerage states
that it is not fully accepted in Islamic law and if accepted will be subject to strict
monitoring by the authorities, as it is generally criticised for allowing the broker to
make a profit which is incommensurate with his efforts and amounts to zulm
(injustice). These brokerage activities were considered likely to maintain unduly high
levels of price for certain commodities which would normally be obtained at a lower
price in a market where direct transactions were the rule.241 Al-ThaTabi, an eleventh
century writer, followed by a writer of the post-cAbbasid period, criticised the role
of the dallal by saying: "Everyone needs capital (in trade) but the capital of a broker
is lying".242 The "lying of the broker" (kadhib al-dallal) was proverbial in medieval
cIraq . Al-Dimashqi, a Syrian writer of the twelfth century, described vividly the
deceitful practice of the brokers, who did not hesitate to hoax even their next-door
neighbours and dear friends.243
Despite a negative assessment of brokers, their role as intermediaries and middle¬
men in a broad sense including commercial agency and distribution undoubtedly
240
Samir Saleh, Commercial Agency and Distributorship in the Middle East, London, 1989, p. 10.
241 M. A. J. Beg, op. cit., pp. 87 - 90.
242 Abu Mansur al-Thaclabi, Thimar al-Qulub. Cairo, 1908, pp. 193 - 194 cited in M. A. J. Beg., Ibid.
243 AI-Dimashqi. Kitab al-lsharah, p. 95. He wrote : "The broker sometimes described the excellence of
the merchandise and had even tricked the expert with it. Sometimes he mentioned the scarcity of the
merchandise and its unavailability in the area and some of them have been sold, other than what he had
in hand. He also said that price will rise and demand for it is tremendous...".
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becomes important in modern commercial and banking activities as well as the local
and international market. The role of the market supervisors (muhtasib) as part of the
institution of hisbah was seen to an effective way of controling the practice.244 The
government would have to intensify the enforcement of the commercial law, for
example implementing a price control policy (tasfir). Furthermore, the formation of
guilds of brokers can also stand surety for the smooth and honest operation of its
members.
244
Abu al-Faraj b. cAli b. al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam fi Tarikh al-Muluk wa al-Umam, Vol. X, Hyderabad,
1938 - 1939, p. 223; Claude Cahen and M. Talbi. "Hisbah", El(2), Vol. Ill, 1971, pp. 485 - 488; see also
R.B Serjeant, "A Zaidi Manual of Hisbah of the 3rd century (H)", Rivista Delgi Studi Orientali, Vol.
XXVIII. 1953, pp. 1 - 34; J. Derek Latham, "Translation of al-Jarsifi's treatise on Hisba', Journal of
Semitic Studies, Vol. V. 1960, pp. 124 - 143; Benjamin R. Foster, "Agoranomos and Muhtasib", JESHO,
Vol. XIII, 1970, pp. 139 - 144.
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PART TWO
PARTNERSHIP IN ISLAMIC BANKING AND
FINANCE IN MALAYSIA
CHAPTER THREE
PARTNERSHIP IN THE OPERATION OF
ISLAMIC BANKING OF MALAYSIA
CHAPTER THREE : PARTNERSHIP IN THE OPERATION OF
ISLAMIC BANKING OF MALAYSIA
Introduction
In this chapter we shall discuss the emergence of the modern Islamic banks, how
banking could be established on the basis of joint stock company which operates on
the basis of the contracts of partnership, i. e. mudarabah and musharakah, the modes
of operations of Islamic banking, the establishment and operations of Bank Islam
Malaysia Berhad] and the application of partnertship (mudarabah and musharakah)
in the operations of BIMB.
3.1. The Emergence of Islamic Banks
The emergence of modern Islamic banks2 can be seen as having four distinct
phases:
a. The experimental domestic phase
b. The international phase
c. The phase of dissemination
d. The phase from 1980 until 1985.
1
Hereafter referred to as BIMB.
2 At least since the late 1940s, there have been academic and theoretical discussions in the Muslim world,
especially in Pakistan, on interest-free Islamic banking. The goal was the design of a bank which offers
to its customers the whole variety of financial services of conventional commercial banks but on an
interest-free basis, i. e. the goal was the design of an interest-free Islamic commercial bank. See for
example, Anwar Iqbal Qureshi, Islam and the Theory of Interest, Lahore, Pakistan, 1967; Sh. Mahmud
Ahmad, Economics of Islam : A Comparative Study, New Delhi, 1980 and Muhammad Uzair's An Outline
of Interestless Banking published by Raihan Publications, Karachi, 1955, 21 p; M. N. Siddiqi, Muslim
Economic Thinking : A Survey ofContemporary Literature, Leicester, U. K., 1981, pp. 219 - 220; Volker
Nienhaus, "Islamic Banks-A Short Survey" in Islam and the Modern Age, Vol. XIV (1), 1983, p. 1.
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(a) The experimental domestic phase
A pioneering experiment in putting the principles of Islamic banking into practice
was conducted in rural Egypt in Mit Ghamr and Dondait, about 40 miles north of
Cairo in 1963/ The experiment combined the idea of German Saving Banks with the
principles of rural banking.4 The main objective of this experiment was to start rural
banks in order to stimulate the habit of savings among small savers (village
communities) with the view to accelerating the process of capital accumulation and
economic growth.5 The bank had started in a modest way with one room and a staff
of twenty-five persons. The rural people in that region were religious and would not
put their savings into any bank because of interest being forbidden in Islam.
Moreover, there was hardly any institution available to them. Under these
circumstances, the emphasis was given to educating people about the use of banking.6




R. K. Ready, "The Egyptian Municipal Saving Bank Project", International Development Review, Vol.
IX(3), 1967, pp. 2-5; See also, Delwin A. Roy, "Islamic Banking", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XXVII
(3), 1991, p.428;
4 T. Wholers-Scharf, Arab and Islamic Banks : New Business Partners for Developing Countries, Paris,
1983, pp. 79-80.
5 Ahmad al-Najjar, al-Madkhal ila al-Nazariyyah al-Iqtisadiyyahft al-Manhaj al-lslami, Dar al-Fikr, 1973,
pp. 26-27; Idem, "Islamic banks : A Model and the Challenge" in Altaf Gauhar (ed.), The Challenge of
Islam, London, 1978, p. 222; Delwin A. Roy (1991), op. cit., p.428.
6 R.K. Ready (1967), op. cit., p.2-5; T. Wholers-Scharf (1983), op. cit., pp. 79-80; Ahmad al-Najjar,
"Islamic Bank : A New Approach for Economic Cooperation" in Muazzam Ali (ed.), Islamic Bank and
Strategies for Economic Cooperation, International Association of Islamic Bank, 1982, pp. 26-28.
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3. Social service fund or zakat accounts.7
In a saving account, depositors could start saving with a minimum deposit of five
piasters (about 5 pence). No interest was due on these accounts, but depositors were
entitled to a small short-term interest-free loan (qard hasan) for productive ventures
and the bank would also help them in terms of technical assistance without any
payment.8
The investment accounts drew deposits, but unlike savings accounts, restricted
withdrawals. These funds were invested on a profit and loss sharing basis, either
directly by the bank to finance their rural projects or through the agency of local
entrepreneurs who were in need of funds.9 The yield of these investments was
distributed among depositors in this fund in proportion to the amount and duration
of their deposits. Freedom to draw from the sum deposited in this account is
restricted in accordance with the nature of the investment operations and liquidity
requirements.10
The resources in the social service fund were amassed from the money provided
and from public bodies. They were distributed in the form of financial assistence to
7
R. K. Ready, "The Egyptian Municipal Savings Banks Project", International Development Review, Vol.
IX (2), 1967, p. 3; al-Najjar (1982), op.cit., pp. 26-27; Idem, Bunuk bila Fawa'id, Jeddah, 1972, pp. 51-53;
Idem, "Local Social Banks", in Al-Islam, Vol. IV (2), (Singapore, 1973), pp. 1 - 4; Shahrukh Rafi Khan,
Profit and loss Sharing : An Islamic Experiment in Finance and Banking, Karachi, 1987, p. 53.
8
Ready (1967), op. cit., pp. 3-4; Ahmad al-Najjar (1978), op. cit., p. 225; Delwin A. Roy (1991), op cit.,
p. 428.
9 Ahmad al-Najjar (1982), op. cit., p. 27.
10 Ready (1967), op. cit., pp. 3 - 4; Ahmad al-Najjar (1978), op. cit., pp. 224-225.
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savers who were in financial difficulties as a result of unforeseen misfortune."
Table 1 reviews the progress of the Egyptian experiment over a three year
period.12
Table 1
Operation of the first Islamic Bank in Egypt over a three year period (Egyptian £'s)
1963 1966
Savings Accounts 25,000 125,000
Investment Deposits 35,000 75,000
Investment Financed 30,000
Development Review, Vol. IX (2), 1967, p. 4.
The growth reflected in the numbers above is impressive, especially since the
project began with one room and a small staff. The experiment met unexpected
success as savings deposits increased from 25,000 Egyptian pounds to 125,000
Egyptian pounds during 1963-1966. During the same period, investment deposits
increased from 35,000 Egyptian pounds to 75,000 Egyptian pounds.'3 It is also
reported that "the bank functioned on a cautious basis, rejecting on average, 60 per
cent of loan applications in the first three years. The default ratio was zero in
economically good times".14
"
Ibid., p. 225; Idem, "Local Social Bank", op cit., p. 2.
12 R. K. Ready, op. cit., p. 4; see also Shahrukh Rafi Khan, op. cit., p.54.
13 R.K. Ready, op. cit., p. 4.
14 Shahrukh Rafi Khan, op. cit., p. 54.
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The success of the experiment in part resulted from the direct participation of the
local community. Thus, because transactions were based on intimate contact and
mutual trust and because the interest of the community was directly at stake in the
transactions, a fair amount of social pressure was present as a check on the
borrowers. Demand also mushroomed from neighbouring communities, which
appreciated the ethical and decentralized approach of the bank. In 1967, four more
branches were added to the initial bank, and eight new banks were opened. After
three years of its operations, there were sixty thousand depositors, and when the
operations had to be stopped due to certain political factors, there were close on a
million.15
Egypt was also responsible for the first successful urban-based experiment in the
form of an Islamic welfare oriented bank, called The Nasser Social Bank. It was
established in September 1971 and started its operation in 1972 and is still in
existence. The bank is a public authority with an autonomous status. Its main
objectives are social services such as granting interest-free loans for small projects
on a profit sharing basis, assistance to the poor and needy, and loans to needy
students for higher education.16
15
Ibid., p. 54; Ahmad al-Najjar (1978), op. cit., pp. 230-232; Cf. Asif Huda, "The New Islamic Bankers",
Middle East, No. 89, March, 1982. p. 68.
Information on the Nasser Social Bank is drawn from a report edited by The Banker Research Unit
entitled Banking Structures and Sources of Finance in the Middle East, London, 1980, pp. 178-180; Cf.
Shahrukh Rafi Khan, op. cit., pp. 54-55; Ausaf Ahmad, Development and Problems of Islamic Banks,
Jeddah, 1987, p.4; Delwin A. Roy (1991). op cit., p. 428.
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(b) The international phase
The international phase of Islamic banking started in August 1974, when the draft
agreement of the Islamic Development Bank was adopted by the Islamic Conference
of Ministers of Finance. The agreement had far-reaching implications. It was
considered the first official document reflecting the Islamic point of view regarding
the modern banking system. It also reflected a new phase featuring the practical
potential of Islam with its spiritual, moral and intellectual reserves in the field of
modern banking systems and economic thought. It was unequivocal in its adherence
to the provisions of the Sharfah, saying that the Islamic Development Bank was to
support the economic development and social progress of Islamic communities in
accordance with the provisions of Islamic law. It also represented in a practical way
the image of unity of the Muslim ummah concerning the establishment of the Bank.
It was also an official proclamation by all the Muslim states that there existed a
distinct Islamic system of economy.17
The late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and various international Islamic
organisations such as the Muslim World League, had campaigned for the
establishment of an international Islamic financial institution to foster economic and
social progress in Muslim countries. This led to the establishment of the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) in 1975 with an authorised capital of 2 billion dinars
(about $ 1.25 million) and with its headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.18 The Bank
17
Muazzam Ali, "A Framework of Islamic Banking", in Directory of Islamic Financial Institutions edited
by John R. Presley, Kent, 1988, pp. 4-6; Hj. Azlan Khalili Hj. Shamsuddin, Banking and Finance in
Islam, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1988, p. 24.
IS
Waqar Masood Khan, Towards an Interest-Free Islamic Economic System, Leicester, U.K., 1985, P. 91.
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has grown from twenty-two member countries to forty-three after ten years of
operation. It aims at promoting the harmonious and balanced development ofmember
countries through mutual financing and economic co-operation. It encourages trade
and transfer of technology among member countries, provides technical assistance,
and funds research. The cornerstone of its policy is stated to be the replacement of
interest by co-operation in all international dealings on the basis of profit and loss
sharing. Accepting deposits from individuals and the government, it disburses funds
for productive projects on the basis of either direct interest-free loans, equity
financing, or profit and loss sharing. The Islamic Development Bank found a shortage
of trained manpower to be one of the main bottlenecks retarding the progress of its
operations. Therefore, it started the Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI) in
1981.19
In the sixth year of its operation, the Islamic Development Bank had participated
in- more than 275 projects in thirty-six countries by financing development projects
with interest-free loans. The Bank's sixth annual report puts the amount it has
committed to development projects, trade financing, technical assistance (which
mainly finances feasibility studies) and the special assistance account for the poorer
countries at $2.18 billion of which 66.7 per cent has actually been disbursed.20
"
W. E. Kuhn, "The Islamic Development Bank : Performance and Prospects", Journal ofEconomics and
Business, Vol. XXI, (Nebraska, 1982). pp. 49 - 63; Mannan, article "Islamic Bank in Operation : Treads
and Issues" in The Making of Islamic Economic Society, Cairo, 1984, pp. 453 - 470; Idem, " The Islamic
Development Bank and Economic Development of Southeast Asia", in Mohamed Ariff (ed.), Islamic
Banking in Southeast Asia, Singapore, 1988. pp. 172 -185; Muazzam Ali (1988), op cit., pp. 5 - 6; R.
Wilson, "The Islamic Development Bank's Role as an Aid Agency for Moslem Countries", Journal of
International Development, Vol. III. 1989, pp. 444 - 466; Shahrukh Rafi Khan, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
20
Waqar Masood Khan, op. cit., p. 91.
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(c) The phase of dissemination
The phase of dissemination was between 1975 and 1979. During this period, a
number of Islamic financial institutions opened for business. It started with the
establishment of the Dubai Islamic Bank in 1975.21 In 1976, Jaame in Johannesburg
was set up with an estimated 1981 turnover of $250,000. In 1977, more high-powered
companies like the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (FIBS) and the Islamic Investment
Company (IIC) registered in the Bahamas but bases in Geneva were established. The
International Association of Islamic Banks was also established in 1977 to promote
co-operation among Islamic banks and to co-ordinate their activities. In 1978, the
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt, the Islamic Bank of Jordan and Islamic Banking of
Luxembourg were established. These were followed in 1979 by the Bahrain Islamic
Bank, the Kuwait Finance House, the Jordan Islamic Bank for Investment and
Finance, and Iran Islamic Bank.22
(d) The phase from 1980 until 1985
This phase can be marked from the announcement of President Zia-ul-Haq of
Pakistan on 10th February 1979 of his intention to remove interest from the economy
21
The success of the rural bank in Egypt's experiments encouraged the Dubai Merchants to utilize the new
forms of banking to harness the wealth of those in the Emirates who on religious grounds refused to have
dealing with the conventional banks. See Delvin A. Roy (1991), op. cil., pp. 429 - 450.
22
Rodney Wilson, Banking and Finance in The Arab Middle East, London, 1983, p. 80; Muhammad
Nejatullah Siddiqi, "Islamic Banking : Theory and Practice", in Mohamed Ariff (ed.), Islamic Banking in
Southeast Asia. Singapore, 1988. pp. 42 - 45; Waqar Masood Khan, op. cit., p. 91; Delvin A. Roy (1991),
op cit., pp. 429 - 450.
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within a period of three years.23 At the end of 1979, there were twelve Islamic
banks.24 More Islamic banks were established between 1980 and 1985, so that their
number reached over fifty excluding Islamic Banks in Pakistan and Iran.25 The
establishment of Dar al-Mal al-lslami based in Geneva (DMI) on 26th Ramadan
1401 H. corresponding to July 27th 1981, which now has twenty-two subsidiaries,
and the al-Baraka Group,26 based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to which nine institutions
belong, has introduced a new phase of integrated multinational institutions in the
Islamic finance movement.
Dar al-Mal al-lslami (DMI) was established as a trust and a holding company
with an authorized capital of US 1 billion for the purpose of promoting a diversity
of financial business in accordance with Islamic law through the establishment of
a network of Islamic investment companies, Islamic banks, insurance (takaful)
companies and Islamic business institutions. Dar al-Mal al-lslami and its subsidiaries
engage in four types of transactions, mudarabah, musharakah, murabahah, leasing,
23
Ziauddin Ahmed. "Interest-Free Banking in Pakistan" in JIBF, Vol. IV (1), 1987, p. 14; Mohammad
Anwar. Modelling Interest-Free economy : A Study on Macroeconomics and Development, Herndon. U.
S. A.. 1987. pp. 10 - 11.
24 This includes the Malaysian Pilgrims Management and Fund Board in Malaysia.
25 Encyclopaedia of Islamic Banking and Insurance, London, 1995, pp. 301 - 386.
26 Al-Baraka Group and its nine affiliates (institutions) were established in 1982 with an authorized capital
of $5 billion US dollars. Besides murabahah, musharakah, mudarabah and leasing, baf al-salam is also
mentioned as one of the activities planned. Murabahah has accounted for the bulk of the business so far,
but some efforts are being made to use various profit-sharing modes of finance as well. The bank and
companies of the al-Baraka Group have set out a number of strategic objectives .These include a
comprehensive and integrated plan of work which aims at the ideal utilization of human and juridical
Islamic capabilities and resources in order to participate creatively in the socio-economic system with its
economic, financial and investment rules and regulations. See Saleh Abdullah Kamel, "Islamic Banking
in Practice ; The al-Baraka Group In Muslim Minority Countries", in JIMMA. Vol. XIII (2), 1992, pp. 325
- 336; See also Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi (1988). op. cit„ p. 45.
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and some interest-free loans with a view to promoting Islamic banking.27
(e) Islamic banking at the national level28
In the fourth phase, Islamic banking has also been adopted at the national level,
as in Pakistan,29 Iran30 and Sudan.31 These countries have the largest number of
Islamic financial institutions of any country.
3.2. Theory of Islamic Banking
3.2.1. The Establishment of an Islamic Bank: A Simple Model
An Islamic bank would be organized as a joint stock company with the
shareholders supplying the initial capital (share capital).32 It is managed by the
"7
Ibid., pp. 44-45.
2S Mohammad Anwar, op cit., p. 10.
29 Muhammad Akram Khan, "Islamic Banking In Pakistan", in International Journal of Islamic and Arabic
Studies, Vol. II (2), 1985. pp. 21 - 35; Christine Gieraths. "Pakistan : Main Participations and Final
Financial Products of the Islamization Process" in Rodney Wilson (ed.), Islamic Financial Markets,
London and New York. 1990, pp. 171 - 195.
30 Hossein Aryan. "Iran : The Impact of Islamization on the Financial System", in Rodney Wilson (ed.),
Islamic Financial Markets, pp. 155 - 170; Article, "Monetary Resources and Banking Facilities under the
Law for Usury-Free Banking" in al-Tawhid, Vol. Ill (4), 1986, pp. 60 - 77 and article, "The Impact of the
New Banking System in Iran on the Instruments of Monetary and Credit Policy", pp. 78 - 89; Muhsin
Nurbakhsh. "The Inroduction of Usury-Free Banking in Iran", al-Tawhid, Vol. IV (4), 1986-87, pp. 89 -
96.
31
For example, see al-Bagkir Y. Mudawi, "Islamic Banking ; Evaluation of Sudanese Experience" in JIBF,
Vol. I (1), 1984. pp. 51 -57.
32 M. N. Siddiqi. Banking Without Interest, Leicester. U. K., 1988, pp. 15 - 18; See also Ausaf Ahmad,
Development and Problems ofIslamic Banks, p. 14 - 15; M. A. Khan, Issues in Islamic Economics, Lahore,
1983. p. 50.
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shareholders through their representatives on the board of directors. Its main business
is to obtain funds from the public on the basis of mudarabah and with these capitals
some enterprises may be financed and services rendered for earning profit and
receiving remuneration, on the basis of partnership and mudarabahP This form of
joint investment is called Linan partnership, where two or more persons would
participate in an enterprise with a fixed amount of capital under an agreement that
they will work jointly and will participate in the profit or loss of the business
proportionately,34 as has been explained earlier.35 In this case, it is not necessary that
every partner should participate in running the business. Practically, although none
of the partners can be prevented from such participation, in principle, they shall have
the right even though they may or may not participate practically.36
The amount of capital provided by each shareholder may be equal or vary. It
may, however, be an ideal proposition to fix the value of one share at any given price
and every shareholder may be allowed to secure as many as he likes. The minimum
and maximum limits of the subscribed capital may also be specified. Each
shareholder would become the owner of the bank, according to the proportion of his
assets in the total investment.37
33
M. A. Mannan, "Islam and Trends in Modern Banking" in al-Islam, Vol. Ill (3), (Singapore, 1972), p.
3; Mohsin S. Khan and Abbas Mirakhor, "The Framework and Practice of Islamic Banking", in Finance
and Development, September 1986, p. 33; Cf. Abu Saud, "Money, Interest and Qirad", in K. Ahmad (ed.).
Studies in Islamic Economics, Leicester, 1981, pp. 59 - 84.
34 Siddiqi, Banking Without Interest, p. 15; M. Muslehuddin, "Comments Upon the Egyption Study on the
Establishment of the Islamic Banking System", al-Islam, (Singapore, June 1973), pp. 37 - 38.
35 See Chapter I, 1.3.2 (a), (b), (c) and (d) pp. 67 - 78.
36 M. N. Siddiqi (1988), op. cit., p. 15; Abdelmoneim Mahmoud el-Gousi, Riba Islamic Law and
Interest, Unpublished Ph. D Thesis, Temple University, 1982, pp. 225 -229.
37 Siddiqi (1988). op. cit.. p. 15.
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As regards the volume of profits in the banking business, it would be appropriate
to adopt the policy of proportionally distributing them according to the size of each
individual's capital (number of shares), and, for this purpose, the total investment of
the bank may be divided by the total profit, in order to determine the percentage of
profit payable to each individual shareholder. There is, however, every justification
for the adoption of a formula of even the disproportionate distribution of the profit,
more so because some of the members would be more competent and active than
others to play a more effective role in the promotion of business and may be willing
to undertake more responsibilities in this direction. In the light of the partnership
principles in Islam, if the bank suffers a loss in any year, the shareholders cannot
escape the liability, and have to share the loss in proportion to the size of their
shares.38
All major decisions regarding the overall operation of the bank would be made
with the mutual understanding of the partners. If, however, the partners are very large
in number, the powers to make decisions on various matters (which should be
determined beforehand) would be delegated to a council of representatives. Day-to-
day decisions on routine business matters would be entrusted to the paid managers
whose appointment and removal would rest in the hands of the partners of the
council of representatives.39
18
Ibid., p. 16; S. M. Hasanuzzaman, "Limited Liability of Shareholders : An Islamic Perspective", IS, Vol.
XXVIII (4). 1989. pp. 353 - 361; Idem. "The Liability of Partners in an Islamic Shirkah", IS, Vol. x (4),
1971. pp. 319 - 341; M. Raquibuz Zaman, "Monetary and Fiscal Policies of an Islamic State : The Claims
Versus the Reality", International Journal of Islamic and Arabic Studies, Vol. V (1), 1988, pp. 23 - 24.
39 Siddiqi (1988). op. cit., p. 16.
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3.2.2. Principles of Mudarabah and Musharakah
It is reported that the operations of islamic banking and financial institutions
should be on the basis of profit and loss-sharing in consonance with the Islamic legal
concept of sharikah and mudarabah, and also qard hasan.M) Qard hasan is a loan
extended without any additional charge over and above the principal amount.41 Under
this system, the amount of return on the funds invested is neither fixed nor pre¬
determined. The ratio of profit depends on the operational results of the economic
undertaking. When capital is provided entirely by one party and enterprise or labour
entirely by another party, the proportion of profit are to be agreed proportionately at
the time of the contract, while loss is to be borne by the supplier (provider) of the
capital unless it is due to the negligence of the entrepreneur (worker). If there is more
than one supplier of capital, profit is to be distributed among them in agreed
proportions, while loss is to be shared by them strictly in proportion to their capital
contributions.42
411
For a discussion see Ingo Karsten. "Islam and Financial Intermediation", in IMFStaffPapers, Vol. XXIX
(1). March 1982. pp. 108 - 142 and the CI! Report which contains a detailed blueprint for reorganisation
of the operations of Islamic banking and finance entitled "Elimination of Interest from the Economy" in
Ziauddin Ahmed, et al (eds.), Money and Banking in Islam, Islamabad, 1983, pp. 103 - 257; M. U. Chapra,
Towards a Just Monetary System, Leicester, 1985, pp. 166 - 173.
41 Al-MawsiFah al-Ilmiyyah wa al-cAmaliyyah Li al-Bunuk al-Islamiyyah, Vol. V, Cairo, n. d., pp. 206-211;
Cf. Nabil A. Salleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press,
1986, pp. 99-100.
42 See M. Mohsin, " A Profile of Riba-Free Banking" in Mohamed Ariff (ed.), Monetary and Fiscal
Economics of Islam, Jeddah, 1982, pp.188; Mohamed Ariff, "Introduction" in Ibid, pp. 6-9; Muhammad
Abdul Mannan, "Allocative Efficiency, Decision and Welfare Criteria In An Interest-Free Islamic
Economy", in Ibid., pp. 53 - 62; AbulHasan Muhammad Sadeq, "Economic Growth in an Islamic
Economic" in AbulHasan Muhammad Sadeq, et al (eds.). Development and Finance In Islam, Petaling
Jaya, Malaysia. 1991. pp. 60 - 61: M. Umer Chapra. " Towards An Islamic Financial System", in
AbulHasan Muhammad Sadeq. et al (eds.) (1991), Ibid, pp. 130 - 137; Idem, "Money and Banking in an
Islamic Economy", in Mohamed Ariff (ed.). Islamic Banking in Southeast Asia, pp. 51 57; Munawar Iqbal
and M. Fahim Khan, A Survey of Issues and a Programme for Research in Monetary and Fiscal Economics
of Islam, Jeddah and Islamabad, 1981, pp. 75 - 76; Zubair Hasan, "Distributional Equity in Islam" in
Munawar Iqbal (ed.). Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy, Leicester and
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It may be mentioned that in the case of Islamic Banking, there will be three
parties involved, i. e.:
a. The actual user of the capital or entrepreneur;
b. The bank which serves as a partial user of capital funds and as an
intermediary link, and
c. The supplier of savings or capital funds, i.e. the depositors in the
bank.43
There are two mudarabah contracts involved between the actual entrepreneurs,
the bank and the depositors. One tier of mudarabah contract is between the bank and
the depositors. In this contract, the depositors are the owners of the wealth (ashab al-
mal) and the bank becomes the entrepreneur. The second tier of mudarabah contract
is between the bank and the actual user of the fund or the entrepreneurs. In the
second contract, the bank will become the owner of the wealth (sahib al-mal) which
will share the profits with the entrepreneurs.44
Islamabad. 1986, pp. 45 - 59; Syed Aftab Ali. "Risk-Bearing and Profit-Sharing in an Islamic Framework
: Some Allocational Considerations", in Ziauddin Ahmed , et al (eds.), Fiscal Policy And Resource
Allocation in Islam, Jeddah and Islamabad. 1983, pp. 253 - 269; Masudul Alam Chowdhury , "A
Mathematical Formulation of The principle of 'Mudarabah', The Profit-Sharing System", in Proceeding
of the Third National Seminar of the Association ofMuslim Social Scientists, Gary, Indiana, 1974, pp. 45 -
49; Azlan Khalili Shamsuddin, Banking and Public Finance in Islam, pp. 31 - 32; Ma'bid Ali al-Jarhi,
"A Monetary and Financial Structure for an Interest-Free Economy : Institutions, Mechanism and Policy"
in Ziauddin Ahmed, et al (eds.. Money and Banking in Islam, pp. 70 - 90, see also "Introduction" by the
editors, pp. 8-14.
43 See for example. Muhammad Uzair, "Some Conceptual and Practical Aspects of Interest-Free Banking",
in Khurshid Ahmad (ed.), Studies in Islamic Economics, Leicester, 1980/1400 H., p. 46. Hereafter referred
to as Some Conceptual and Practical Aspects of Interest- Free Banking', See also Anu N. M. Wahid,
"Islamic Banks and a Theory of Optimal Profit Sharing", in IS, Vol. XXIV (3), 1985, pp. 389 - 396;
Mohammad Mohsin, "Feasibility of Commercial Banking Without Rate of Interest and Its Socio-Economic
Significance", IQ. Vol. XX-XXII (4), 1978, pp. 152 - 155.
44 Uzair, Some Conceptual and Practical Aspects of Interest-Free Banking, pp. 46-47; There may be. for
example, an arrangement thet the entrepreneur (or the borrower in the present-day banking system) and the
bank would share the profit in a ratio of 50 per cent each, or 60 per cent for the entrepreneur and 40 per
cent for the bank, or any such ratio as may be agreed upon between themselves. Similarly, there will be
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In this triangular relationship depositors-bank-entrepreneurs as shown in Figure
3.1 below, the bank will have direct contact with both the depositors and the
entrepreneurs. The bank accepts deposits into "investment accounts" entitled to an
agreed percentage share of the profits accruing to the bank on the profitable
employment of these deposits in a pooled manner. These depositors are liable to
losses, their liability being limited to the extent of their deposits. As a financial
intermediary mobilising savings from the public, the bank will invest their funds
(share capital, mudarabah deposits and part of the demand deposits) in a variety of
forms of investments including partnership contracts with other investors or
mudarabah contracts with entrepreneurs. The bank and investors are entitled to an
agreed percentage share of the profits accruing to these funds in the business
enterprise. These mudarabah funds invested in the business are also liable to losses
which are limited to the extent of the funds supplied. The bank and its shareholders
will share the profit and loss in the enterprise, i. e. the bank after sharing the profit
and loss with the entreprenuers on the mutually agreed terms, will share its income
with the depositors according to the predetermined percentage.45
an arrangement between the bank and the supplier of capital (or depositors in the present-day banking
system) for sharing the profit in the ratio of 50 per cent each or 60 per cent for the bank and 40 per cent
for the suppliers of capital funds or the depositors.
45
Waqar Masood Khan. op. cil., p. 74; M. N. Siddiqi. Banking Without Interest, pp. 21 -37; Idem, Issues
In Islamic Banking, pp. 22 - 24,59 -61, 97 -113, pp. 134 - 136; Idem, "Economics of Profit-Sharing", in
Ziauddin Ahmad, et al (eds.), Fiscal Policy and Resource Allocation in Islam, Leicester, and Islamabad,
1983, pp. 163 -177; Abu N. M. Wahid, "A Theoretical Justification of Islamic Banks", IQ, Vol. XXX(3),
1986, pp. 193 - 194; Timur Kuran, "The Economic System in Contemporary Islamic Thought :
Interpretation and Assesment", IJMES, Vol. XV11I. 1986, pp. 149 - 152; Zubair Iqbal, "Theory of Profit
: The Islamic Viewpoint", JRIE, Vol. 1(1). 1983. pp. 12 - 15; Zaidi Sattar. "A Dynamic Investment Model




Another way of profit and loss sharing in the context of Islamic banking is
musharakah (partnership). In distinction to mudarabah, the two partners in
musharakah participate in the capital of the venture. Profits are allocated according
to the agreed proportion. If losses occur, they are borne by the partners in proportion
to their contribution of the capital. For example, the bank may participate in 60 per
cent of the capital though its share in profits might not exceed 50 per cent, whilst,
in the case of losses, the bank's liability must not be less than 60 per cent.
A number of other alternative financing arrangements within the general
framework of Islamic values have been suggested in the literature of Islamic banking.
The major alternatives recommended are : ijarah (leasing), hire-purchase, bayc
bithaman ajil or bayc mu'ajjal (a sale against deferred payment), murdbahah and bayc
al-salam,46 In all other instances these scholars advise against employment of these
methods, warning that the banking system may come to rely too heavily on weakly
Islamic modes such as murabahah, which, because of their simplicity, minimal risk
4f'
CII Reports, p. 110.
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and predetermined fixed rate of return, preserve the status quo associated with
traditional banking, with its emphasis on the creditworthiness of the client and the
maintenance of credit-debtor relationship.47
The general principle, which is beyond dispute as being the criterion for
determining the permissibility or otherwise of any method of financing, is that the
financier cannot avert the taking of risk if he wishes to derive an income.48 However,
these alternative techniques would be of importance in financing small businesses that
are unable to maintain proper accounts and hence may not be conducive to
47
I he Council of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan gave due recognition to the difficulties that may arise in
changing the whole system to profit sharing in one step. and. therefore, gave qualified approval to the
above-mentioned other methods being used in conjunction with profit and loss sharing (mudarabah and
musharakah). CII Report, p. 110; For a discussion see M. U. Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System,
pp. 166 - 173. Dr. Ziauddin Ahmed makes the following observation about these techniques: "Though far
simpler to operate compared to profit/sharing, (they) cannot be recommended for widespread use as they
cannot be of any material assistence in achieving the socio-economic objectives of an Islamic economy.
The fact that replacement of interest by baf mu'ajjaI (mark-up), for example, does not represent any
substantive change becomes apparent if one views it in the perspective of the philosophy behind the
prohibition of interest. As mentioned earlier, the interest system is disallowed in Islam because intrinsically
it is a highly inequitable system. The feature that makes the interest system inequitable is that the provider
of funds is assured a fixed return while all the risk is borne by the user of these capital funds. Justice,
which is a hallmark of the Islamic system, demands that provider of capital funds should share the risk with
the entrepreneur if he wishes to earn profit. It is easy to see. therefore, that the mark-up system, and for
that matter all devices which involve a fixed predetermined return on capital, are no real substitutes for
interest". Ziauddin Ahmed, Concept and Models of Islamic Banking : An Assessment, Islamabad, 1984, p.
11. For some other views on the subject, see Abbas Mirakhor, "The Progress of Islamic Banking : The
Case of Iran and Pakistan" in Chibli Mallat (ed.), Islamic Law and Finance, London, 1988, pp. 91 - 113.
Dr. Mirakhor refers to these techniques as 'weak' and argues that even in the transition to full Islamic
banking, the policy of heavy reliance on weakly Islamic measures as means of minimising risk may not
be optimal. Ibid., pp. 95 - 96 and Idem, "Short-term Asset Concentration and Islamic Banking" in Mohsin
S. Khan and Abbas Mirakhor (eds.), Theoretical Studies in Islamic Banking and Finance, Houston, U. S.
A., 1987, pp. 186 - 188; See also Zubayr Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, "Islamic Banking" in al-Tawhid, Vol.
IV (3), 1986, pp. 94 - 103; see also M. N. Siddiqi. Issues in Islamic Banking : Selected Papers, Leicester,
U. K., 1983. pp. 133 - 145; Mohsin S. Khan and Abbas Mirakhor, "The Framework and Practice of Islamic
Banking " in Finance and Development, September 1986, pp. 33 -34; Shahrukh Rafi Khan, "An Economic
Analysis of a PLS Model for the Financial Sector" in Mohsin S. Khan and Abbas Mirakhor (eds.) (1987),
Theoretical Studies in Islamic Banking and Finance, pp. 107 - 124; Nadeem U1 Haque and Abbas
Mirakhor, "Saving Behaviour in an Economy Without Fixed Interest" interest" in Ibid, pp. 125 - 139; Idem,
"Optimal Profit-Sharing Contracts and Investment in an Interest-Free Economy" in Ibid., pp. 141 - 161.




However, cautioning against the danger that such methods could open a back¬
door for interest,50 it is emphasised that their use should be kept to the minimum
extent that maybe unavoidably necessary under given conditions and that their use
as general techniques of financing must never be allowed.51
The Muslim monetary authorities, on the other hand, argue that adoption of fully
Islamic banking on the basis of risk-return is embarking "on an uncharted course"52
and that steps towards full implementation of Islamic banking must be taken
cautiously and carefully, lest the financial structure "collapse under its own weight".53
They assert that in addition to being compatible with Islamic norms, the banking
operations adopted must be viable because:
The bank's money belongs to a number of depositors of all shapes and sizes:
the big shots are there, but also ordinary people who make deposits as small
as RS. 1000 in their accounts. That money is channeled to borrowers by the
bank, which is also a trustee of that money. The system should be such that
it protects the depositor and also gives him an adequate rate of return. Unless
41
M. U. Chapra (1991), "Towards an Islamic Financial System", p. 139.
50 A group of Muslim economists who were invited to comment on the CII Report ( see Ziauddin Ahmed,
et al (eds.) (1983, p. 12), strongly cautioned "against the danger that such methods could open a back door
to interest", and they emphasized that "keeping in view the rational for the condemnation and prohibition
of interest in Islam, no mechanism other than profit/sharing really conforms to the spirit of Islam".
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that these scholars were justified in their concern. For instance,
Qureshi comments that murabahah transactions "have been the subject of acute criticism because (this kind
of arrangement) is tending to encompass the bulk of financial transactions. See D. M. Qureshi, "Investment
Financing on the Basis of Shared Risk", p. 15. A Paper presented at the First Workshop on "Interest-Free
Banking", Karachi, Pakistan, 1985. The fear that this would happen had been expressed earlier by M. N.
Siddiqi in his comment on CII Report, p. 225.
51 CII Report, p. 110; Towards, p. 171.
52 A. G. N. Kazi. "Islamic Banking in Perspective" in JIBF. Vol. 1(3), (Karachi, 1984), p. 9.
53 Ibid., p. 13.
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we safeguard the interest of the depositor, the system will be totally unfair
because it will be lacking in cadl (justice) which is essential in any Islamic
system.54
Clearly, although the Muslim monetary authorities agree that ideally the Islamic
financial system should be based on risk-return sharing, however, as trustees of
public money, they are concerned with the safety of the bank first and wish to avoid
bankruptcy and the failure of the bank. The statement elsewhere warns that "...the
structure which we have should be a viable structure which will protect the banking
system itself and which does not lead to the collapse of the banking system".55
This cautious concern with the safety of the banking system is essentially based
on a type of moral hazard argument that, in the absence of Islamic ethical values
functioning in the business community,56 engaging in risk-return activities such as
mudarabah and musharakah by the banks without adequate safeguards may lead to
the bankruptcy of the banks.57 This legitimate concern of the authorities translates
into policies which approach Islamic banking with the utmost caution, thus resulting
in heavy reliance on weakly Islamic modes of finance, such as murabahah, which
have a minimum probability of risk.
54
ibid., p. 13.
55 Ibid., p. 10.
56 Qureshi argues that "the successful functioning of the profit and loss sharing system will depend on the
existence of a high degree of business ethics and the moral fabric of the society leaves much to be desired",
he concludes that "initially, therefore, recourse may have to be taken to techniques which are not predicated
on the maintenance of proper books of accounts". See D. M. Qureshi. "Instruments of Islamic Banking in
the Muslim World : An Evaluation", p. 89. A Paper presented at the International Seminar on Islamic
Banking. Islamabad, 1984.
57 See Chapra (1985). pp. 223 - 227; Idem. Islam and the Economic Challenge. Leicester, 1992, pp. 235 -
248.
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3.3. The Establishment of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) *
3.3.1. Historical perspectives
The Muslims in Malaysia, like their counterparts elsewhere, have for a long time
had the desire to practise the rules of the Sharfah in the fields of banking and
finance. They have always been cautious about being involved in riba transactions.59
They had developed their own transactions which avoided riba. One such customary
transaction which was prevalent amongst the Malays in pre-colonial times, and has
survived until now, is jual janji (conditional sale).60
The origin of jual janji has been attributed to the objection that Malays (as
Muslims) have towards riba., which is the economic basis on which the modern
system of charge or mortgage functions. The answer to this objection, which proceeds
58
Hereafter referred to as BIMB.
59 Article, "Economic and Financial Development of Muslim Society", in al-Nahdah, Vol. VII (4), (Kuala
Lumpur, 1987). pp. 20 - 22; Nik Mustapha Nik Hassan. "Pendekatan Sistem Ekonomi Islam Dalam
Meningkatkan dan Memajukan Kedudukan Ekonomi Masyarakat Melayu", in Occasional Paper Kulliyyah
of Economics, International Islamic University, Malaysia, June 1989, pp. 8-11; See also Ibrahim Omar,
"Sistem Kewangan Islam Memasuki Dagangan Antarabangsa", in Dakwah, (Kuala Lumpur, November
1984), pp. 43 - 45; Nungsari Ahmad Radhi, "Wang, Kadar Bunga dan Riba", A Paper Presented at the
Seminar Kursus Ekonomi Islam, Jitra, Kedah, 1987; Sobri Salamon, Perniagaan Menurut Pandangan Islam,
Shah Alam, Malaysia, 1988, pp. 120 - 124; Fokus, "Masalah Bank dan Saham : Penyelesaiannya Cara
Islam", in Dunia Islam, (Kuala Lumpur, July 1991), pp. 21 - 28; Khoo Kay Kim, "Islam and Economic
Development in Malaysia : A Historical Perspective". A Paper presented at the International Seminar on
Islam and Development in Southeast Asia, 25 - 26 September 1991, Kuala Lumpur; Zakariya Man, "Riba
dan Kadar Bunga : Penilaian dan Penjelasan Kepada Isu Semasa", A Paper presented at the Siri Seminar
Ekonomi Islam. 18-19 January 1994, Kuala Lumpur.
60 The English term is translated by Maxwell.(See W. E. Maxwell, "The Law and the Customs of the
Malays with Reference to the Tenure of Land". Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,
No. XIII. June 1884. p. 123; Cf. M. B. Hooker, Reading in Malay Adats Laws, Singapore, 1970, pp. 354 -
361; J. M. Gullick, Malay Society in the Late Nineteenth Century, Singapore, 1987, pp. 98 - 149). Though
Maxwell's translation 'conditional sale' is conceptually correct, 'promissory sale' is more precise. The
Customary practice of jual janji is recognised in the National Land Code (NLC), Section 4(2).
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from the Islamic injunctions against riba, is the transaction known as bayc bi al-
wafa\ which is the sale with an option to repurchase.61
The identification of jual janji as a local customary transaction peculiar to the
Malays because of religious considerations received judicial notice from the British
judge. Briggs, in the case of Tengku Zahara v. Che Yusuf (1951 17 MLJ 1), in
which he held that:
The whole purpose ofjual janji transactions is to provide a procedure
for securing loans and giving the lender adequate recompense
therefore without infringing the prohibition of usury which is binding
on the conscience of all good Muslims.
In Mohamed Isa v. Haji Ibrahim (1968 1 MLJ 186), Azmi, Chief Judge
(Malaya) made a similar observation regarding this religious element when he said
that amongst the Kedah Malays, the transaction of jual janji was in fact, " a
conditional transfer with a right to repurchase and so made in order to enable the
lender to benefit from the transaction lawfully to Muslim law".
Realising that the prohibition of riba for Muslims, had led to growing demands
M
Under this practice, if a land owner would like to obtain a credit facility without involving riba, he could
sell his land to another person at an agreed price. Normally, the price is not the market price but far
cheaper. In agreement, a condition was stipulated that within a certain period of time (say 2 or 3 years),
the seller would re-purchase the land at the same price. The buyer was given a right to occupy the land
as well as have usufructuary right. If the time stated has expired and the seller failed to re-purchase the
land, the ownership of the land is, therefore, transferred to the buyer. This transaction was considered
acceptable by Islam as no riba element was involved. For detail, see S. Buang, "Kearah Pengislaman
Kanun Tanah Negara", in Law Faculty, University of Malaya, Makalah Undang-undang Menghormati
Ahmad Ibrahim. Kuala Lumpur, 1988, pp. 175 - 176; Idem, "The law of Real Property in Malaysia" in I1U
Law Journal, Vol. 1(1). Petaling Jaya, Malaysia. 1989, pp. 97 - 98; Idem, Malaysian Torrens System,
Kuala Lumpur. 1989, pp.87 - 88. However some criticised Jual janji as one way to circumvent the
prohibition of interest (riba). See S. Gordon, "Contradictions in the Malay Economic Structure" in Intisari,
Vol. 1(1), Singapore, 1963, pp.30 - 32.
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for the establishment of an Islamic bank in Malaysia.62 In the early 1960s, the first
major move towards establishing an interest-free financial institution was the setting
up of the Tabung Haji (Pilgrims' Management and Fund Board). The success of TH
in mobilising the funds of the depositors in accordance with Islamic principles put
pressure on the Government to establish an Islamic bank.63 Further, the desire of the
Muslims in Malaysia was especially rekindled when, in the early 1970's there was a
successful move to establish Islamic banks in West Asia such as the Islamic
Development Bank in 1974 which operates in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.64
A more formal demand for the establishment of an Islamic bank in Malaysia was
first made in 1980 when the Bumiputera Economic Congress passed a resolution
urging the Government to allow the Pilgrims' Management and Fund Board to
establish an Islamic bank in Malaysia in order to mobilise and invest the funds of the
Muslims in the country in accordance with Sharicah principles.65 Implementation of
such a resolution began in 1981 under Dr. Mahathir, the Prime Minister of Malaysia,
when he invited prominent international Muslim scholars to Malaysia and accepted
their recommendation on how Government could Islamise the administrative
62
Sobri Salamon, "Prinsip-Prinsip Falsafah Ekonomi Bank Islam", in Dakwah, (Kuala Lumpur, May 1982),
pp. 43 - 46; Idem. "Falsafah Ekonomi Bank Islam : Mengapa Malaysia Perlu Kepada Bank Islam", in
Muhammad Syukri Salleh (ed.), Konsep dan Perlaksanaan Pembangunan Berteraskan Islam, Pulau Pinang,
1990, pp. 77 - 101; Tony Naughton and Bala Shanmugam, "Interest-Free Banking in Malaysia", in National
Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, February 1990. p. 22.; Cf. Muhammad Abu Bakar, "Islamic
Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia". Asian Survey, Vol. XXi (10), 1981, pp. 1041 - 1059.
63 See Chapter Five, 5.1, pp. 254 - 257.
64 See Chapter III. 3.1. b and c., pp. 135 - 137.
65 Abdul Halim Ismail (1983a), "Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad : Establishment and Operations", p. 1. Paper
presented at the International Conference on Islam and Technology, Malaysia, December 1983. Hereafter
referred to as Abdul Halim Ismail (1983a); BIMB, Bank Islam Penubuhan dan Operasi. Kuala Lumpur,
1989, p. 3; See also, M. Muttalib, "Islamic Revivalism in Asian States : Political Implications", Asian
Survey. Vol. XXX (9). 1990. pp. 881 & 889; Abdul Monir Yaacub. "Merealisasikan Sistem Pinjaman
Rahan" in Berita Harian, 22 October. 1993, p. 10.
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machinery of the country by setting up Islamic institutions such as banks and
universities.66 Likewise at the National Seminar on the Concept of Development in
Islam, which was held at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia in Bangi in March 1981,
a resolution was passed requesting the Government of Malaysia to take immediate
steps to legislate an Act which would enable the setting up of banks and financial
institutions whose operations would be based on Islamic principles.67 On the same
occasion. Dr. Mahathir announced the setting up of an Islamic Research Group and
a Special Enforcement Group with the task of conducting research on all issues
relating to an Islamic economic system, as well as assisting the Government's
development projects by ensuring that they conform to Islamic principles.68 Their
efforts finally culminated in the appointment by the Prime Minister of a National
Steering Committee on the Islamic Bank on 30 July 1981.69 The twenty-member
Steering Committee headed by the Raja Tan Sri Mohar, the special advisor to the
Prime Minister, was given the following tasks:
a.- To study and identify various critical aspects of Islamic banking such as the
basis of the establishment, areas of operation, and business relationship with
the customers and other financial institutions.
b. To examine the suitability of Islamic banking in the Malaysian context from
various points of view including religious, legal, racial, social and
66
H. Mutalib, Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics, Singapore. 1990, p. 138; Aidit Ghazali, Development
: An Islamic Perspective, Petaling Jaya, 1990. pp. 142 - 144; Cf. Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne, "The
Mahathir Administration in Malaysia : Discipline Through Islam", Pacific Affair, 56 (Winter 1983 - 84),
pp. 617 - 648; William Case, "Comparative Malaysian Leadership Tunku Abdul Rahman and Mahathir
Mohamad", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXI (5), 1991, pp. 456 - 473;
67 Abdul Halim Ismail."Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad : Structure and Functions", pp. 1- 2. Paper presented
at the Seminar on Current Trends and Development of the Banking Industry in Malaysia. Bangi, Malaysia,
1983. Hereafter referred to as Abdul Halim Ismail (1983b); BIMB (1989), op. cit., p. 3.
68 H. Mutalib (1990). op cit., p. 138.
BIMB (1989), pp. 3 - 4.
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development angles; and
c. To present to the Government of Malaysia a proposal to establish Bank Islam
Malaysia in a complete report encompassing the following aspects: (i)
fundamental concepts of Islamic banking; (ii) legal framework; (iii) structure
of the company; (iv) area of operation; and (v) organizational structure.70
3.3.2. Basic Principles of the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
The report of the National Steering Committee on the Islamic Bank of Malaysia
outlines three major principles that should govern the operation of the Bank Islam:
a. The prohibition of riba and the sharing of profit and loss. Profit and loss-
sharing is the basis of all economic activities involving money, wealth and
labour in Islam. This concept of profit-sharing should replace interest as an
important mechanism in the present banking system.
b. Management of Islamic bank based on Islamic transactions (muLamalah). The
success of an Islamic bank is largely dependent on the understanding and
implementation of the Islamic principle of transactions on the part of the
management. Thus, an Islamic bank must ensure that its activities will not be
in conflict with the Sharfah (Islamic Law).
c. Avoidance of activities contradictory to the interest of the Muslim ummah.
Any activity which is not in conformity with the interest of the ummah is
70
Ahmad Ibrahim, "The Sharfah and Codification: Malaysia Experience", in Shariah Law Journal Vol.
IV. (Petaling Jaya. January 1987), pp. 58 - 59; Zakariya Man, "Islamic Banking : The Malaysian
Experience" in Mohamed Ariff (ed.), Islamic Banking in Southeast Asia, Singapore, 1988, p.70.
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tantamount to misuse and abuse of the wealth entrusted by God.71
The National Steering Committee submitted its report on 5 July 1982, and the
report was accepted by the government. The recommendations of the committee
included the following:
a. An Islamic bank which operates according to the principles of Sharfah
should be established.
b. The bank should be incorporated as a limited company under the Company
Act 1965.
c. An act styled the Islamic Banking Act 1983 should be legislated and some
consequential amendments should be made to other existing related Acts.
d. Bank Negara (Central Bank) should administer the Islamic Banking Act 1983.
e. The bank should set up a Religious Supervisory Council to ensure that the
operations of the Bank comply with the principles of the Sharfah.12
3.3.3. Legal and Regulatory Framework of BIMB
(a) Incorporation
The Bank Islam was finally incorporated as a limited company under the
71
BIMB (1989), pp. 4 - 5; Bank Negara Malaysia, Wang dan Urusan Bank di Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur,
1992, pp. 216 - 218 and 477; Abdul Samad bin Haji Alias, et al, Guide to Islamic Banking in Malaysia
: An Overview, Kuala Lumpur, 1993, p. 2. See also Ahmad Ibrahim, "The Administration of Islamic
Financial Institutions", in Syariah Law Journal, Vol. VII, (Petaling Jaya, September 1991), pp. 16 - 17.
72 Abdul Halim Ismail (1983a), p. 2; Idem, " Bank Islam malaysia Berhad : Principles and Operations" in
Sheikh Ghazali Sheikh Abood, et al (eds.), An Introduction to Islamic Finance, Kuala Lumpur, 1992, p.
244; BIMB (1989), p. 4; Ahmad Ibrahim, "Legal Aspect of the Establishment of the Islamic Law", a
working paper presented at the International Conference on Islam and Technology, Kuala Lumpur, 1985,
pp. 11 - 13.
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Company Act 1965 on 1 March 1983 taking the name of Bank Islam Malaysia
Berhad (BIMB) with its registered office situated in Malaysia. Its memorandum of
Association prefaces that "all businesses of the company will be transacted in
accordance with Islamic principles, rules andpractices". It lists among the company's
first objectives as "to carry on the Islamic banking business in all its branches and
departments and to transact and do all matters and things incidental thereto, or which
may at any time hereafter at any place where the company shall carry on business
be usual in connection with the Islamic banking business". The memorandum then
proceeds to enumerate a number of possible objects for which the company is
established, and seals the listing with a proviso that "nothing in this memorandum
contained also shall empower the company to carry on any business or do anything
involving any element which is not approved by the religion of Islam".73
To carry out its activities on interest free basis, the bank has an authorized capital
of RM 500 million, divided into 500 million ordinary shares of RM 1.00 each and
the initial paid-up capital of the bank is RM 80 million, which is RM 20 million less
than the amount recommended by the National Steering Committee.74 The initial
paid-up capital then held by the Malaysian Government and various other parties was
as follows:
73
Abdul Halim Ismail (1983a), pp. 2 - 3; Idem (1992), op. cit, pp. 245 - 246.
74 Abdul Halim Ismail (1983a), p. 3; BIMB (1989), p. 6; Article, "Islamic Banking in Malaysia", Banker's
Journal, Malaysia. No. 52, April. 1989. pp. 63 - 64.
155
Shareholders RM Million
Government of Malaysia 30
Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH) 10
Muslim Welfare Organization of Malaysia 5
State Religious Councils 20
State Religious Agencies 3
Federal Agencies 12
Total 80
Source : BIMB. Penubuhan dan Operasi. Kuala Lumpur, 1989. p. 6: Bank Negara Malaysia,
Annual Report 1987, pp. 16 - 17.
Table : 2
Commercial Banks (Locally Incorporated) : Assets, Deposits and Shareholders' Funds (RM
Million) (As at 31 December 1984)
Name of Institution Assets Deposits Shareholders'
Funds
Ranking
Malayan Banking Berhad ** 22.067.9 14,066.8 1,132.1 1
Bank Bumiputera Malaysia Berhad 21.102.4 14,658 1,074.5 2
Public Bank Berhad 5,811.9 4,785 319 3
United Malayan Banking Corporation
Berhad*
7,494.3 4,517.4 200.9 4
Development and Commercial Bank
Berhad
4.154 2,999.1 174.5 5
United Asian Bank Berhad* 3,543.9 2,161.9 132.7 6
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB)* 563.4 279.6 80.4 7
Perwira Habib Bank Berhad 2,346.1 1,844.7 76.4 8
Malayan United Bank Berhad 1,540 1,262 75 9
Hock Hua Bank Berhad 1,313.3 973.4 74.4 10
Kwong Yik Bank Berhad 1.341.3 1.090.2 72.7 11
Notes:
* Position as at 31 December 1983
** Position as at 30 June 1985
Source : Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad. The Kuala Lumpur Bankers Directory, 1986.
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Based on the shareholders' funds of the bank which amounted to RM 80.4
millionas at 31 December 1984 , the BIMB can be placed among the seven largest
locally incorporated commercial banks in Malaysia. This comparison is clearly shown
in Table 2. Based on these comparisons, obviously the BIMB has a sound base to
conduct its operations and to gain the people's confidence. The confidence of the
people towards the bank also stems from the fact that the Government and other
major religious agencies and Muslim institutions in the country have contributed to
the bank shareholders' funds. It is significant to note that the BIMB is the first Islamic
bank to be established with direct Government involvement, while other earlier
Islamic commercial banks in other Muslim countries were established mainly by
private individuals.75
(b) Islamic Banking Act (IBA) 198376
■ The BankingAct 1973 requires the rate of interest to be an important mechanism
for banking operations and prohibits banks from trading.77 In contrast, the Qur'an
explicitly states that, "Allah has permitted trade and prohibited interest (ribd)".7S This
divergence between the Banking Act 1973 and the Qur'anic injunctions implies that
the initial legal environment in Malaysia did not permit the establishment of an
Islamic bank that would operate without the element of interest.
^
For example Dar at-Mat al-Islami and al-Baraka Group. See Ausaf Ahmad (1987), pp. 14 - 15.
76 Flereafter referred to as IBA 1983.
77
Banking Act, 1973 (Act No. 1202, 1973), section 31.
78 Q. 2 : 275.
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In view of the above conflict, the Islamic Banking Act was legislated towards the
end of 1982 to facilitate the establishment of Bank Islam. The Act, which was
gazetted on 10 March 1983, is now known as the Islamic Banking Act 1983 (Act No.
276, 1983). The Act seeks to provide for the licensing and regulating of the Bank
Islam business. It has been modelled on the country's Banking Act 1973 (now
amended by the Banking and Financial Institution Act (BAFIA), 1989 with
modifications and amendments as are necessary to conform with Islamic banking
practises. It basically retains the normal practices of prudent banking contained in the
Banking Act 197379 and vests the Central Bank (Bank Negara) with similar powers
of supervision and regulation over Bank Islam as in the case with other licensed
banks.80
(c) Salient Features of the Islamic Banking Act 1983
■ The following are the major provisions of the IBA 1983 as compared with the
BAFIA 1989:
a. Definition section {IBA, Section 2) defines an Islamic bank as "any
company which carries on Islamic banking business".
b. Definition of "Islamic banking business". According to
Section 2 IBA 1983, "Islamic banking business" means "banking
business whose aims and operations do not involve any element which
is not approved by the Religion of Islam". This definition surely poses
71
Article, "The Law and Banking", in Banker's Journal Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur. June, 1987), p. 17.
80 Bank Negara Malaysia. Wang dan Urusan Bank di Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur. 1992, pp. 103 -167. See
also Badariah Sahamid, "Bank Islam : Konsep dan Amalan" in Faculty of Law, University of Malaya,
Makalah Undang-Undang Menghormati Ahmad Ibrahim. Kuala Lumpur, 1988. pp. 79 - 80.
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the question: What is Islamic banking business? It has been clarified
through various lectures given by BIMB's officials and its handbook
that the banking mechanism of BIMB is as mentioned below (3.5), i.
e. mudarabah, musharakah, murabahah, bayc bi thaman ajil, bayc
salam, ijarah, wadfah, wakdlah. kafalah and qard hasan.S] However,
these concepts and principles are not laid out in detail in the Act.
Having a first glance at the Act, one could feel that there is nothing
Islamic about the whole Act except for where it states "... aims and
f
operation not contrary to the religion of Islam". However, Section 2
of BAFIA 1989 defines "banking (and finance) business" as:
The business of receiving money in any currency or deposit accounts;
paying and collecting cheques drawn by or paid in by customers and
provision of finance, which include the lending of money, leasing
business, factoring business, the purchase of bills of exchange,
promissory notes, certificates of deposits, debentures or other
negotiable instruments; and acceptance or guarantee of any liability,
obligation or duty of any person and includes such other business as
the Central Bank, with the approval of the Minister may prescribe.
In the absence of a statutory definition of "banking business" in the
IBA 1983, it is the practice and in fact the law, to have regard to the
Common Law to determine its meaning.82 It would appear therefore
that the IBA 1983 intends to define "Islamic banking business" in
similar terms as that carried out by conventional banks in Common
Law jurisdiction.83 The only exception is that the aims and operations
81
See also Bank Negara Malaysia, Wang dan Urusan Bank di Malaysia, pp. 216 - 218.
112 Ahmad Ibrahim (1987), "The Shortah and Codification: Malaysia Experience", p. 59 - 60; see also Idem
(1985), "Legal Aspects of the Establishment of the Islamic Law", pp. 11 - 12.
83 See Section 2 of Banking and Financial Institution Act (BAFIA), 1989.
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of such banking business should not involve any element which is not
approved by the religion of Islam.84
c. Engaging in Trade and Commerce.
The fundamental principle of Islamic finance is trading and profit and
loss sharing. Islamic banks have to trade to earn an income since the
Qur'an expressly forbids riba but allows profit-making by trading.85
However, according to Section 31, BAFIA 1989, conventional banks
and financial institutions are not allowed to engage in wholesale or
retail trading. Therefore, this provision is absent in the IBA 1983
which enables the Islamic bank to engage in such trade and commerce
and is in line with the Sharfah.
(d) Government Investment Act 1982
■ According to the ShariLah rules, an Islamic bank is not allowed to trade in
Treasury Bills or other papers such as Government Bonds or securities which are
interest-based transactions. From the operation point of view, however, it is important
for the BIMB to trade in these papers in order to meet its legal liquidity
requirements.86 In order to make the operations of BIMB possible, consequently, The
Investment Act 1982 was passed enabling the Government to issue non-interest
84
See Section 2 of IBA 1983.
85 Q. 2 : 275 : "..But Allah has permitted trade and forbidden usury".
86 Bank Negara Malaysia, Wang dan Urusan Bank di Malaysia, pp. 216 and 406.
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bearing investment certificates so as to meet BIMB's liquidity requirements87 in terms
of its holdings of liquid assets as well as to provide an investment avenue for its
excess funds. The issuance of Goverment Investment Certificates (G1C) which is
governed by the principle of qard hasan represents a benevolent loan to the
Government, except that there is no pre-determined rate of interest. The holder of
these Certificates also does not expect any returns on the capital except the principle
amount invested which will be fully refunded upon maturity.88
(e) Religious Supervisory Council
B1MB has set up a Religious (Sharfah) Supervisory Council to supervise and
advise its banking operations to ensure that its operations do not involve any element
which is not permissible in Sharicah,s9 This Council has a minimum of three and a
maximum of seven members of eminent Muslim Religious Scholars in the country.90
87
The certificates are. however, not limited to BIMB, but are also made available to others in the financial
system which represent borrowings by the Government for Its development expenditure. See Jaffar Hussein,
"Facing the Challenge of Islamic Finance", in al-Nahdah, Vol. VII (4), (Kuala Lumpur, 1987), p. 26; Bank
Negara Malaysia, Wang dan Urusan Bank di Malaysia, p. 406.
88 However, at the discretion of the Government, BIMB will be paid some dividends at the maturity of these
Certificates and the rate of dividends is to be determined by the Minister of Finance. Bank Negara
Malaysia, Wang dan Urusan Bank di Malaysia, p. 406; Article, "Islamic Banking in Malaysia", in Banker's
Journal Malaysia. April 1989. p. 65.
89 The Islamic Bank Act 1983 states on the licensing of Islamic banks that : "The Central Bank shall not
recommended the grant of license, and the Minister shall not grant a license, unless the Central Bank or
the Minister, as the case may be, is satisfied: (b) that there is, in the articles of association of the bank
concerned, provision for the establishment of a Sharfah advisory body to advise the bank on the
operations of its banking business in order to ensure that they do not involve any element which is not
approved by the Religion of Islam".
90 Accordingly, Article (3) of the Bank's Articles of Association provide that; (a) "A Religious Supervisory
Council, whose members would be made up of Muslim Religious scholars in the country, shall be
established to advise the company on the operations of its banking business...; (b) The Religious
Supervisory Council shall have a minimum of three and a maximum of seven members whose appointment
shall be acceptable to the Minister for a term not exceeding two years and each member is eligible for
reappointment".
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The supervisory role of the Religious Supervisory Council has been criticised in the
following words:
Although the Sharfah Advisory Body has the power to advise, it is
questionable as to how far it is able to perform such a function. It
must be remembered that the Central Bank supervises the whole
banking system and therefore the ultimate power rests with the Central
Bank. 1 can understand the government's position in protecting its
interest of the Bank's paid up capital but it is quite pointless to set up




In view of the primary objective for which it is set up, BIMB has formulated its
corporative objective as follows:
The corporate objective of the Bank is to provide banking facilities and
services in accordance with Islamic principles, rules and practices to all
Muslims and the population of this country. The Bank's effort to provide
these banking facilities and services is to be undertaken within the framework
of its viability and capability to continuously grow and expand.92
3.4.2. Organizational structure
The Organizational structure of BIMB is shown in the figure 3.2. The structure
consists of three divisions with line functions, i. e. operations, trade finance and
treasury, and corporate investments and three other divisions with staff functions, i.
"
N. Mohd. Awal, "Banking System : Legal Impediment Towards Its Islamisation in Malaysia" in Jurnal
Perundangan, Vol. 1(1), (Petaling Jaya, 1989), p. 28.
92 Abdul Halim Ismail. "Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad : Structure and Functions". A Paper presented at the
Seminar on Current Trends and Development of the Banking Industry in Malaysia, in Bangi, Selangor,
Malaysia. 6-7 June 1983; See also idem, "BIMB : Satu Tinjauan Tentang Perkembangannya 10 Tahun
Akan Datang". p. 3. A Paper presented at the Seminar Sistem Kewangan Islam, Universiti Kebangsaan
Malaysia, Bangi, 1984.
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e. establishment, accounts and legal, and secretarial. Each division is divided into
departments and further subdivided into units as deemed necessary. BIMB has its
Board of Directors comprising the nominees of its major shareholders who are elected
at the annual general meetings. The management of the Bank is spearheaded by the
Managing Director. The Managing Director and the Internal Auditors report to the
Board of Directors. Meanwhile, the Religious (Sharfah) Supervisory Council advises
the Board of Directors on all areas of operations related to religious affairs.93




































































3.4.3. Subsidiaries and Branch Network
BIMB formed three subsidiary companies during its second financial year (1 July
1984 to 30 June 1985). For the purpose of acquisition of immovable and movable
fixed assets, BIMB formed a wholly-owned subsidiary company with a paid-up
capital of RM $ 1 million under the name of Syarikat al-Ijarah Sendirian Berhad.
Another wholly-owned subsidiary company with a paid-up capital of RM 25,000,
known as al-Wakalah Nominees Sendirian Berhad was formed to provide portfolio
investment management and nominee services for BIMB and its clients.94 A third
subsidiary company is the 51-per cent owned Syarikat Takaful Sendirian Berhad
which is engaged in takaful (Islamic Insurance) business in both family takaful
business as well as general takaful business. The company began its Islamic insurance
operation in the financial year 1985/86.95
As at 30th June 1993, BIMB had successfully opened 44 full-service branches in
almost all the major towns in Malaysia, including 32 mini branches which accept
deposits in current, savings and investment account facilities.96
3.5. Banking Operations
BIMB commenced its business operations on July 1, 1983 to meet the savings
14
Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report 1987, p. 110.
95 BIMB, Annua! Report 1986, p. 7; Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad, Annual Report 1986, p.
5.
96 BIMB. Annual Report 1993. p. 11.
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and credit need of the Malaysians in general and the Muslim community in
particular.97 In line with the basis of the Bank's establishment and its corporate
mission, all of its banking operations and activities are in accordance with the
principles of Sharfah such as wad?ah, mudarabah, musharakah, murdbahah, bayc
bi thaman ajil, ijarah, wakalah, kafalah and qard hasan.9S
3.5.1. Customers' Deposits
There is a consensus among scholars and practitioners of Islamic banking that
deposits can be mobilised using the two Sharfah contracts, i. e. wadfah and
mudarabahIn the case ofBIMB, deposits are received from its ordinary customers
through the following three accounts, namely:
(a) current accounts;
'"•See Mahathir Mohamad, the Prime Minister's speech on the opening of the operations of BIMB on the
First of July, 1983 published in Koleksi Ucapan Mahathir Mohamad, Kuala Lumpur, 1992, pp. 84 - 89.
98 Abdul Halim Ismail (1983a). pp. 7-8; Idem, "Pelaburan Harta Baitulmal Melalui Bank Islam dan
Syarikat Takaful", pp. 3 - 4. A Paper presented at the Seminar Baitulmal Peringkat Kebangsaan, Bangi,
1984/85; Idem, "Bank Islam : Prospek dan Perkembangannya Pada Masa Hadapan", pp. 1 -5. A Paper
presented at the Seminar Pengajian Islam Peringkat Kebangsaan, Universiti Malaya, 1985; Idem, "Bank
Islam Sebagai Satu Institusi Pembangunan Masyarakat Islam" in Muhammad Syukri Salleh (ed.), Konsep
dan Pelaksanaan Pembangunan Berteraskan Islam, Pulau Pinang, Malaysia, 1990, pp. 69 - 76; Idem,
(1992), p. 271; Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report 1984, p. 75; BIMB, Annual Report 1986, p. 7; BIMB
(1989), Penubuhan dan Operasi, 28 pp.; Tajuddin Abdul Rahman, "Peranan Bank Islam Dalam Membantu
Usahawan di Malaysia", pp. 3 - 4. A paper presented at the Seminar Keusahawanan dan Perniagaan Islam,
Petaling Jaya, Malaysia, 1987. See also Steven T. Abdul Kader, "Strategic Considerations for the
Development of Halal Financial Services'\jn al-Nahdah, Vol. Vil(l), (Kuala Lumpur, 1987), pp. 34 - 37;
M. Ali Baharom, "Kaedah-kaedah Sharpah Dalam Mucamalat", A Paper presented at the Seminar
Keusahawanan dan Perniagaan Islam, 28 - 29 November 1987, Petaling Jaya; Mahmud Saidon, "Teori
dan Bentuk-bentuk Kontrak Mu'amalat Berkaitan Dengan Perbankan", A Paper presented at the Siri
Seminar Ekonomi Islam, 18-19 January 1994. Kuala Lumpur;
99 For example, see Sacid Mar(an. Madkhal li al-Fikr al-Iqtisadi fi al-Islam, Muassasat al-Risalah, n. d.,
pp. 220 - 221; Ahmad al-Najjar. "Islamic Banking : Concept and Implementation", pp. 6-7. Paper
presented to the International Conference on Islam and Technology, Kuala Lumpur, 1983; Muhammad
Uzair, "Some Conceptual and Practical Aspects of Interest - Free Banking", in Khurshid Ahmad (ed.),
Studies in Islamic Economics, Leicester, 1981, pp. 48 - 49; Sobri Salamon, Bank Islam, Petaling Jaya,
Malaysia. 1984, p. 164; see also Ahmad al-Najjar, 100 Su'al wa 100 Ajwibah, Cairo, 1981, pp. 133 - 134.
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(b) savings accounts; and
(c) investment accounts.
(a) Current accounts
Current accounts are operated in the same way as in the conventional banks.
BIMB accepts deposits from its customers looking for safe custody of their funds on
the Sharfah principles of wadfah (safekeeping). With the permission of the
customers, the Bank uses these funds to generate profit which would entirely belong
to the Bank. In return, the Bank provides the customers with the cheque books and
other usual current account services. The customers may withdraw a part or the
whole of their balance at any time they so desire, and the Bank guarantees the refund
of such balances.100
(b) Savings accounts
BIMB accepts deposits from its customers looking for safe custody of their funds
with some degree of convenience in their use together with the possibility of some
profits in the form of saving accounts on the principle of wadfah. The customers
may withdraw part or the whole of their balance at any time they desire and the Bank
guarantees the refund of such balances. The Bank requests permission from such
customers to make use of their funds in any investments so long as these funds
10,1
Abdul Halim Ismail (1983a), p.8; Idem, (1983b), p. 5; Idem. "Cara Melabur di Bank Islam", Dakwah,
June, 1983, p. 12; BIMB (1989), p. 16; Mustafa Hamad,"The Operations of Islamic Banking and Its
Implications on Current Accountings Practices", p. 2. A Paper presented at the Seminar on New
Developments in Financing. Kuala Lumpur. 19 August, 1985; Mustapha Hamat, et al., "Applicability
Existing ofAccounting Standards for Islamic Banks". ISLAMIKA. (Department of Islamic Studies's Journal,
University of Malaya. 1991). pp. 250 -251. 255 - 258.
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remain with the Bank. However, in contrast with current accounts, the Bank may, at
its absolute discretion, reward the customers by returning a part of the profits
generated from the use of their funds from time to time.101
(i) Investment accounts
There are two type of investment accounts offered by BIMB, both of which are
operated on the mudarabah principle, i. e. General Investment Account and Special
Investment Account.
(i) General investment accounts
Deposits received under this account on the principle of mudarabah are invested
by the Bank on behalf of the depositors. BIMB accepts such deposits on the following
basis, i. e. 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 12 months, 15 months, 18
months, 24 months, 36 months, 48 months, 60 months and over. The mudarabah
contract requires the Bank to act as the "entrepreneur" and the customers as the
"providers of capital", and both parties to agree, among others, on how to distribute
the profits, if any, generated by the Bank from the investment of the funds. At
present, the Bank offers a profit-sharing ratio of 70 : 30 (70 per cent to the customers
and 30 per cent to BIMB from the gross profits made). This ratio, however, may be
varied from time to time so as to maintain an equitable distribution of profits between
the two parties. The management of the investment of the funds is entirely under the
""
Abdul Halim Ismail (1983a),pp. 8-9; Idem (1983b), pp. 8-9; Idem (1984/85) "Pelaburan Harta
Baitulmal melalui Bank Islam dan Syarikat Takaful", p. 3 ; BIMB (1989), pp. 16 - 17; Mustapha Hamad,
et al (1991), op. cit., pp. 250 - 251; Mustapha Hamad (1985), op. cit., p. 2.
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supervision of the Bank. In event of loss, the depositors will bear all the losses.102
(ii) Special Investment Accounts
BIMB also selectively accepts deposits from the Government and corporate
customers in the form of Special Investment Accounts which are operated on the
principle of mudarabah, but the modes of investment of the funds and the ratios of
distributions of profits may be individually negotiated.103
3.5.2. Project Financing
Two methods used by BIMB to finance acceptable projects are governed by the
principles of mudarabah and mushdrakah.104
(a) Project financing under the principle of mudarabah
Under this mode of financing, BIMB is the "provider of capital" and will provide
100-per cent financing for the relevant project. The initiator of the project is the
"entrepreneur" who will manage the project. The Bank cannot interfere in the
102
BIMB, Annual Report 1986, pp. 5-6; BIMB (1989), pp. 17 - 18; Abdul Halim Ismail (1992), p. 274;
Mustafa Hamad( 1985), "The Operation of Islamic Banking and Its Implementations on Current Accounting
Practices", p. 2 ; see also Jaafar Ahmad, "Institusi-institusi Kewangan Islam" in Mohd. Nasir bin Omar
(ed.), Tamadun Islam dan Ideologi Masa Kini, Selangor, 1986, p. 86.
103 BIMB (1989), pp. 20 - 21; Abdul Halim Ismail (1992), p. 275; see also Abdul Samad bin Haji Alias,
et al. op. cit., p. 10.
104 BIMB (1989), pp. 20 - 21; Abdul Halim Ismail (1983a). pp. 10 - 11; Idem (1983b), pp. 11 - 12; Idem.
"Cara Melabur di Bank Islam". Dakwah, June. 1983. p. 13; Idem (1992), pp. 275 - 276; Mustapha Hamad
(1985). "The Operations of Islamic Banking and Its Implications on Current Accountings Practices", pp.
3 - 5.
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management of the project, but has the right to undertake the follow-up and
supervision tasks. Both parties agree through negotiation on the ratio of distribution
of the profits generated from the project, if any. In the event of loss in the project,
BIMB will bear all the loss.105
(b) Project financing under the principle of musharakah
Under this mode of financing, the Bank together with the initiator or initiators
of the relevant project will provide the whole financing for the project in agreed
proportions. All parties, including BIMB, have the right to participate in the
management of the project; but all the parties have the option to waive such right.
All parties agree through negotiation on the ratio of distribution of the profits
generated from the project, if any. Such a ratio need not coincide with the ratio of
participation in the financing of the project. In the event of loss in the project, all
parties will bear the loss in proportion to their shares in the financing.106
(c) Financing the acquisition of assets
BIMB also provides assets financing facilities under various principles such as
murabahah, bayc bi thaman ajil and ijarah}"1
105
BIMB (1989), p.20; Abdul Halim Ismail (1983b), p. 11; Idem (1992), p. 275.
106 BIMB (1989), pp. 20 - 21; Abdul Halim Ismail (1983b), pp. 11 - 12; Tajuddin Abdul Rahman (1987),
"Peranan Bank Islam Dalam Membantu Usahawan di Malaysia", p. 7.
107 BIMB (1989), pp. 21 -23; Abdul Halim Ismail (1983a), pp. 11 - 12; Idem (1983b), pp. 12 - 13; Idem
(1992), pp. 276 - 277; Tajuddin Abdul Rahman (1987), "Peranan Bank Islam Dalam Membantu Usahawan
di Malaysia", pp. 8-9.
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i. Financing the acquisition of assets under the principle ofmurabahah and
bayc bi thaman ajil :
Murabahah
Under this mode of financing, B1MB first purchases the asset, movable or
immovable, and subsequently sells the relevant asset to the customer at the agreed
price which consists of the actual cost of the asset to the Bank plus the Bank's
margin of profit.108
Bayc bi thaman ajil (deferred sale)
Under this mode of financing, BIMB first determines the requirements of the
customer in relation to the duration and manner of repayment. The Bank then
purchases the asset and subsequently sells the relevant asset to the customer at the
agreed price which comprises (a) the actual cost of the asset to BIMB, and (b) the
Bank's margin of profit and allows the customer to settle the payment within a
specific period or to pay by instalments or in a manner so determined.109
ii. Financing the use of services of assets under the principle of ijarah
(leasing)
Financing under the principle of ijarah requires BIMB first to purchase the asset
required by the customer and subsequently to lease the asset to the customer for a
fixed period on a rental basis and other terms and conditions as agreed by both
108
BIMB (1989), p. 21.
109 Ibid, pp. 21 - 22; Abdul Halim Ismail (1983a), p. 11.
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parties."0
iii. Financing the use of services and subsequent acquisition of assets under
the principle of al-bayc al-ta'jiri (leasing ending with ownership)
This mode of financing requires BIMB to finance its customers who initially wish
to acquire the right to use the service of a required asset and subsequently own it.
The procedure involved is the same as the above principle of ijarah, except that both
parties agree that the customer will eventually purchase from the Bank the asset
concerned at an agreed price with all the lease rentals previously paid constituting
part of the price."1
3.5.3. Qard Hasan (benevolent loan)
BIMB may use an appropriate proportion of the funds at its disposal in the form
of loans to deserving customers under the principle of qard hasan. The borrower is




111 BIMB (1989), pp.22 - 23; Abdul Halim Ismail (1983a), p. 12; Ahmad Tajuddin Abdul Rahman (1987),
"Peranan Bank Islam Dalam Membantu Usahawan di Malaysia", p. 11.
Abdul Halim Ismail (1992), p. 277; Cf. M. Hamidullah. "A Suggestion for an Interest-free Islamic
Monetary Fund", IR. (June, 1955), pp. 11- 12;
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3.5.4. Trade Finance
BIMB may provide specific facilities or financing, mostly on a short-term basis,
for the purpose of facilitating trade or providing working capital for its customers.
Such facilities or financing may be granted in connection with the purchase or import
and sale or export of goods and machinery, and the acquisition and holding of stocks
and inventories, spares and replacements, raw materials, and semi-finished goods. The
facilities or financing currently provided include letters of credit, letters of guarantee
and working capital under the principles of wakalah, musharakah, murabahah, ijarah
and wadicah}u
Letters of Credit under the principle of wakalah
Under the principle of wakalah (agency), the customer first informs BIMB of his
letter of credit requirements and places with the Bank a deposit equal to the full
amount of the price of the goods to be purchased or imported which the Bank accepts
under the principle of wadbah. BIMB then establishes the Letter of Credit and pays
the proceeds to the negotiating bank utilizing the customer's deposit, and
subsequently releases the documents to the customers. The Bank charges the
customer fees and commissions in connection with this service under the principle
of ijarah.UA
113
BIMB (1989), pp. 24 - 25; See also Abdul Halim Ismail (1983a), pp.13 - 15; Idem (1983b), pp. 14 - 15;
Idem (1992), pp. 278 - 280; Mustapha Hamad (1985), "The Operations of Islamic Banking and Its
Implications on Current Accounting Practices", p. 10; Tajuddin Abdul Rahman (1987), "Peranan Bank
Islam Dalam Membantu Usahawan di Malaysia", pp. 10 - 14.
114 BIMB (1989). p.25.
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Letters of Credit under the principle of musharakah
This mode of financing requires the customer to inform BIMB of his letter of
credit requirements and negotiate the terms of musharakah financing. The customer
places with the Bank a deposit for his share of the cost of the goods to be purchased
or imported which the Bank accepts under the principle of wadfah. The Bank then
issues the letter of credit and pays the proceeds to the negotiating bank utilizing the
customer's deposit as well as its own share of financing, and subsequently releases
the documents to the customer. The customer takes possession of the goods and
disposes of them in the manner stipulated in the agreement. Profits derived from the
venture will be shared as per agreement."5
Letter of Credit under the principle of murabahah
This mode of financing requires the customer to inform BIMB of his letter of
credit requirements and to request the Bank to purchase or import the goods,
indicating thereby that he would be willing to buy the goods from the Bank on their
arrival on the principle ofmurabahah. BIMB then issues the Letter of Credit and pays
the proceeds to the negotiating bank utilizing its own funds. BIMB sells the goods to
the customer at a price comprising the cost of the goods and a profit margin under
the principle ofmurabahah for settlement by cash or on a deferred payment (bayc bi
thaman ajil) basis.116
115




BIMB may provide the facility of Letter of Guarantee to its customers in certain
cases under the principle of kafalah. This facility may be provided in respect of the
performance of a task, the settlement of a loan, etc. To provide this facility, B1MB
may require the customer to place a certain amount as a deposit which BIMB receives
under the principle of wadfah. BIMB will charge the customer fees and commissions
in connection with this facility under the principle of ijarah.ul
Finance for working capital under the principle of murabahah
This mode of financing requires the customers to approach BIMB to provide
financing for his working capital requirements to purchase stocks and inventories,
spares and replacements, semi-finished goods and raw materials. BIMB first purchases
or appoints the customer as its agent to purchase the required goods on its behalf and
BIMB pays from its own funds. BIMB subsequently sells the goods to the customer
at an agreed price on the principle of murabahah. The customer is allowed to settle
this sale price on a deferred term of 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, or any other duration
as the case may be."8
3.5.5. Other Services
BIMB also provides other usual banking services under various rules ofSharfah.
1,7
Ibid., pp. 27 - 28.
"" Ibid., pp. 23 - 24.
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Suffice it to mention just a few as follows: remittances and transfers, sale and
purchase of foreign currency, investment or portfolio management and trustee and
nominee company services."9
Types of financing based on the principles ofSharfah and the modes of contract
implemented by BIMBU0 in its operation can be summarised as followed:
Type of Financing Contracts Used to Grant Financial Facilities
Project Financing Mudarabah and Mushdrakah (Equity Financing)
Financing the Acquisition Murdbahah. Bay' bi thaman Ajil (Deferred Sale) of assets, Ijarah wa al-
Istiqncf (Leasing Ending with Ownership) and Qard Hasan (Benevolent
Loan)
Trade Financing Wakalah. Murdbahah. Mushdrakah. Letter of guarantee (under the
principle of Kafalah)
Services Fees and Commissions charges under the Sharfah principle of al-Ajr wa
al-llmulah
3.6. Examination and Evaluation of the BIMB's Performance
3.6.1. Mobilisation of Monetary Resources
There has been no objection raised against BIMB on the use of either wadfah
or mudarabah contracts to mobilise deposits among its customers. The mobilisation
of deposits by BIMB is presented in Table 3.
119
Ibid., p. 28.
120 Cf. Ataul Hoque (ed.). Readings in Islamic Banking, Dacca. 1987, pp. 131 - 149; M. I. Siddiqi, Model
of an Islamic Bank. Lahore, 1986, pp. 46 - 66.
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Table 3
BIMB : Customers Deposits (Excluding Short-term Deposits of Institutional Customers),
Depositors and Assets 1983 - 1993, as at 30 June.
Year Total Deposits
(RM Million)
%** Total Depositors Total Assets (RM
Million)
%**
1983* 91.1 - 22,499 170.6 -
1984 274.9 201.8 41,086 369.8 116.8
1985 405 47.3 127.980 514.2 39
1986 566.9 40 Not available 682.9 32.8
1987 809.1 43 Not available 932.3 36.5
1988 1,022.2 26.3 200,766 1,153.7 23.7
1989 1,229.2 20.3 235,786 1,368.3 18.6
1990 1.220.9 -0.7 270,049 1,396.3 2
1991 1.175.1 -3.8 299,040 1,357.2 -3.8
1992 1,320.5 12.4 329,990 1,607.8 18.5
1993 1.611.7 22.1 362,111 1,890.6 17.6
Notes: * 1983, as at 31 December.
** Rate of increase (%)
Source : Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report 1984, p. 75; BIMB, Compiled from BIMB's
Annual Reports 1986 - 1993.
The total deposits mobilised by the BIMB, as shown in the Table 3 above, to four
types of accounts, namely, current account, saving account, investment and special
investment accounts, increased steadily from 1983 to 1989, but with a marginal
decrease of growth. The total deposits of the BIMB increased from RM 91.1 million
in 1983 to RM 274.9 million in 1984, an increase of 201.8 per cent. In 1985, the
total deposits continued to increase to RM 405 million, an increase of 47.3 per cent.
In 1986, the total deposits further increased to RM 566.9 million but the rate of
increase fell from 47.3 per cent in 1985 to 40 per cent in 1986, and increased again
in 1987 to RM 809.1 million, an increase of 43 per cent. In 1989, the total deposits
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increased to RM 1,229.2 million from RM 1,022.2 million, an increase of 20.3 per
cent. Nevertheless, there was a slight decrease in the total deposits of BIMB in 1990
and 1991, i.e. RM 1,220.9 million and RM 1,175.1 million respectively. This may
be due to the huge dividends offered by other investment institutions especially by
the most popular Government backed institutions such as Tabung Haji. Total
deposits, however, rose again by RM 291.2 million in 1993 to RM 1,611.7, an
increase of 22.1 per cent in the financial year.
The total numbers of depositors consisting of individuals, Government
Departments, statutory bodies and various entities from the corporate sectors
increased steadily from 1983 to 1993. As can be seen from Table 3 above, in ten
years of its operations, its depositors increased from 22,499 thousands in 1983 to
362,111 thousands in 1993, an increase of 1509.5 per cent. This can be considered
a remarkable progress in terms of the role of BIMB in mobilising the funds and
savings of the Muslims in particular and Malaysians in general, in a relatively short
span of time.
The rates of profits actually paid to the depositors are divided into various
accounts based on different weightages. The lowest weightage is given to current
accounts and the highest to investment accounts. In the case of investment acccounts,
different weightage is assigned depending on the time frame, i.e. 1 or 3 or 6 or 9 or
12 or 15 or 18 or 24 or 36 or 48 or 60 months and above. As shown in Table 4
below, the rate of profit to the depositors in the financial years of 1988 to 1993 was
between 3.25 and 3.99 per cent per annum for the saving accounts, and for the
investment accounts was as follows:
1 month = 3.64 -5.11;
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3 months = 3.87 - 5.42;
6 months = 4.09 - 5.74;
9 months = 4.32 - 6.06;
12 months = 4.54 - 6.38;
15 months = 4.77 -6.70;
18 months = 5.00 - 7.02;
24 months = 5.23 - 7.34;
36 months = 5.45 - 7.66;
48 months = 5.68 - 7.98;
60 months and above = 5.91 -8.30.
Table 4
BIMB : Rates of profits to depositors (%), as at June 1988 - 1993
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
■Saving Accounts 3.25 3.31 3.37 3.35 3.65 3.99
Investment
Accounts
1 Month 3.64 3.71 3.78 4.29 4.67 5.11
3 Months 3.87 3.94 4.01 4.55 4.97 5.42
6 Months 4.09 4.17 4.25 4.82 5.26 5.74
9 Months 4.32 4.41 4.49 5.09 5.55 6.06
12 Months 4.54 4.64 4.72 5.36 5.84 6.38
15 Months 4.77 4.87 4.96 5.63 6.13 6.70
18 Months 5.00 5.10 5.19 5.89 6.42 7.02
24 Months 5.23 5.34 5.43 6.16 6.72 7.34
36 Months 5.45 5.57 5.67 6.43 7.01 7.66
48 Months 5.68 5.80 5.90 6.70 7.30 7.98
60 Months and
above
5.91 6.03 6.14 6.97 7.59 8.30
Source : Compiled from Annual Reports of BIMB 1988 - 1993.
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3.6.2. Financing and Investment
The size of banking financing facilities granted to various sectors in the economy
is presented in Table 5. The total financing granted by BIMB continued to increase
yearly but at a declining and fluctuating rate, causing the financing-deposits ratio of
the BIMB to increase from 44.7 per cent in 1983 to 90.9 per cent in 1984, but fall
to 79.5 per cent, 69.7 per cent, 53 per cent, then slighly rise to 59.6 per cent, then
fall to 54.2 per cent, then rise again to 66.2 per cent, 67.2 per cent, 76.1 per cent and
slighly fell to 61.8 per cent from 1985 to 1993 respectively. The decreasing of this
financing-deposits ratios suggests that BIMB has a large amount of idle funds not
used efficiently. Consequently, this will impose a cost to the Bank as well as
affecting its rate of returns.
Table 5
BIMB : Financing of BIMB, 1983 - 1993






1983 91.1 40.7 44.7
1984 274.9 249.8 90.9
1985 405 322 79.5
1986 566.9 395.3 69.7
1987 809.1 428.6 53
1988 1,022.2 609.4 59.6
1989 1,229.2 666.1 54.2
1990 1,220.9 807.8 66.2
1991 1.175.1 789.3 67.2
1992 1,320.5 1.004.7 76.1
1993 1,611.7 996.5 61.8
Source : Bank Negara Malaysia. Annual Report 1984, p. 75; Compiled from Annual Report of
BIMB 1986 - 1993.
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If we look at the Bank's modes of operations, we find that heavy reliance has
been given to murabahah and bay' bi thaman ajil contracts. The proportion of funds
granted under these two contracts are presented in Table 6. The table shows that the
proportion of funds allocated for murabahah and bayc bi thaman ajil tradings between
1984 to 1993 constituted more than 85 per cent of BIMB's modes of financing. It has
continued to increase from 87.3 per cent in 1984 to 95 per cent in 1985, 95.4 in 1986
and 99.2 in 1987. However, it has slighly decreased to 96.9, 94.9 and 84.8 in 1988,
1989 and 1990 respectively. In 1991 nearly 100 per cent of the funds were granted
under the murabahah and bayc bi thaman ajil contracts, and it decreased to 90.7 and
88.7 in 1992 and 1993 respectively.
Table : 6
BIMB : Proportional of Funds' Financing Granted under Bayc Bithaman Ajil and
Murabahah, 1984 to 1993
Year Credit (RM Mil) BBA (RM Mil.) %* MH (RM Mil.) %* BBA + MH ( %
)
■1984 249.8 193.9 77.6 24.2 9.7 87.3
1985 357.7 252.5 71.2 84.5 23.8 95
1986 397 338.5 82.3 52 13.1 95.4
1987 525 432.5 82.4 88 16.8 99.2
1988 646 505.5 78.2 121 18.7 96.9
1989 758 579.5 76.4 140 18.5 94.9
1990 865 623.5 72.1 110 12.7 84.8
1991 905 656.3 77.4 118.9 21.9 99.3
1992 1.004.7 723.8 72 188.3 18.7 90.7
1993 996.5 713.5 71 175.9 17.7 88.7
Notes:
* Rate of Financing (%)
BBA = Bay bi Thaman Ajil', MH = Murabahah
RM = Ringgit Malaysia
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Source : Compiled from Annual Reports ofBank Negara Malaysia 1984 - 1992; BIMB, Annual
Report 1992 - 1993.
These figures show that the funds which were allocated under the other modes
of financing such as mudarabah and musharakah were very small in percentage.
These figures also reflect the Bank's limited scope of operations to merely trading
business of acquisition of assets under the modes of murabahah and bayL bi thaman
ajil, thus denying the desire of investors or would-be entrepreneurs to obtain funds
for equity based investment in productive business ventures.
It is obvious that the Bank's pattern of financing and investment has a somewhat
close resemblance to the practices of other commercial banks. No doubt these two
modes of financing will enable the Bank to achieve the normal objectives of
commercial banks such as profitability and safety. However, these are rather
inconsistent with the proposed involvement of the Islamic bank mainly with the first-
line techniques identified such as mudarabah and musharakah. Since the BIMB is
largely engaged in the second-line techniques, that is murabahah and bayc bi thaman
ajil, there are doubts in the minds of the people, as to whether the Bank is allowing
interest through the back door.
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3.6.3. Profit and Loss Accounts
Table 7
BIMB : Profit and Loss Accounts











Source : Compiled from Annua/ Reports of BIMB 1984 - 1993
BIMB was unfortunate to commence operations at the time of recession in
Malaysia and this was reflected in the loss incurred in the first year of operation.
However, as shown in Table 7, a profit has been recorded in every year since. The
initial losses were apparently caused by bad debts on financing. Since then a more
cautious approach with tighter internal controls has been operated. Although
profitability is modest in terms of the assets employed, the recent growth is an
encouraging sign.
3.7. BIMB and Economic Development
In terms of significance to the Malaysian economy, BIMB is still a relatively
small bank compared with other commercial banks. For example, by the end of 1988,
BIMB's share of the total banking deposits had risen to 2.3 per cent. Nevertheless, of
the twenty-three local banks, BIMB ranks thirteenth in terms of both assets and
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deposits, tenth in terms of shareholders' funds and fifteenth in terms of profitability.121
However, this sub-topic will discuss the role and contribution of BIMB in the fields
of mobilisation of savings and promoting investment, financing projects and social
welfare in the country.
3.7.1. Mobilising of Savings and Promoting Investment.
In spite of the fact that only a short time has passed since the BIMB experiment
began, and in spite of strong competition by interest-banks, the results indicate that
BIMB has achieved the desired goal as presented in Table 2 above. Its goal is to offer
an interest-free banking system to the Muslims in Malaysia and to mobilise their
savings in accordance with the Sharfah.122 From the above discussion, it can be seen
that the role of BIMB in encouraging and mobilising the savings of the Malay
Muslims is crucial. Prior to the establishment of Tabung Haji and BIMB, the Malays
preferred to hold their wealth in the form of cattle, land and jewellery. In spite of the
fatwa proposed by the colonial government about the permissibility of accepting
interest from the Post Office and Co-operative, the most favoured methods of holding
savings were still the traditional ones.123 This attitude was claimed to have been the
cause of economic retardation amongst the Malays.124
121
Bank Negara Malaysia. Annual Report 1988: Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank, 1988, p. 3.
122 Sobri Salamon. Bank Islam. Petaling Jaya. 1984. pp. 117 - 139; Idem, "The Ideological Aspects of
Islamic Banking", A Paper presented at the International Conference on Islam and Technology, Kuala
Lumpur, December 1985; "Editor" in Berita Harian, 28 April 1993, p. 10; Article, "Bank Islam Buktikan
Kemampuan Bersaing" in Berita Harian, 2 July, p. 10.
123 F. V. Von der Mehden, Islam, Development and Politics in Malaysia, Texas, 1978, p. 8; Cf. Abdul
Razak Ayoub, "Bank Moden dan Riba" in Berita Harian, 2 July 1988, p. 8.
124 Ibid.: See also W. Wilder, "Islam, Other Factors and Malays Backwardness : Comments on an
Argument" in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. II (2), 1968, p. 158; T. G. Lim (ed.), Reading on Malaysian
Economic Development, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, p. 342.
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Therefore, the existence of BIMB at least managed to solve the problem of the
Malay businessmen having to finance their economic activities by riba-based loans.123
Above all, Islamic banking is expected to play an important role in attaining the
economic objectives of restructuring the Malay Muslim community which depends




BIMB : Distribution of Financing (%) among the Country's Major Economic Sectors 1987 -
1993
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1 3.7 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.2 4.0 4.3
2 12.0 19.6 28.4 34.2 30.3 35.4 33.5
3 6.0 1.5 7.2 6.4 8.0 8.3 7.5
.4 15.5 11.9 6.8 5.9 6.2 5.8 6.7
5 4.2 5.5 4.5 3.4 3.0 3.0 2.6
6 18.4 3.8 4.1 3.8 4.0 2.0 3.2
7 10.7 25.4 18.7 14.2 10.1 7.1 7.9
8 - - - - 0.7 1.0 -
9 25.6 25.0 25.1 26.8 32.5 29.9 33.0
10 3.9 2.1 - - - 3.5 1.3
11 2,484 3,215 4,070 5,029 6,859 12,456 16,711
12 78% 81% 83% 85% 89% 93% 94%
Notes:
1= Agriculture; 2= Manufacturing; 3= Construction
4= Wholesale and Retail Trade; 5= Transport and Storage
6= Business Services; 7= Real Estate; 8= Other Services
125 See for example Arifin Salih, "Interest-Free Loan Banking Scheme", in al-Nahdah, Vol. XIII(1 - 2),
(Kuala Lumpur. 1993), pp. 24 - 25.
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9= Miscellaneous including Housing: 10= Others
11= Total Numbers of Account's Financing
12= Per cent of Accounts for amount of less than RM 100,000.00 thousands.
Source : Compiled from Annual Report of BIMB 1987 - 1993.
BIMB believes that the success of the economic development process in Malaysia
depends mainly on the gradual change towards the creation of a production sector.126
For this purpose, BIMB grants financing facilities in various economic sectors of the
country, particularly those which have an effect on the process of social and
economic development such as manufacturing, real estate, agriculture, construction,
wholesale and retail trade, transport and storage, housing127 and other services. In
granting its financing to the above sectors, BIMB is largely engaged in small projects
with small investors or traders as presented in Table 8. For example, the total
number of accounts in customer financing increased to 16,711 from 12,456
previously. Around 94 per cent of these accounts were for amounts of less than RM
100,0U0.128
3.7.3, Social Welfare
As a commercial institution which operates for profit, BIMB is also involved in
l2<'
Jaffar Hussein, "Facing the Challenge of Islamic Finance" ,in al-Nahdah, Vol. VII (4), (Kuala Lumpur,
1987), p. 26: Sobri Salamon, "Bank Islam dan Cabarannya Dalam Pembangunan Ekonomi" in Ekonomi
Islam. Petaiing Jaya, 1989, pp. 194 - 211.
127 In participating in housing projects, BIMB allocated almost RM 46 million in 1989 for construction
projects. It is a policy of BIMB to lay emphasis on financing the purchase of low-cost houses by its
customers from low and middle-income groups. BIMB, Annual Report 1989, p. 35. See also : Sobri
Salamon, "Bank Islam dan Cabarannya Dalam Pembangunan Ekonomi", A Paper Presented at the Seminar
Sistem Kredit Islam Dalam Koperasi, 21-22 September 1985, Petaiing Jaya.
I2S BIMB, Annual Report 1993. p. 8.
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social and welfare activities, for example, the qard hasart facility which is granted
to eligible Muslims who are engaged in viable and productive economic activities.
The biggest contribution of BIMB in the field of social welfare is through its annual
zakat payment from its profits. Zakat is an obligatory levy on all surplus wealth and
agricultural income of Muslims. Its objective is to provide financial support to
specified categories of people such as the poor and the needy.129 Conceptually, zakat
is supposed to be a milestone in providing social security, eradicating poverty and
stimulating the economy.130 As Table 9 shows below, zakat paid by BIMB increased
every year. For example, zakat paid by BIMB in 1993 amounted to RM 662,000 and
this amount can be channelled to promote economic development of Muslims in
Malaysia.
Table 9
BIMB : Zakat Payment, 1985 - 1993










Source : Compiled from Annual Reports of BIMB 1985 - 1993.
I2'
Aghnides, Mohammedan Theories of Finance, New York, 1916, pp. 203 - 347.
130 F. R. Faridi, "Zakat and Fiscal Policy", in Khurshid Ahmad (ed.), Studies in Islamic Economics,
Leicester. 1981. pp. 119 - 130; Monzer Kahf, The Islamic Economy, Indiana, 1978, pp. 59 - 67; A. H. M.
Sadeq. Economic Development in Islam, Petaling Jaya, 1990; Ataul Huq, Development and Distribution
in Islam. Petaling Jaya. 1993. pp. 35 - 41.
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3.8. BIMB : Problems and Challenges
3.8.1. Legal Impediments to Islamic Banking
Islamic law relating to commerce and business ('mucamalat) in Malaysia is only
applicable to a very limited scope, since the law relating to this matter is either the
statute law or English law. In this connection. Section 5 of the Civil Law Act 1956
provides that "in the absence of any written law, the law generally applicable to
commercial matters and any matters incidental thereto is the English Law". In other
words, English law principles are inapplicable if there are other provisions in any law
covering the question or issues which have been decided. If, however, there is no
provision dealing with the issue in question, though there may be a general act
covering certain aspects of the law, the issue shall be settled by reference to English
law on the matter not covered by the Act.131 Even though the IBA 1983 and others
were enacted, they were merely acts to provide for the licensing and regulating
Islamic commercial institutions and did not include any provision of the substantive
law.
For this reason, Islamic financial institutions have to work in the context of the
Islamic contracts such as murabahah, bayc bi thaman ajil, ijarah, etc, which have to
be interpreted in line with the equivalent of the relevant legislation and the English
principles applicable to interpret or supplement the legislation.132 In the case ofBIMB
131
Section 5, Civil Law Act, 1956.
132 Ahmad Ibrahim, "Legal Aspects of the Establishment of the Islamic Law", pp. 3 - 13; Idem, "The
SharLah and Codification : Malaysia Experience", pp. 59 - 60; Mustapha Hamat, "Pembiayaan dan
Penyediaan Modal Menurut Islam", in Dunia Islam, (Kuala Lumpur, January 1992), p. 51 - 53; Nik
Mustapha Nik Hassan (1989), "Pendekatan Sistem Ekonomi Islam Dalam Meningkatkan dan Memajukan
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v. Tinta Press Sdn. Bhd. (1986 MLJ 256; 1987 CLJ 474), a dispute relating to lease
(ijarah) of printing equipment by BIMB to the defendants had to be dealt with in the
High Court according to English legal principles. The question arises whether such
legislation and legal principles are in line with the Sharfah. The relevant legislation
already existing includes Contract Act, 1950, Bankruptcy Act, 1967, Companies Act,
1965, Partnership Act, 1961 and Sale of Goods (Malay States) Ordinance, 1957.
There is an urgent need to examine these statutes and to bring them into line with the
requirement of the Sharfah, or to make them inapplicable to Muslims.133
There are some other legal hindrances to the smooth running of Islamic banking
in Malaysia vis-a-vis customer financing. These include:
National Land Code (NLC) 1965
• Section 205(3) of the National Land Code 1965134 which prohibits the transfer
of an undivided share of agricultural land of less than 2/5 hectare (1 acre) has created
a disadvantage for BIMB. The reason is that the nature of the operation of BIMB
involves buying the property on behalf of customers, and not merely being an
intermediate agent between the buyer and the seller as practised by conventional
Kedudukan Ekonomi Masyarakat Melayu", pp. 13 - 14; Fokus, "Kerajaan Bertanggungjawab Melaksanakan
Sistem Ekonomi Islam", in Dunia Islam. (Kuala Lumpur, November 1991), pp. 20 - 26.
133 Ahmad Ibrahim, "Legal Impediments in the Islamisation of the Malaysian Economy with Special
Reference to Banking and Insurance", A paper presented at the Seminar on Issues in Islamic Economics,
29 December, 1985. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia; Syed Othman Alhabshi, "Dasar Kerajaan", in S. G. S. Abod,
et al (eds.), Pengurusan Perniagaan Islam, Shah Alam, 1991. pp. 391 - 400.
134 Section 205(3) of the National Land Code 1965 provides that, "subject to sub-section (4), no dealing
in respect of any alienated land or any interest therein subject to the category 'agriculture' or to any
condition requiring its use for any agricultural purpose shall be effected if such dealing would have the
effect of creating any undivided share of such size that, if the land is to be partitioned in proportion to the
several shares, the area of any resulting individual portion would be less than two-fifths of a hectare".
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banks. For example, if there is a piece of land belonging to A and B and the
customers C and D go to BIMB to ask the latter to finance the buying of the said
property and BIMB buys the property and it will have difficulty if it is going to sell
the property to C and D because the provision of the National Land Code 1965
prohibits the transfer of that land to another party. Therefore, this provision should
be abolished or made inapplicable to BIMB since unlike other commercial banks, it
is involved in trade, not merely in financing transactions.
Hire Purchase Act, 1967
BIMB is presently involved in financing its customers in acquiring fixed assets
such as land, property, equipment, etc under the principles of bayc bi thaman ajil.
Nevertheless this Islamic contract of bayc bi thaman ajil is not covered by the Hire
Purchase Act, 1967 since the Act is outside the principle of the Sharfah. According
to the Sharfah, there should not be two transactions in one contract (caqd). It must
be two separate transactions, i. e. hire followed by purchase.
The Hire Purchase Act has given complete protection both to the financier and
the debtor in terms of legal documentation and enforcement of such an agreement.
Thus, it will not be difficult for a financial institution to conduct its operations
especially in cases involving repossession, unlike the agreements entered into under
bayc bi thaman ajil which need approval from a Civil Court before they can be
enforced. Therefore, it is hoped that this Act can be modified in order to make it
consistent with the Sharfah.
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3.8.2. Islamic Banking in a Capitalistic World
The theoretical concept of Islamic banking on the basis of profit and loss sharing
was originally developed under the explicit assumption of a general prohibition of
interest.135 Today, BIMB has to carry on its business in a capitalist economy where
interest persists and BIMB exists side by side with interest-based banks. This
phenomenon will create problems for a newly established Islamic bank in competing
with the established and widespread influence of the conventional banks.
Normally, depositors in Islamic banks can be classified into two categories:
a. Those motivated mainly by Islamic commitment and conviction
regarding the prohibition of interest. These depositors will put their
money in an Islamic bank regardless of the rate of interest as it is the
only institution devoid of interest.
b. Those who are concerned purely with maximisation of profits.
135
For a discussion see M. A. Mannan, "Islam and Trends in Modern Banking" in The IR, Vol. LVI (11-
12), 1968, pp. 5 - 10; Vol. LVII (1), 1969, pp. 28 - 33. These articles also published in al-Islam, Vol. Ill
(3), 1972. pp. 1 - 16; Sh. Mahmud Ahmad, "Banking in Islam" in al-Islam, Vol. Ill (2), 1972, pp. 37 - 46;
M. N. Siddiqi, "Banking in an Islamic Framework" in Islam and Modern Age, Vol. VIII (4), 1977, pp. 4 -
20; Muhammad Sami'ullah, "Elimination of Interest from the Economy" in Islamic Order, Vol. VI (1),
1984, pp. 103 - 114; Waqar Masood Khan (1985), Towards an Interest-Free Islamic Economic System, pp.
23 - 52; Mohsin S. Khan and Abbas Mirakhor (1986), pp. 33; Idem, "The Financial System and Monetary
Policy in an Islamic Economy" in Mohsin S. Khan, et al (eds.), Theoretical Studies in Islamic Banking and
Finance, pp. 163 - 184; T. W. Taylor and J. W. Evans, "Islamic Banking and the Prohibition of Usury in
Western Economic Thought" in National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, November 1987, pp. 21 -
27; Muhammad Anwar (1987), Modelling Interest-Free Economy : A Study in Macro-Economics and
Development, 84pp.; Zubayr Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, "Islamic Banking", pp. 91 - 94; . A. Saud,
"Toward Islamic Economics" in Toward Islamication of Disciplines, Herndon, Virginia, U. S. A., 1989,
pp. 265 - 270; R. Wilson, "Economic Change and Re-Interpretation of Islamic Social Values", in British
Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin, Vol. IX (1), 1982, pp. 108 - 111; W. M. Ballantyne,
Commercial Law in the Arab Middle East : The Gulf States, London, 1986, 122 - 125; John Thomas
Cummings, et al, "Islam and Modern Change", in John L. Esposito (ed.), Islam andDevelopment: Religion
and Sociopolitical Change, New York, 1980, pp. 32 - 34; A. L. Udovitch, "Bankers Without Banks :
Commerce, Banking, and Society in the Islamic World of the Middle Ages", in the Center for Medieval
and Renaissance Studies, University of California (ed.), The Dawn of Modern Banking, New Haven and
London, 1979, pp. 256 - 273.
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An entrepreneur who is concerned with the maximisation of profits in an
investment project will only decide in favour of an Islamic bank on the basis of a
profit and loss sharing contract, if the expected profit is higher than that of interest
from conventional banks. Since both the entrepreneur and the Islamic bank strive for
maximum profit, they will bargain for the desired predetermined ratio of their profits.
If an Islamic bank claims a higher ratio of profit than the entrepreneur, this will lead
the latter turns to a conventional bank. Therefore, the Islamic bank has to adapt its
claims for a given investment project to the market rate of interest. Therefore, if the
interest rate of commercial banks is high, BIMB cannot claim a higher ratio of profit
sharing since it will be less attractive to customers who have the option of investing
in an interest-based banks.116
Furthermore, in the capitalistic environment of Malaysia, where an Islamic and
conventional banks co-exist, customers may only deposit or invest their money in
BIMB's general investment or special investment accounts if they are confident that
they will gain higher profits and their money is secure. This can be seen, for
example, in the financial year of 1991 and 1992,137 BIMB's total deposits from
customers rose but the balances in general investment accounts continued to decrease
as its rates of profit were less attractive against rates of interest on fixed deposits paid
by the conventional banks.138 In addition, BIMB is competing not only with the
commercial banks, but also with other Government supported investment institutions
136
Barjoyai Bardai, "Jurang Harapan Pelabur Bank Islam" Berita Minggu, 2 January 1994, p. 8; Interview
with Tajuddin Abdul Rahman, Managing Director of BIMB, Kuala Lumpur, 24/11/94.
137 See Chapter III, 3.6.1, Table 3, p. 176.
I3# BIMB, Annual Report 1991, p. 6; 1992, p. 5; Z. Phoon, "Jaafar's Dream : The Islamic Banking is
available to all Bumiputeras, Non-Bumiputeras, Muslims and Non-Muslims" in Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange. Investors Digest. April, 1993, p. 13.
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such as Tabung haji. In this case, Tabung Haji has managed to offer an attractive rate
of return (dividend) to its depositors.
3.8.3. Over-Dependence on "Second-Line Techniques"
Another issue raising concerns is the excessive reliance of the BIMB on the
second-line techniques of operation, that is murabahah and bayc bi thaman ajil since
the early days of its inception. These secondary techniques are seen by some scholars
as counterparts to the institution of interest as practised by conventional banks. This
is because the mark-ups charged by the BIMB are about the same as the rate of
interest, if we were to convert these mark-ups into a ratio of the principal sum of
money provided by the bank. Therefore they accuse BIMB of charging interest in "a
disguised form" and being "mainly similar to other commercial banks albeit without
the interest label".139 Consequently, the cost of finance advanced by BIMB under the
above methods is still high and is comparable to the cost of funds provided by other
banks based on interest.
Although murabahah and bayL bi thaman ajil are technically correct and
permissible in the Sharfah, in effect they operate very much like interest-based
lending. Moreover, they are considered as weaker Islamically speaking because of
13,)
For example, see Zakariya Man (1988), "Islamic Banking : The Malaysian Experience" p. 91; Janne
Conners, "Towards a System of Islamic Finance in Malaysia", in Islamic Law and Finance, p. 11;
Naziruddin Abdullah, "Bank Islam : Fungsi, Operasi dan Masa Depannya", Mimeo, International Islamic
University, Malaysia, pp. 18 - 24; Nik Mustapha N. Hassan. "Institusi Ekonomi Islam di Malaysia : Suatu
Persoalan Tentang Keberkesanannya", Paper presented at the Simposium Keilmuan Islam, 25 January 1987,
Kuala Lumpur.
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their minimal risk and pre-determined fixed rate of return in the business.140 Siddiqi
for example is disturbed at this phenomenon: "There is a genuine concern among
Islamic scholars that if interest is largely subtituted by devices like 'mark-up', it
would represent a change just in number rather than in substance, and the new system
would not be rid of iniquitous nature of the interest-based system".141
The Bank has been accused of being only concerned with making profits and
neglecting the welfare element in its operations.142 According to officials of B1MB in
a series of lectures, this allegation was due to the tendency of the people to equate
BIMB with the bayt al-mal (welfare institution).143 However, they say that BIMB
belongs to the tijari (commercial) sector. As a commercial organisation, it is argued
that BIMB operates on profit because it needs to protect the interests of the depositors
140
Muhammad Umar Chapra (1986), Towards a Just Monetary System, pp. 163 - 174; Idem, "Towards an
Islamic Financial System" in Abul Hasan M. Sadeq, et al (ads.), Development and Finance in Islam,
Petaling Jaya, Malaysia, 1991, pp. p. 138 - 139; Ziauddin Ahmed, "Islamic Banking at the Crossroads" in
Abul Hasan M. Sadeq, et al ( eds.), Ibid, pp. 157 - 170; Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Issues in Islamic
Banking, Leicester, U. K., 1983. 134 - 143; Idem, "Islamic Banking : Theory and Practice" in Mohamed
Ariff (ed.), Islamic Banking in Southeast Asia, Singapore, 1988, pp. 51 - 57.
141 M. N. Siddiqi, "Islamic Banking : Theory and Practice" in Mohamed Ariff (ed.) (1988), op. cit., p. 56.
He goes further to say: "It is also emphasised that, apart from equity consideration, the prohibition of
interest in Islam is meant to stimulate overall productive activity, generate maximum employment and
encourage innovation which is the mainspring of growth. These blessings can only be reaped if the interest
system is completely uprooted in the real sense of the term and replaced by a fundamentally different
system like profit/loss sharing". Ibid.
142 For example, see Mohd. Azmi Omar, "Bank Islam dan Matlamatnya", pp. 31 - 35. A Paper presented
at the Seminar Kursus Ekonomi Islam, Sintok, Kedah, 1987; Nik Mustafa Nik Hassan, "Institusi Ekonomi
Islam di Malaysia : Suatu Persoalan Tentang Keberkesananya", pp. 29 - 30. A Paper presented at the
Simposium Keilmuan Islam, University Malaya, 1987; Mohammad Ariff, "Islamic Banking in Malaysia :
Framework, Performance and Lessons", Journal of Islamic Economics, (Petaling Jaya, 1991), p. 76;
Barjoyai Bardai (1994), op cit., p. 8; Cf. Malami, "Prospects of Islamic Banking in the Muslim Minority
Communities", JIMMA, Vol. XIII (2), 1992, pp. 309 - 310.
143 Muslim Scholars have categorised the Islamic economic system into three sectors: a. siyasi or
government sector which should encompass all public sector commercial activities; b. tijari or commercial
sector which should encompass all private sector commercial activities; and c. ijtimffi or welfare sector
which should encompass the administration of bayt al-mal, zakat and sadaqah.
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and shareholders by maintaining a reasonable rate of return on their investment.144
The nature and aim of BIMB to make profits in its business by using the second
line techniques has been criticised by some scholars.145 They strongly argue that
BIMB should concentrate on muddrabah and musharakah in its operations which are
claimed to be more just and in line with Islamic principles. In this connection,
Zakariya Man says:
The fact that the bank needs to make profits cannot justify its over-
dependence on the second line techniques of operation because possibilities
for making even more profits through the first line techniques such as
muddrabah and musharakah are not absent. Besides, the Bank's over
dependence on the second line techniques may also lead to inequitable
distribution of gains between the users and the providers of capital.
Otherwise, the Bank cannot contribute significant changes in the distribution
of income as encouraged by Islam. In this context, it is relevant to note that
many customers of the bank prefer to get murabahah rather than musharakah
finance, as they make more profits after paying a fixed sum of mark-ups as
agreed in the contract. Clearly, the first-line techniques of muddrabah and
musharakah will be more just in terms of profit distribution between the users
and the providers of capital.146
There are several arguments which support the BIMB stance, some of which147
are:
m
See Abdul Halim Ismail, " Bank Islam : Prospek dan Perkembangannya Pada Masa Hadapan"; Idem,
"Islamic Banking in Malaysia : Some Issues, Problems and prospects", pp. 1 - 13. A Paper Presented at
the Seminar on Issues in Islamic Economics, 27 - 29 December 1985, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia; Idem,
"Sistem Kewangan Islam Dengan Tumpuan Kepada Urusan Bank dan Insuran", pp. 7 - 11. A Paper
presented at the Seminar Sharpah Islam. 6-9 September 1986, Brunei Darulsalam, also presented at the
Bengkel Tertutup Pemikiran Sistem Ekonomi Islam Berasaskan Sharpah Peringkat Kebangsaan, 21 March
1989. Kuala Lumpur; Idem, "Aspects of the Islamic Economics System and Its Treatment in the Issue of
Poverty", pp. 13 pp. 13 - 16. A Paper Presented at the International Seminar on Islamic Philosophy and
Science, 30 May - 2 June, 1989, Pulau Pinang, Malaysia; Arabia, Vol. V (56), 1986, p. 68; Barjoyai Bardai
(1994). op cit., p. 8.
145 See ref. no. 141, above.
I4" Zakariya Man (1988), p. 92.
147 Interview with Tajuddin Abdul Rahman. Managing Director of BIMB, Kuala Lumpur, 24/11/94.
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a. There is no Qur'anic prohibition on these types of finance. Therefore,
to equate the practice of trade financing under the scheme of bayc bi
thaman ajil and murabahah with interest amounts to rejecting the
permissibility of trade as expounded by the Qur^an and the rulings of
Muslim jurists.148 Moreover, BIMB has a Sharfah Advisory Council
to oversee the Islamic validity of its operations and therefore it should
have advised BIMB if these methods were haram.u<>
b. The requirement of the members of the community in this modern age
are highly varied. There are various types of financing required by
customers for such purposes as house purchase or business. These
various modes of financing would have to be met to the satisfaction
of both financier and the party financed.150 To restrict all the
requirements to or give priority to the profit and loss sharing
transactions would have the effect of undermining the criteria of
meeting the viability of both parties, i. e. the Bank and the
customers.151
148
Abdul Halim Ismail, "The Deferred Contracts of Exchange : Al-Qur'an in Contrast with the Islamic
Economists' Theory on Banking and Finance", pp. 6 - 51. A Paper Presented at the Bengkel Tertutup
Pemikiran Sistem Ekonomi Islam Berasaskan Sharpah Peringkal Kebangsaan, 21 March 1989, Kuala
Lumpur; Idem," Shari'ah and the Islamic Economics ; Permissibility of Uses of Funds Contracts", pp. 1 -
11, Ibid\ Idem, "The Deferred Contracts of Exchange in al-Qur'an" in Sheikh Ghazali Sheikh Abod, et
al(eds.), An Introduction to Islamic Finance, Kuala Lumpur, 1992, pp. 284 - 313; Article, "Bank Islam (M)
Berhad : Operasi, Masalah dan Masa depan" in Risalah, Vol. XIV, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia, 1990, p. 19;
Jaffar Hussein. "Islamic Financial System in the 1990s", in NAH, Vol. X(1 - 2), (Kuala Lumpur, 1990),
pp. 13 - 14.
I4<) Abdul Halim Ismail, "Sistem Kewangan Islam Dengan Tumpuan Kepada Urusan Bank dan Insuran",
pp. 15 - 19; Idem. " The Deferred Contracts of Exchange : Al-Qur'an in Contrast with the Islamic
economists' Theory on Banking and Finance", pp. 51 - 52.
150 Abdul Halim Ismail (1992a), pp. 261 - 262.
151 Ahmad Tajuddin Abdul Rahman (1987), pp. 19 - 20; A. Halim Ismail (1985), "Bank Islam : Prospek
dan Perkembangannya Pada Masa Hadapan", pp. 19 - 20; Article, "Bank Islam (M) Berhad : Operasi,
Masalah dan Masa Depannya", in Risalah (1990), p. 20.
195
c. Such methods are considered less risky in view of the capitalist
climate ofMalaysia. The possibility of getting an unscrupulous partner
in such profit and loss sharing contracts might cause loss to BIMB.
Further, BIMB has to monitor the project and more personnel have to
be employed.152
The resolution over the debate concerning the first and second line techniques of
operations is fundamental to the continued success of Islamic banking in Malaysia.
There exists a real danger that an element of doubt may exist in the minds of
depositors that BIMB is failing to be a truly Islamic bank.153
3.9. The future of Islamic Banking in Malaysia
Islamic banking is widely recognised by Muslim scholars as one of the
approaches to be adopted in the process of Islamising an economy. This approach is
based on the premise that under the existing political, social and technical constraints,
Islamization should be phased in, so as to avoid any abrupt changes which might
cause unpredictable chaos in the economy. Accordingly, Islamization of the banking
sector is to be implemented by first establishing the model of an Islamic bank side
l5\ A. Halim Ismail (1985). "Bank Islam : Prospek dan Perkembangannya Pada Masa Hadapan". p. 8; A.
Tajuddin Abdul Rahman (1987), p. 17; Interview: Tajuddin Abdul Rahman, Managing Director of BIMB,
Kuala Lumpur, 24/11/94.
153 C. Muzaffar in his works, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia, 1987, p.82 writes
that the Islamic Bank is but another bank. It may abolish interest, but given the capitalist structure of the
economy, the bank like other commercial banks, will continue to mobilise the savings of the ordinary
people for investments that will earn profits, which will almost always benefit those in the middle and
upper echelons of society. The abolition of interest in a capitalist economy without other fundamental
changes can only lead to greater injustice and inequilities.
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by side with the existing interest-based banks.154 The nature of co-existence between
Islamic and conventional banking is going to be a significant issue for the Malaysian
economy. In this regard, Tan Sri Jaafer Hussein, the former Governor of the Central
Bank of Malaysia said: "I have a dream, and my dream is that I will be able to see,
in my life time, a fully fledged Islamic financial system in Malaysia side by side with
the existing conventional system, both equally sophisticated and modern".155
He also said :
Our aim during the 1990s is to establish a comprehensive financial system
which runs parallel with the conventional system. We should not aim at least
for the present to completely replace the conventional system in Malaysia
with the Islamic financial system. The Islamic financial system should be
implemented gradually, so as not to create disruptions. This is important
considering that Malaysia has a multi-religious population.156
Dr. Halim Ismail, the former Managing Director of BIMB and the initiator of
Islamic banking in Malaysia had been interviewed on the possibility of the
Islamization of banking in Malaysia. He did not believe in universal Islamization,
154
See for example, M. Umer Chapra 1986), pp.228 - 231; Idem (1991), "Towards an Islamic Financial
System", p. 139; Khurshid Ahmad, "Islamic Approach to Banking : Some Conceptual and Operational
Aspects". Paper Presented at the International Conference on Islam and Technology, Kuala Lumpur,
December 1985. 9pp; Omar Asghar Khan, "Political and Economic Aspects of Islamisation", in O. A. Khan
(ed.), Islam, Politics and the State, Kuala Lumpur, 1987, pp. 77 - 98; Z. Ahmed, "Islamisation of Financial
System", JIBF, Vol. XI (2), 1994, pp. 22 -30; For the Malaysian perspective, see Hamzah Ismail and
Ahmad Shahbari Salamon, "Ke Arah Perlaksanaan Sistem Ekonomi Islam di Malaysia" in Mahayudin Hj.
Yahaya (ed.), Islam dan Pembangunan Negara, Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia, 1986, pp. 124 - 142; A. H.
Pramanik, Development and Distribution in Islam, Petaling Jaya, 1993, pp. 108 - 109; Mustafa Hamat,
"Pelaksanaan Sistem Kewangan Islam Ke Atas Institusi Kewangan Islam Kini", in Dunia Islam, (Kuala
Lumpur, February 1991). pp. 53 - 54. See also CII Report pp. 128 - 129. Cf. The Report of the Council
of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan on the Elimination of Interest, which is a product of the combined efforts
of the experts in economics and banking and those of SharTah has been internationally acclaimed as a
historic document on the subject. CII Report, pp. 103 - 257; M. A. Khan, "Islamic Banking in Pakistan"
in International Journal of Islamic and Arabic Studies, Vol. II (2), 1985, p. 21.
155 Quoted in The Star, 4 November 1991, p. 1; Datuk Mustapa Mohammad, who was the Deputy Finance
Minister also stressed the policy that the conventional banking system was not going to be abolished or
replaced totally with the Islamic financial system. Quoted in Berita Harian, 12 April 1994, p. 11.
I5'' Quoted in Berita Harian, 30 march 1990.
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rather he upheld the system of co-existence which he claimed to be more suitable to
multi-racial Malaysia.157
BIMB remains the sole Islamic bank in Malaysia, surrounded by hundreds of
conventional banks. As mentioned earlier, in 1982 the former Finance Minister said
that the Islamic Bank was " a first in the Government's efforts to instil Islamic values
into the country's economic and financial system as a "replacement for the current
Western-based economic system". He further added that "in the near future, there
would be as many as 100 such banks throughout the country".158
BIMB is still monopolising the Islamic banking sector in Malaysia and Muslims
have no choice but to turn to this bank to avoid involving themselves in riba
transactions. However, BIMB has, in many instances, been criticised for imposing a
higher rate of mark-up in financing their customers as compared to interest-based
banks. For the critics, this is tantamount to exploitation which is equally forbidden
in Islam.
Instead of establishing more Islamic banks, the Malaysian Government has
recently embarked upon establishing interest-free banking facilities within existing
conventional banks. The pilot scheme which was launched by the Finance Minister,
Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim on 4 March 1993159 involving three major commercial
157
Abdul Halim Ismail," Should the Whole Banking be Islamised?" in the Muslim Reader, Singapore, 1989,
p. 13. See also Aidit Ghazali, Development : An Islamic Perspective, 1990, pp. 129 - 135.
1511 Quoted in H. Mutalib (1990), op. cit., p. 138.
159 "Editor" in Berita Minggu, 7 March, 1993, p. 10; See also Article, "Perkhidmatan Bank Tanpa Faedah",
in Al-lslam, (Kuala Lumpur, April, 1993), p. 7.
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banks in Malaysia, i. e. Malayan Banking Berhad (MBB), Bank Bumiputera Malaysia
Berhad (BBMB) and United Malayan Banking Corporation (UMBC) was to provide
a wider application for Islamic banking activities and to help refine the domestic
banking sector into a sophisticated and mature industry. They were given permission
to offer interest-free banking facilities to customers side by side with their
conventional banking. These facilities, which include customers' deposit accounts,
assets financing and trade financing, are based on the Shari'ah principles such as
wadi6ah, mudarabah, murabahah, bay' bi thaman ajil, ijarah, kafalah and wakalah]b0
as presented in Table 10 below.
The three banks which form the first phase of the Interest-Free Banking Services
provide these services through their 281 branches throughout the country. These
facilities have met with an encouraging response from the public. In less than 2
months, their operations have attracted almost RM 30 million in public deposits and
investments involving a total of 4,146 depositors. Of the total amounts, RM 5,598
million was placed in saving accounts by 3,853 account holders, and the rest in
investment deposit accounts by 293 depositors.161
Interest-Free Banking is another way ofmobilising funds for productive purposes
160
Azhar Abu Samah. "Bank Tanpa Riba Dapat Sambutan" in Berita Harian, 12 March 1993, pp. 1-2;
Abdul Monir Yaacob. "Mempraktikkan Institusi Kewangan Islam" in Berita Harian, 24 September 1993,
p. 10; Berita Minggu, 24 April. 1994, p. 11: Dinsman, "Menerokai Sistem Kewangan Yang Adil" in Dewan
Masyarakat, January 1994, pp. 6 - 8; Article, "Perkhidmatan Bank Tanpa Faedah", in Al-lslam, (Kuala
Lumpur, April 1993), p. 7; Dinsman. "SPTF Bukan Saingan Sistem Ribal", in Dewan Masyarakat, (Kuala
Lumpur, Mac 1994), pp. 11 - 12; Cf Mahsin Mansor, Undang-undang Perdagangan Dalam Islam, Kuala
Lumpur, 1984.
161 Azhar Abu Samah, "Bank Tanpa Riba Dapat Sambutan" in Berita Harian, 12 March, 1993, p. 1; Noor
Hayati, "Interest-Free Banking Gets Good Response" in New Straits Times, 28 April, 1993, p. 2;
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and national development from Malaysians in general and Muslims in particular.162
It also offers the public and the corporate sector an alternative way of investment.
Under this system, the bank shares the profit earned from the utilisation of deposits,
including a share in the profits gained from the bank's investment in the clients'
projects. The return to the depositors, the bank and the users of the funds would
depend on the profit and the pre-determined profit and loss-sharing ratios.163
Table 10
164










4. Financing the Acquisition of Assets such as
houses and vehicle





6. lnterest-Free Export Credit Refinancing
6.1. Pre-delivery
6.2. Post-delivery
Murabahah or Bay al-Dayn
Bay! al-Dayn
Murabahah or BayL al-Dayn
Bay al-Dayn
7. Interest-Free Bank Guarantee
8. Interest-Free Shipping Guarantee
9. Letter of Credit
Kafalah
Kafalah
Wakdlah or Murabahah or Musharakah
10. Letter of Guarantee Kafalah or Ijarah
162 "SPTF Terbuka Kepada Semua Kaum", in Dewan Ekonomi, (Kuala Lumpur, January 1994), p. 43; Cf.
Shaifddin Aliman, "Sistem Perbankan Islam", in Ibid, pp. 41 - 42.
"'3 A. Rachel, "Islamic Banking Gains Popularity" in New Sunday Times, 10 October, 1993, p. 26;
Dzuljastri Abdul Razak and S. I. Abdul Karim, "Skim Perbankan Tanpa Faedah", in Dewan Ekonomi,
(Kuala Lumpur. May 1994), pp. 8-9.
IM See. for example, "SPTF AIternatif Kepada Sistem Konvensional" in Dewan Ekonomi, Mei, 1994, pp.
10 - 12; Azhar Abu Samah. "Bank Tanpa Riba Dapat Sambutan" in Berita Harian, 2 Mac 1993, p. 1;
Idem, "SPTF Beri Pilihan Luas Kepada Pelanggan" in Berita Harian, 7 Oktober 1994, p. 4; A. Rachel, op.
cit., p. 26; Mohamed Sidek Ahmad, "Banking on Interest Free Principles" in Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange, Investors Digest, October 1993. pp. 31 - 33.
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Ten more financial institutions are involved in the second phase of the Interest-
Free Banking scheme, which was launched by the Finance Minister on 21 August,
1993. They are Development and Commercial Bank Berhad, Kwong Yik Bank
Berhad, Perwira Habib Bank Berhad, Standard Chartered Bank Berhad, Arab-
Malaysian Finance Berhad, BBMB Kewangan Berhad, Mayban Finance Berhad, MBF
Finance Berhad, Public Finance Berhad and Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad.
Their participation would increase the number of branches offering Interest-Free
Banking services to 440165 (not including BIMB's 44 branches).166
In future, more financial institutions are expected to offer the Interest-Free
Banking services in addition to their existing services.167 On the future of Islamic
banking and finance in Malaysia, Abdul Halim offers a bright prospect:
The market can be big, but it has to be nurtured and developed in an orderly
manner...The success of Islamic banking will also depend on the political
stability, economic growth and a visionary leadership which we are enjoying
now. And assuming that it's efficient (like conventional banking), it should
attract non-Muslim customers too, which means the market should grow.
Above all, the Islamic banking and financial system is expected to play an
important role - which is to attain the economic objectives of restructuring the
Bumiputera community and Vision 2020 (when Malaysia is expected to be an
165
Othman Abu Bakar, "Interest-Free Banking Nationwide in a Year" in New Sunday Times, 22 August,
1993, p. 1; A. Rachel (1993), op cit., p. 26; Abdul Monir Yaacob, "SPTF Perlu Diperluaskan Lagi" in
Dewan Ekonomi, May, 1994. pp. 12 - 13; Dinsman, "AMFB Menerokai Pembiayaan Cara al-Musyarakah",
in Dewan Masyarakat, (Kuala Lumpur. May 1994). pp. 45 - 46.
166 This figure includes 12 mini branches of BIMB opened during the financial year of 1993 at Baling,
Tanah Merah, Dungun, Masjid Tanah, Kluang, Subang Jaya, Banting, Bandar Pusat Jengka, Kota Tinggi,
Jasin, Sri Manjung and Kulim. These are deposit taking-taking branches providing current account, savings
account and investment account facilities. See BIMB, Annual Report 1993, pp. 10, 67 -70.
167 According to Nor Mohamed Yakcob, Bank Negara adviser, that in the future all 37 commercial banks,
12 merchant banks and 41 finance companies will have all or part of their nation-wide branches offering




In this chapter, we have seen that the Islamic mode of banking is both
theoretically feasible and practically possible. The Islamic Banking system has
provided practical evidence of the possibility of an interest-free banking system in
the modern world. Muslim scholars and economists are all agreed that Islamic
Banking will be based on the commercial contracts of mudarabah and musharakah
as already explained in the first and second chapters, and other modes of financing
such as murabahah and bay1 bi thaman ajil. The above discussion also provides
strong evidence of how transactions can be made according to the Islamic
commercial law through the modern financial intermediary of the banking system. It
is encouraging to note that Islamic banking in Malaysia is functioning successfully
side-by-side with conventional banks. However, available evidence clearly suggests
that there is tendency for the BIMB to confine its profit-generating operations to
almost risk-free techniques to ensure success. Consequently, it creates the bank's over
reliance on murabahah and bayc bi thaman ajil modes of financing rather than the
entrepreneur-creating operations of mudarabah and musharakah. To a certain degree,
people doubt the bank's genuine intention to apply Islamic principles in banking, thus
the bank has been unable to influence the pattern of the distribution of profit between
the providers and the users of capital in a more equitable manner as enjoined in
Islam. It may be argued that more meaningful outcomes could have been achieved,
had the bank placed greater emphasis on the first-line techniques of mudarabah and
musharakah.
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, Investors Digest. April, 1993, p. 11.
202
CHAPTER FOUR
MUDARABAH IN THE OPERATION OF
SYARIKAT TAKAFUL MALAYSIA
SENDIRIAN BERHAD
CHAPTER FOUR : MUDARABAH IN THE OPERATION OF
v
SYARIKAT TAKAFUL MALAYSIA SENDIRIAN
BERHAD
Introduction
This chapter will critically analyse the establishment and operations of Syarikat
Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad (STMSB)] as the only one company granted
permission to operate Islamic insurance busines based on the contracts of mudarabah
and takaful. The topics that will be discussed include the nature of insurance, an
Islamic view on present-day insurance, the historical development of Syarikat
Takaful, types of takaful business, contributions and investments of the Family
Takaful Fund, Group Family Takaful Fund and General Takaful Fund, as well as the
investment of Syarikat Takaful's shareholders Funds, evaluation of the performance
of Syarikat Takaful's role as an Islamic financial institution in Malaysia and some
issues relating to the takaful scheme.
4.1. Nature of Insurance
The term "insurance' in its real sense refers to community pooling to alleviate the
burden of the individual, which might be ruinous to him. The simplest and most
general conception of insurance is a provision made by a group of persons, each
singly in danger of some loss, the incidence of which cannot be foreseen, that when
1
Hereafter referred to as Syarikat Takaful.
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such loss shall occur to any of them, it shall be distributed over the whole group.2
Insurance has been described as a device provided by the community or group of
people to cover loss,3 or an arrangement against risk,4 or against the dangers5 which
beset human life and dealings, when they occur to the members of that community
or group of people, by creating funds to cover losses or against that risk.6
In its modern form, insurance can be described as a contract whereby one person
called the "insurer" undertakes, in return for the agreed consideration called the
"premium", to pay another person called the "insured", a sum of money or its
equivalent, on the happening of a specified event.7 The aim of insurance is to make
provision against the dangers to which a group of persons are all equally subject.
Insurance is thus a mutual coverage of accidental loss by a group of persons subject
to a common danger.8 In the present form of insurance, losses are not distributed but
Entry on "Insurance" in Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. XX, Connecticut, 1984, p. 233; The New
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XXI, Chicago, 1985, p. 678.
3 Those who describe insurance as "pooling of losses" in E. Cannan, A Review of Economic Theory,
London, 1929. p. 424; Encyclopaedia of Banking and Finance, p. 385; "distribution of losses", W. F.
Gephart, Principles of Insurance, New York, 1911, pp. 4-5; "mitigation of losses", Ibid., pp. 1 - 2;
"Indemnifying of losses". L. D. Edie, Economics : Principles and Problems, London, 1926, p. 215 and
"meeting of losses", A. H. Silverman, The Substance of Economics, London, 193, p. 164.
4 See C. Gide, Political Economy, London. 1914, p. 745; S. H. Patterson and K. W. H. Schholz, Economic
Problems ofModern Life, New York and London, 1931, p. 98; M. Dobb, Capitalist Enterprise, London,
1925, pp. 53 and 164; Marks Dordman says that risk can be divided into four categories, i. e. subjective
risk, objective risk, pure risk and speculative risk. See Introduction to Insurance, Englawood Cliffs, 1982,
p. 9.
5 T.W. Morgan (ed.). Porter's Laws of Insurance, London, 1933, p. 1.
6 H. Barou, Coperative Insurance, London. 1936. p. 40; see also Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations,
Edwin Cannan (ed.), Vol. II, London, 1950, p. 248.
7
E. R. Hardy Ivamy, General Principles of Insurance Law, London, 1975, p. 3; See an entry "Insurance"
in The New Encyclopeadia Britannica, Vol. XXI. p. 678.
* T. W. Morgan (ed.),( 1933). p.
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funds are created to cover the losses calculated in advance with the aid of past
experience.9 Thus, it can be seen that insurance involves the spirit of mutuality and
co-operation.
The modern contract of conventional insurance seems to have its origin in the
marine loans of ancient Greeks.10 As against the ancient Greek marine loan, the idea
of mutual insurance finds its expression in the payment of blood money11 (Qaqilah)
which was prevalent in Arab tribes during the pre-Islamic times.12 This virtue of pre-
Islamic times was approved and incorporated into Islam by the Prophet, and later
acted upon by Caliph cUmar.13 The nature of blood-money was neither usurious, nor
exploitative. It ingrained the spirit of mutuality, co-operation and mutual insurance,
and eliminated the danger of wars of revenge which continued in pre-Islamic Arabia
for decades.
9
ft. Barou (1936), op. cit., p. 40.
10 This marine loans of ancient Greeks described by Demosthenes; "Money was advanced on a ship or
cargo, to be repaid with large interest if the voyage prospered, but not repaid at all if the ship be lost, the
rate of interest being made high enough to pay not only for the use of capital, but for the risk of losing it".
(Entry on "Insurance", in The New Encyclopaedia of Britannica, Vol. XXI, 1989, p. 678). According to
Barou. "The rate of interest includes together with other elements a premium for insurance in order to
provide compensation for the loan to the lender, in case of a loss incurred through the bankruptcy of the
borrower". (See H. Barou, Cooperative Insurance, London. 1936, p. 25). Thus it can be said that the
modern contract of insurance is basically the same (usurious in nature) as the old marine loan of ancient
Greeks. (M. Muslehuddin, Insurance and Islamic Law. New Delhi. 1982, pp. 27- 28).
"
or blood-wite. See Th. W. Juynboll. "Akila", in EI (I), Vol. I, 1913, p. 239.
12 Muslehuddin. op. cit., pp. 10 - 11; Juynboll, "Akila", pp. 239 - 240. cAkilah is the name of the man's
male relations who according to the precept of the religious law have to pay the penalty (the Laql) for him,
when unintentionally he has caused the death of a Muslim. This decree was based on a verdict of the
Prophet. One day in a quarrel between two women of the Hudhayl tribe, one of them who was with child
was killed by the other with a stone, which hit her in the womb. When, soon after, the other woman also
died, the Prophet decided, that her kin faqilah, or, according to a different reading her 'asabah, i. e.
agnates), in accordance with an old custom, had to pay the penalty to the relatives of the woman who had
been killed. (Muslehuddin. op. cit., p. 11; Juynboll, "Akila", p. 239).
13 Muslehuddin, op. cit.. p. 23; See also Hidayah, Vol. IV, p. 642; M. Hamidullah. The First Written
Constitution in the World, Lahore. 1981, pp. 41 - 42 and 44 - 45.
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4.2. An Islamic View of Present-Day Insurance
Insurance has undoubtedly assumed tremendous importance in modern commerce,
trade and industry. The contract of insurance has been the subject matter of prolonged
and detailed studies, examination and scrutiny by and amongst eminent Islamic
scholars, who have come to different conclusions, views and opinions. There at least
three standpoints: That it is permissible (mubah), that it is prohibited (haram) and
that some forms are allowed and others disapproved.14
The proponents of the permissibility of insurance (ta'min)15 declare that such
contract is allowed if it is free from riba. It is considered as a collective undertaking
Carnal tcfawuni) which takes care of the welfare (masalih) of individuals and
society. In so far as maslahah is achieved, it is in compliance with the law.
Moreover, originally all contracts are permissible and as such it can be equated by
analogy to various permissible contracts.16 Justification based on public interest and
even on the socio-economic survival of the Muslim Ummah has also been put
foward.17
14
Ahmad al-Sacid Sharaf al-Din, cUqud al-Ta'min wa cUqud Daman al-Istithmar, pp. 88 - 94; M.
Musiehuddin, Insurance and Islamic Law, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 109 - 125.
15 Ta'min became the Arabic term for insurance in the 20th century. (E. Klingmuller, "The Concept ajid
Development of Insurance in Islamic Countries", /C, Vol. XXXXIII (1), 1969, pp. 27 - 37). Ibn cAbidin,
however, a Hanafi jurist who is considered the first Muslim to name insurance sukara (security),
influenced by the Italian term siguare and the Turkish sigorla. (Hash A., Vol. IV, pp. 170 - 173; Vardit
Risper-Chaim, "Insurance and Semi-Insurance Transactions in Islamic History Until the 19th Century",
JESHO. Vol. XXXIV, 1991, pp. 142 - 143).
16 A. S. Sharaf al-Din, op. cit., p. 90.
17 Muhammad al-Bahi. L'Aqd al-Ta'min, p. 23.
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The justifications of ta'min advanced by Mustafa Zarqa'18 and cAli al-Khafif,19
leading contemporary scholars, have been overwhelmingly accepted. Firstly, it is
argued that ta'min is a newly known contract not covered by a text (nas$) whether
approving or disapproving of it. It should thus be considered allowed (ja'iz) and
permissible (mubah). Secondly, since it is a contract based on maslahah and since
there is no aspect of any harm (darar), it complies with the prescribed law. Thirdly,
insurance has become a common usage (curfcamm) necessary for the attainment of
private and public interests. cUrf is considered to be a source of law, as long as it
does not contradict the precepts of the Sharfah.20
The proponents of the prohibition of insurance argue that it contains the elements
of riba (usury), gharar (risk), jahalah (uncertainty), maysir (gambling and unearned
gain), and attempting to supersede the will of God, all of which is said to be
diametrically opposed to the ethical standards set by Islamic law.21 Muhammad Abu
Zahrah has made the qualification that ta'min not founded on a collective basis (al-
ta'min ghayr al-taLawuni) is reprehensible (makruh). Such a decision is established
on the basis of the classical methodology of cUlama' al-salaf that no prohibition will
be pronounced except where there is an explicit evidence (dalil qafi).22
18
His finding on this matter was delivered in the Usbff al-Fiqh al-lslami in Damascus (1961) as well as
in his deliberation at the Mecca Conference (1976).
19 His opinions submitted to the second assembly of the Majmd al-Buhuth al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Research
Academy) of al-Azhar University in which he excluded life insurance from the list of validated insurances.
20 A. S. Sharaf al-Din, op. cit., p. 90.
21 M. Muslehuddin, op. cit., p. 109; A. S. Sharaf al-Din, op. cit., p. 88.
22 For details on thejpolemic between Muhammad Abu Zahrah and Mustafa Ahmad al-Zarqa', see Zarqa"s
works cAqd al-Ta'min wa mawqif al-SharTah al-Islamiyyah minhu (A lecture delivered during the Usbuc
al-Fiqh al-lslami). Damascus. 1962 and a recent work cAqd al-Ta'min fi al-SharTah al-Islamiyyah, 1982.
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The third group hold that some forms of ta'min are allowed and some are
prohibited. Some of them allowed the use of ta'min on property but ban life
insurance.23 However, an overwhelming majority of Islamic scholars are now of the
opinion that the conventional insurance contract does not, in its present form,
conform to the Sharbah because it includes an element of gharar (uncertainty),
based on the practice of riba and a sort of gambling (maysir).24
4.3. The Establishment of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad
(STMSB) 25
4.3.1. Origin/Historical Development of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian
Berhad
The need in Malaysia for a scheme of insurance which is in line with Islamic
teachings was officially affirmed when the National Fatwa Committee26 declared in
1972 that the conventional concept of life Insurance as practised in Malaysia was
23
Siddiqi, op. cit.. p. 26.
24 Insurance has been discussed at a number of Islamic conferences, but a favourable verdict on commercial
insurance has been withheld in view of the objections of the eminent scholars. This is brought out by the
resolutions passed at the 1965 Islamic Research Congress at Cairo and those adopted in 1969 at Kuala
Lumpur. See Siddiqi, Muslim Economic Thinking : A Survey ofContemporary Literature, Leicester, 1981,
p. 27. As recently as 1976 the First International Conference on Islamic Economics held at Mecca resolved
that: "The Conference feels that commercial insurance as presently practised does not realise the SharTah's
aims of co-operation and solidarity because it does not satisfy the Islamic conditions for it to become
acceptable". Furthermore, the conference recommended the establishment of a committee consisting of
specialists in SharTah and economics to recommend a system of insurance which is free from riba and
speculation, promotes co-operation in accordance with the SharTah, and helps replace the current form of
commercial insurance. See General Recommendations, no. 6, First International Conference on Islamic
Economics. Mecca. 1976 cited in Siddiqi. Muslim Economic Thinking, p. 27.
25 Hereafter cited to as Syarikat Takaful.
2,1 The National Fatwa Committee is made up of 14 muftis from 14 states in Malaysia.
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unlawful in Islam as it contained the elements of riba, gharar and maysir.21
Gharar
Gharar means obvious indeterminancy, hazard or risk (khafar or mukhajarah)
and ignorance that is likely to cause disputes which, when applied to insurance,
means the presence of unknown and uncertain factors in the operation of the
contract.28 This element of gharar (or uncertainty) is found in the operation of
conventional insurance, both life and general insurance contracts. In such a contract,
the insured or the policy holder agrees to pay a certain sum as a premium and in turn
the insurance company guarantees to pay a certain sum of compensation in the event
of a catastrophe or disaster. The uncertainty relates to the fact that the insured or the
policy holder is not informed, for example, of how the amount of the compensation
that the company will pay him is to be derived.29
27
Report ofthe Committee on the Setting-up od an Islamic Insurance Company in Malaysia, Kuala Lu pur,
1984, p. 1.
211 Lisan. Vol. V, pp. 13 - 14; Lane. Vol. II, p. 2239; In Islamic terminology, this is a sale of an article of
goods which is not present at hand; or the sale of an article of goods, the consequence ('aqibah) or
outcome of which is not known; or a sale involving risk or hazard where one does not know whether the
commodity will later come to be or otherwise. Aclam, Vol. I, p. 358; Zurqani, Vol. Ill, p. 313; Ramli,
Nihayat al-Muhtaj, Vol. Ill, p. 335; Muw. Y., pp. 554 - 555. The term means that such transactions, which
are prohibited in Islam, in form are apparently no different from those prohibited in Islam for deceiving
when in reality the nature of the object is not known and therefore risk involved. Several reasons are given
for the prohibition of bag al-gharar. Some of them are related to fraudulence since such a sale amounts
to obtaining the property of others by selling unavailable goods and the contract may lead to disputes and
disagreements between the parties in the contract. Sahnun, Vol. IV, p. 207; Zurqani, Vol. Ill, p. 313;
Musannaf Vol. VIII, pp. 108 ^_109; Muzani, Vol. VIII, p. 185; Muhalla^Vol. VIII, pp. 399 - 400; See also
al-Saddiq Muhammad al-Amin al-Darir, al-Gharar wa Atharuhu ft al-Uqud ft al-Fiqh al-Islami :
Dirasah Muqaranah, Cairo, 1967, p. 27; Coulson, Commercial Law, p. 44; Franz Rosenthal, Gambling in
Islam, Leiden, 1975, p. 139.
29 STMSB. Risalah Perlindungan Takdful, M. F. Yusuf, "Takaful Insurance Company Malaysia Sdn. Bhd.",
Syariah Law Journal. (International Islamic University, Petaling Jaya, September, 1991), p. 87; CfAfzalur
Rahman. Banking and Insurance, Vol. IV, London, 1979, pp. 133 - 142.
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Maysir
Closely related to and justified by Islam's wider prohibition against unearned
gains, is the prohibition of all transactions containing an element of maysir. Maysir,
though similar to it, is far wider than the concept of gambling, gaming and wagering.
Generally, it means unnecessary risk by entering into a transaction with the hope of
gain as well as the fear of loss,30 or undertaking a risk in the spirit of speculation.31
Insurance is said to contain the element of maysir, when a life policyholder dies
before the end of his insurance policy after paying only part of the premium, so that
for example, his dependents will receive a certain sum ofmoney which exceeds what
the insured paid in premiums. Similarly, in non-life insurance, if the insured event
occurs and results in a huge loss, the insured will recover more than which he has
paid in premium. On the other hand, if the insured event does not take place, the
insured gets nothing tangible in return for his premiums.32
Riba
The practice of riba and other related practices which contraven the rules of the
Sharicah enter into the investment activities of the conventional insurance
3"
M. N. Siddiqi, Insurance in an Islamic Economy, Leicester, 1985, p. 34; Taj, Vol. XIV, pp. 453 - 479.
31 S. H. Amin, Islamic Law in the Contemporary World, Glasgow, 1985, pp. 71 - 84.
32 STMSB. Risalah Perlindungan Takaful: Idem. Risalah Pelan Takaful Keluarga (A) and (B)\ M. F. Yusuf
(1991), op. cit., p. 88: Nik Ramlah N. Mahmood. "Takaful : The Islamic System ofMutual Insurance - The
Malaysian Insurance". Arab Law Quarterly. Feb., 1991. p. 285.
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companies.13
In 1982, a Committee set up by the Government to study the implementation of
the Islamic system of insurance in Malaysia recommended the introduction of the
takaful scheme of insurance. The Committee also included in its report a draft
proposal for the Takaful Bill 1984 which provided for the setting-up, control and
regulation of takaful businesses and other related matters. Following the acceptance
by the Government of introducing takaful businesses in Malaysia, the Parliament
gazetted the Takaful Act in 1984,34 and finally a Takaful Company was incorporated
as a private limited company under the Companies Act 196535 on 29th November
1984, taking the name ofSyarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad (STMSB), with
its registered office situated in Malaysia. The Company started its business on 2nd
August 1985.36
To underline the importance of its Islamic character, the Takaful Company's
Memorandum of Association prefaces that "all businesses of the Company will be
"
Afzalur Rahman, op cit., pp. 108 - 114; Muhammad Samiullah, "Prohibition of Riba (Interest) and
Insurance in the Light of Islam", IS, Vol. XXI (2), (1982), pp. 53 - 76; M. A. Choudhury, "Insurance and
Investment in Islamic Perspective", International Journal ofSocial Economics, Vol. X 95), Fresno, 1983,
pp. 16 - 17.
34 The Act seeks to provide for the licensing and regulating of takaful business in Malaysia. See S. (1),
Takaful Act 1984. It has been modelled on Malaysia's existing Insurance Act 1963 with modifications and
amendments as are necessary to conform with the takaful business practices. However, according to the
provisions of the Takaful Act 1984, for example S. 67 (2), Takaful Act 1984 provides that the supervisory
authority responsible for the supervision of all regulations over the Takaful Company is vested in the
Ministry of Finance through the Director-General of Syarikat Takaful.
35 S. 4 (1) (a), Takaful Act 1984 provides "Subject to this Act, takaful business shall not be carried on in
Malaysia by any person as takaful operator except by a Company as defined in the Companies Act 1965".
3<' STMSB. Annual Report 1986. pp. 5-6.
211
transacted in accordance with Islamic principles, rules and practices",37 The Company
has an authorized capital ofRM 100 million, divided into 100 million ordinary shares
of RM 1 each. The initial paid-up capital of the Company is RM 10 million, 51 per
cent of which is held by B1MB\ and the other shareholders are the State Religious
Councils and the State Religious Agencies of Malaysia.38 This ownership of shares
makes Syarikat Takaful a subsidiary of B1MB.
4.3.2. The Concept of Takaful (Mutual Insurance) and Mudarabah
In this section, we discuss the principles of takaful and mudarabah which are
used as modes of operation of Syarikat Takaful.
Literally, takaful means mutual guarantee, joint guarantee and co-operation39 and
these are the hallmarks of this scheme. This concept embodies the principles of co¬
operation, mutual help and shared responsibility.40 The Takaful Act 1984 of Malaysia
defines takaful as a scheme based on brotherhood, solidarity and mutual assistance
which provides for mutual financial aid and assistance to the participants in case of
need, whereby the participants mutually agree to contribute for that purpose.41
17
STMSB, Annua! Report 1986, p. 5; Mohd. Fadzli Yusuf, "Takaful Insurance Company Malaysia Sdn.
Bhd. : Islamic Alternative to Insurance" in International Islamic University Syariah Law Journal,
September 1991, p. 92.
38 STMSB, Annua! Report 1986, p. 5; BIMB, Annual Report 1986, p. 7; See also S. W. Ahmad, "Islamic
Insurance in Malaysia" in Mohamed Ariff (ed.), The Muslim Private Sector in Southeast Asia, Singapore,
1991, pp. 197 - 198;
34 Lisan, Vol. XI, pp. 589 - 590; Lane, Vol. I. p. 3001; R. Dozy, Supplement Aux Dictionaires Arabes, Vol.
II, Leiden and Paris, 1927, p. 478; H. Wehr. Arabic-English Dictionary, ed. J. M. Cowan, New York. 1976,
p. 834.
40 For example, see Sami A. Hanna, "Al-Takaful al-ljtima i and Islamic Socialism". The Muslim World,
Vol. LIX. 1969. pp. 275 - 286; Nik Ramlah N. Mahmood, op. cit., pp. 286 - 287.
41 Takaful Act 1984, s. 2.
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Takaful is characterised by three aspects of mutuality, namely, mutual help,
mutual responsibility and mutual protection from losses. The "insurance" that is
provided is not dispensed by one party (the insurer) to another (the insured). The
person seeking protection participates in a scheme of co-operation with another.42 The
Syarikat Takaful (Takaful Company) that runs the scheme is not the insurer but is
merely an institution which provides the entrepreneurial and administrative skills
required to bring the participants together, to collect and invest the contribution and
to process the claims. Therefore, this scheme can be seen as a method of joint
guarantee among a group of members, that is, participants in any scheme against loss
or damage that may fall upon any of them. The members of the group agree to
guarantee jointly that should any of them suffer a catastrophe or disaster, he would
receive a certain some of money to help him meet the loss or damage. This means
that participants pledge mutual help amongst the group and each member of the
group pools effort to support the needy.43
In the practice of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad (STMSB), the
concept of takaful has been developed as a form of business and the principle of
mudarabah has been applied in the contract between Syarikat Takaful and the
participants. Under the contract of takaful based on the principle of mudarabah,
Syarikat Takaful acts as an entrepreneur or investor (mudarib) and accepts takaful
42
Syed Waseem Ahmad, "Islamic Insurance In Malaysia", in Mohamed Ariff (ed.), The Muslim private
Sector in Southeast Asia. Singapore. 1991. pp. 191 - 192.
43
Report ofthe Committee on the Setting-up ofan Islamic Insurance Company in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur,
1984. p. 8; Mohd. Fadzii Yusuf, "The Operation of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad", p. 5.
Paper presented at the Seminar on Insurance in Malaysia for Journalist, Kuala Lumpur, 1985; Idem, "The
Principles of Islamic Insurance", p.5. Paper presented at the Seminar on Issues in Economics, 27 - 29
December 1985. Petaling Jaya. Malaysia.
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contributions or payment of the takaful instalments termed as ra's al-mal (capital)
from participants, who are treated as investors or providers of capital (ashab al-
mal)44
The takaful contract which is made in accordance with the principle of
mudarabah specifies how the profit (surplus) from the operations of takaful managed
by Syarikat Takaful is to be shared between the participants as the providers of the
capital and Syarikat Takaful (company) as the entrepreneur (investor). The sharing
of such profit may be in a ratio of, for example, 5 : 5, 6 : 4, 7 : 3, et cetera as
mutually agreed between the contracting parties. The contract also clearly states the
rights and obligations of both the participants and the Syarikat Takaful.45
4.3.3. The Concept of Tabarruc
■ Another special feature of takaful contract is the concept of tabarruc which
means to donate, to contribute.46 Under the takaful contract, the participants agree to
relinquish as donations, in accordance with the concept of tabarruc, a certain
proportion of their takaful contributions of mutual help as embodied in the concept
of takaful. Therefore, the purpose of tabarruc as stipulated in the contract is to enable
the participants to perform their obligations in assisting and helping fellow
participants who might suffer a loss or damage due to death or disasters. The sharing
44
STMSB, Risalah Perlindungan Takaful. n. d.; Mohd. Fadzli Yusof, "Takaful Insurance Company
Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. : Islamic Alternative to Insurance", in Syariah Law Journal, Petaling Jaya, Selangor,
September 1991. p. 88: Tajuddin Saman. "Takaful Berasaskan Mudarabah" in Berita Harian, 22 May 1992,
p. 9; Johari Jaafar, "Skim Takaful Bantu Masyarakat Islam" in Berita Minggu, 5 July 1992, p. 10.
45 STMSB. Risalah Perlindungan Takaful.
46
Taj, Vol. XX. p. 319; Lane, Vol. 1, p. 189; Dozy. Supplement, Vol. I, p. 73.
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of the profits or surplus from the operations of takaful, according to the principle of
mudarabah, is made only after the obligations of assisting fellow participants have
been fulfilled. Syarikat Takaful has to meet these obligations as well as generate a
reasonable level of profits by maintaining adequate assets in its takaful funds, whilst
at the same time striving prudently to protect the funds against undue exposure.4'
4.3.4. Types of Takaful Business
There are two types of takaful business offered by Syarikat Takaful, namely,
Family Takaful Plans and General Takaful Schemes.48 In the context of ordinary
insurance, the Family Takaful Plans and the General Takaful Scheme can be
compared with life and non-life insurances respectively.49
The Family Takaful Plans provide various family takaful plans based on a
mudarabah contract. The plans provide cover of mutual financial aid and assistance
from the takaful benefits, in case of the untimely death of a participant.50 The General
Takaful Scheme provides various general takaful schemes as a form of a protection
47
STMSB, Risalah Perlindungan TakafuT, Mohd. Fadzli Yusuf (1985.b), "The Principles of Islamic
Insurance", p. 7; Idem, "Sumbangan Takaful Kepada Usahawan", p. 7. A Paper presented at the Seminar
Keusahawanan dan Perniagaan Islam, 28 - 29 November 1987, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia; Idem, "Berbakti
Kepada Rakan Melalui Tabarrit" in Berita Harian, 7 October 1994, p. 3; Johari Jaafar (1992), op cit., p.
10;
4(1 The Takaful Act 1984 divides the takafu! business into the Family Solidarity Business or Family Takafu!
Plans and the General Takdful Business (Scheme). (Takaful Act 1984, s. 3). The former is defined as
takaful for the benefit of individual and his family, while the latter is defined as all takafu! business which
is not Family Solidarity Business. (Takaful Act 1984, s. 3. a(i) and (ii).
4'' See S. 3 (2), Insurance Act 1963.
511 STMSB, Risalah Pelan Takaful Keluarga (a) and (b)\ Idem, Annual Report 1986, p. 6; Mohd. Fadzii
Yusuf (1987), "Sumbangan Takaful Kepada Usahawan". p. 12; Barjoyai Bardai, "Skim Takdful Keluarga
dan Operasinya" in Berita Minggu, 3 January 1992, p. 8.
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for an individual or a body corporate against material loss or damage arising from
catastrophes, disasters or mishap inflicted upon properties or assets belonging to
participants such as buildings, houses, vehicles, stock in trade, et cetera."
Although the Act introduces a new scheme which is supposed to comply with
Islamic principles, the Act itself has a few provisions as to how the scheme should
operate, except that it must be in accordance with the Sharfah. The general
operation of the scheme is a matter of practice and it was recommended that the
practices of existing insurers, as long as they comply the Sharfah principles, ought
to be followed.
(a) Family Takaful Plans
A Family Takaful Plan, which is essentially an investment programme, provides
investment returns to a participant as well as mutual financial aid. Any individual or
a corporate body may participate in this takaful plan so that he will be able to save
regularly a sum of money as a measure to relieve the financial burden that his
dependents may face should he die prematurely or as a form of contingency should
he survive the term of the plan.52 Therefore, the objectives of the Family Takaful
Plans have been described to enable a person:
1. to save regularly
2. to invest this saving with a view to earning profits in accordance with
the rules and requirement of the Sharfah
51
STMSB. Risalah Perlindungan Takaful; STMSB, Annual Report 1986, p. 7.
52 Risalah Perlindungan TakafuT, Mohd. Fadzli Yusuf (1987), "Sumbangan Takaful Kepada Usahawan",
p. 12.
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3. to provide cover in the form of a payment of takaful benefits to an
heir or heirs should a participant die before the maturity date of his
takaful plan.53
Syarikat Takaful offers to an individual or a corporate body the following Family
Takaful Plans:
1. Family Takaful Plans with a maturity of 10, 15, 20 and up to 40 years,
which must mature before the participant reaches the age of 60 years54
2. Family Takaful Plans for Mortgage55
3. Family Takaful Plans for Education
4. Group Family Takaful Plans.56
A person who wishes to participate in the Family Takaful Plans, who is then
called a participant,57 may choose any one of the types of plans offered by Syarikat
Takaful (or the operator)58 as mentioned above. Any plan has a defined period of
participation such as 10, 15 or 20 year terms. The age groups covered under any
Family Takaful Plan with various maturity periods range from 18 to 50 years. The
participants and the Syarikat Takaful enter a takaful contract based on the principle
53
STMSB, Pelan Takafut Keluarga (A) and (B).
54 STMSB, Annual Report 1986, p. 6; Idem. Risalah Pelan Takaful Keluarga (a) and (b).
55 STMSB, Annual Report 1986. p. 6; Idem. Risalah Perlindungan Takaful.
56 STMSB, Annual Report 1988, p. 7; Annual Report 1989, p. 6; Annual Report 1990, p. 5; Annual Report
1991, p. 5.
57 S. 2 Takaful Act 1984 Provides that "Participants" includes, where a certificate has been assigned, the
assignee for the time being and, where they are entitled as against the takaful operator to the benefit of the
certificate, the personal representatives of a deceased participant.
58 S. 2 Takaful Act 1984 provides that "operator" means a company or a society which carries on takaful
business.
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ofmudarabah and the participants agree to pay regularly to the Syarikat Takaful the
takaful contributions (instalments) (premium), monthly, quarterly or annually which
are then credited into a fund (Family Takaful Fund).59 The contract spells out clearly
the rights and obligations of the contracting parties.
As shown in Figure 4.1 below, each takaful instalment (contribution) paid by the
participant and credited into the Family Takaful Fund shall in turn be divided and
credited by the Syarikat Takaful into two separate accounts, namely:
1. The Participant's Account (PA), and
2. The Participant's Special Account (PSA).
A substantial proportion of the instalments is credited into the PA solely for the
purpose of savings and investment. The balance of the instalment is credited into the
PSA as tabarru' which depends on the age group and maturity period of the
participants. As shown in Table 4.1, the tabarru' proportion varies from two per cent
to twelve and a half per cent. The remaining proportion of the instalment is credited
into the participant's account. It is out of the PSA that Syarikat Takaful is to pay the
takaful benefits to the heir(s) of a participant who may die before the maturity of his
Family Takaful Plan. In other words, money paid into the PSA is paid by the
participant is in the spirit of tabarru' bQ
5'f
The amount of takaful instalment to be paid during the term of the plan is determined by the participants
themselves. Such amount, however, should be within the financial means of the participants and also
subject to the minimum sum fixed by the Syarikat Takaful which at present is RM 15.00 per month payable
on a monthly, quarterly or annually basis. See Risalah Pelan Takaful Keluarga (a) and (b)\ Risalah
Perlindungan Takaful.
60 STMSB. Risalah Perlindungan TakafuT, Mohd. Fadzli Yusuf (1991), "Takaful Insurance Company
Malaysia Sdn. Bhd.". p. 90; Nik Ramlah N. Mahmood, op. cit.. p. 288.
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Table 4.1
Syarikat Takaful : Ratios of tabarru' proportion credited into PSA accounts
Age Group (Years) Maturity Period (Years)
Age Group (Years) 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
18 - 25 2.0% 3.5% 5.0% 5.5% 7.5% 9.5% 12.5%
26 - 30 2.0% 3.5% 5.0% 6.5% 9.0% 12.5%
31 - 35 2.5% 4.5% 6.5% 9.0% 12.5
%
36 - 40 3.5% 6.0% 9.0% 12.5%
41 - 45 5.0% 8.5% 12.5%
46 - 50 7.0% 12.5%
Source : STMSB, Risalah Pelan Takaful Keluarga (a) and (b).
The tabarrvf proportion increases with the length of maturity of the Family
Takaful Plan as well as with the age of the participant at entry. The factors
determining the tabarruc proportion in the Family Takaful Plans are the age at entry
and the timeframe of the contract.61 In this regard, the instalment (contribution)
remains the same but the tabarruc proportion rises.62 It can be said that the purpose
of the tabarru' proportion that goes into the PSA account is to create a form of
mutual fund, whilst that the PA serves to accumulate savings.
61
These factors are the same as those determining for the annual cost of a term assurance policy in
conventional insurance. In Conventional Insurance, the premium rate rises both with age at entry and the
length of the maturity period.
62 Mohd. Fadzli Yusuf (1991), p. 90; See also Nik Ramlah N. Mahmood, op. cit., p. 288.
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Profits from Investment is distributed







RM 2.98 RM 1,028.02
Source : Syarikat Takaful, Risalah Pelan Takaful Keluarga, n. d.
One of the functions of the Syarikat Takaful in managing the Family Takaful
business is the investment of the takaful instalments in line with the principle of
mudarabah or profit and loss sharing. The instalments credited into the two accounts,
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i.e. PA and PSA accounts, are pooled as a single fund as shown in Figure 4.1.
Therefore, monies from both the accounts are invested by Syarikat Takaful on a profit
and loss sharing basis in enterprises which are not contrary to Islamic law either in
their operations or in nature of their business. The profits generated from the
investment are shared between the participants and Syarikat Takaful in a ratio
mutually agreed between them. For example, a participant in the age group of 18 -
25 taking up a 10 years plan under Family Takaful Plan might have 2.0 per cent in
PSA and 98 per cent in PA. The distribution of profits realized from investment by
Syarikat Takaful is first divided according to the profit-sharing agreement, for
example 70 : 30, between the participant and Syarikat Takaful respectively. The
proportion (30 per cent) of the profits allocated to Syarikat Takaful goes into the
profit and loss sharing account of Syarikat Takaful, while the profit accruing to the
participant (70 per cent) is then distributed proportionately between his PA and
PSA.63 In other words, 2.0 per cent of the profits will go into his PSA and the
remaining 98 per cent will go into PA as clearly shown in Figure 4.1.
In the case of loss of the investments of the Family Takaful Fund, however, it
was recommended by the Report of the Committee64 that it should be borne by the
Syarikat Takaful alone as part of its operating costs, to be paid from the following
year's profits. This departure from the Islamic principle of mudarabah contract which
requires both the participants and Syarikat Takaful to share not only the profits of the
investments, but also in its losses, was thought to be necessary because the prospect,
however minimal, of losing all or part of their investments might deter people from
63
Risalah Pelan Takaful Keluarga (b).
"J
Report of the Committee on the Setting-up of an Islamic Insurance Company in Malaysia.
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participating in this scheme.
Family Takaful benefits 65
Under the Family Takaful Plan, the takaful benefits shall be paid to the
participants or their heir(s) upon the occurence of any of the following cases:
Case one (1) : the participant survives the maturity of his takaful plan.
Case two (2) : the participant dies before the maturity of his takaful
plan.
In the first case, he shall be paid the total amount of takaful instalments paid by
the participant during the period of his participation and all the profits, if any, from
the investment of the takaful instalments credited into his PA.66
• In the second case, the takaful benefits to be paid to the heir(s) or proper
claimant67 is all the money in the participant's PA as at the time of his death.68 This
includes all his contributions until the time of his death and all the profits that his
contributions have earned and credited into his PA over the same period. This
amount, however, will inevitably be less than the amount which the participant would
1,5
According to S. 2 Takaful Act 1984, takaful benefits includes any benefit, pecuniary or not which is
secured by a takafuI certificate, and "pay" and other expressions, where used in relation to takaful benefits,
shall be construed accordingly.
STMSB. Pelan Takaful Keluarga (a) and (b).
67 S. 65 (4) Takaful Act 1984 provides : "Proper claimant means a person who claims to be entitled to the
sum in question as executor of the deceased, or who claims to be entitled to that sum under the relevent
law".
The takaful benefit is to be paid to a proper claimant without the need for the production of any probate
or letters of administration. See S. 65 (1) Takaful Act 1984.
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have expected to get if he survived until the maturity of his plan. The difference
between these two cases is that his heir(s) will be paid the outstanding takaful
amounts which would have been paid by the deceased into his PSA should he have
survived. This amount is calculated from the date of death to the date ofmaturity of
his Family Takaful Plan. Through the instrumentality of the PSA, therefore, a
participant in the Family Takaful is able to determine the amount (subject only to
variations of profits) that either he or his heir(s) would get as takaful benefits.69
If the participant decides to withdraw his participation before the maturity date
of his Family Takaful Plan, he shall be able to surrender benefits,70 that is all his
takaful instalments which have been credited into his PA with the profits which those
instalments have earned so far. His contribution to the PSA is a form of donation
which he has agreed to make and it is not returned.71
(b) General Takaful Schemes72
The General Takaful is a scheme which provides cover for an individual or a
body corporate against losses or damage consequent upon a catastrophe or disaster
such as fire, flood and accident, usually inflicted upon properties or assets. The main
69
STMSB, Pelan Takaful Keluarga (a) and (b).
711 There is no minimum period of payment of takaful instalments after which the participant is entitled to
surrender benefits, while in the conventional insurance, the insured becomes entitled to surrender benefits
only if he has paid his premium instalments for a minimum period, for example three years. There is no
forfeiture in the Family Takaful Plan. Syed Waseem Ahmad, op. cit., p. 196.
71 M. F. Yusuf, "Takaful Insurance Company Malaysia Sdn. Bhd.", p. 91; see also N. R. Mahmood, op.
cit., pp. 289 - 290.
72 See s. 3 (1) (ii), Takaful Act 1984.
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types of the General Takaful schemes are, among others. General Takaful Schemes
for motor vehicles, fire and theft, accidents and marine.73
A participant in this scheme also enters in a mudarabah contract with Syarikat
Takaful. The contract stipulates the amount which the participant has to contribute
under the scheme. Like the amount of premium in general insurance, this amount is
determined by Syarikat Takaful which takes into account factors such as the value
of the property and the risk involved.74 The term of participation or the period of
takaful in respect of the General Takaful Schemes is usually for a span of one year.
On expiry of the period of takaful, the term may be renewed for another one-year
period.75
Unlike the Family Takaful Plans, the General Takaful Schemes are not structured
to function as a means of savings, although the participants are entitled to some form
of profit sharing as expressed in the principle of mudarabah. However, under the
General Takaful Schemes, the entire contributions are paid as tabarruc for the purpose
of creating defined assets or funds (General Takdful Fund) to pay against a defined
loss. Part of the tabarruL funds are used to cover the expenses of the scheme. The
remainder is invested by Syarikat Takaful in the same way, subject to the same
restriction as the investment of funds from the Family Takaful. All the profits from
such investments are returned to the Fund.
73
STMSB. Risalah Perlindungan Takaful.
74 In the determination of General Takdful contributions, the same principle, methods and technique apply
as in the case of conventional insurance. The difference from conventional insurance lies in sharing the
surplus (profits) after deducting all operational costs such as re-takaful. See Syed Waseem Ahmad, op. cit.,
p. 197.
75 STMSB. Risalah Perlindungan Takaful.
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In line with the virtue of solidarity, mutual help, shared responsibility and joint
guarantee as embodied in the concept of takaful, Syarikat Takaful (Company) as the
manager (operator) or trustee of the Fund, shall pay from this Fund any benefits,
compensation or indemnity to any participant who suffers a defined loss or damage
consequent upon the occurrence of a catastrophe or disaster. All operational costs for
managing the General Takaful business such as the cost of re-takaful (re-insurance)
and setting-up of reserves shall be borne by the Fund. If, at the end of the financial
year, there is a surplus, it is shared between Syarikat Takaful and the participants
who have not made any claims under their respective plans. The sharing of the
surplus will be made according to a ratio agreed to in advance in accordance with the
principle of mudarabah such as 6 : 4, 5 : 3, 5 : 5, etc.76 This provides a form of
incentive to the participants along the line provided by the No Claims Bonus (NCB)
in motor insurance.
4.4. Syarikat Takaful As A Financial Institution : An Evaluation of
Performance
4.4.1. Family Takaful Fund
(a) Contributions of Family Takdful Fund
Table 4.2 provides statistics relating to the operations of the Family Takaful
Fund of various plans and mortgages which consist of gross Family Takaful
contributions, new business contributions, net Family Takaful contributions after
deduction of the total operational costs and total (cumulative) net Family Takaful
76
Risalah Perlindungan Takaful', N. R. Mahmood. op. cit., p. 290; Syed Waseem Ahmad, op. cit., p. 197;
M. F. Yusuf (1991), op. cit., pp. 91 - 92.
225
contributions at the end of the year during the first six years of Syarikat Takaful's
operations. Table 4.3, presents statistics relating to the details of the operational
costs incurred by Syarikat Takaful during the first six years of Its operations.
During the first six financial years, the gross Family Takaful contributions
increased to 868 per cent or RM 1,092,566 in 1987, 93.9 per cent or RM 2,118,272
in 1988 and 144.6 per cent or RM 5,181,673 in 1989. However, the annual growth
of the gross Family Takaful contributions decreased to 22 per cent and 4.9 per cent
in 1990 and 1991 respectively. It is noteworthy to note that the largest proportion of
the gross Family Takaful contributions were formed from the new business
contribution. For example, during the 1989 financial year, a sum of RM 3,707,381
or 71.5 per cent of the total gross Family Takaful contributions was from new
business.
Operational costs for Family Takaful Fund consist of re-takaful or refunds, claims
(paid and outstanding), surrenders and levies. In the first year, there were no claims.
Consequently, the operational costs (RM 13,922) formed only 2.3 per cent of the
gross Family Takaful contributions. In the second year, operational costs rose to RM
109,221 which constituted about 10 per cent of the gross Family Takaful
contributions. During the third financial year, the operational costs rose further to RM
245,897 or 11.62 per cent of the gross Family Takaful contributions. However, during
the 1989 financial year, these costs declined to 8 per cent of the gross Family Takaful
contributions, and rose again to RM 677,916 and RM 1,080,753, representing 10.7
per cent and 16.3 per cent in the financial years 1990 and 1991 respectively. As
depicted in Table 4.3 below, the significant rise of these costs is obviously due to an
increase in surrenders that accounted for 81 per cent and 82 per cent in the financial
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years 1987 and 1988 respectively. During 1989, the total operational costs constituted
about 8 per cent. Although the cost of surrender rose to 84.64 per cent in 1989
compared with 82 per cent in the previous year, the cost of claims paid and
outstanding declined to 5.80 per cent from 10.4 per cent previously. During the
financial years 1990 and 1991, the total operating costs rose again to 10.6 per cent
and 16.3 per cent of the gross Family Takaful contributions respectively because of
the rise of costs of both re-takaful and claims. In the case of re-takaful, it represents
8.8 per cent and 9 per cent, while the cost of claims constitute 10.7 per cent and 16.3
per cent of the total operational costs.
After deducting the operational costs, the net Family Takaful contributions
retained at the end of the 1989 financial year rose to RM 4,768,553 from RM571,076
in the previous year. At the end of the 1990 and 1991 financial years, the net Family
Takaful contributions reached RM 5,646,595 and RM 5,555,292 respectively. The
cumulative figure of net Family Takaful contributions at the end of the sixth financial
year amounted to RM 19.4 million from RM 14 million in the previous year, an
increase of about 40.2 per cent.
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Table 4.2
Contributions of the Family Takaful Fund (in RM = Malaysian Ringgit)








































































1 = gross Family Takaful contributions 2 = new business 3 = operational costs
4 = net Family Takaful contributions 5 = cumulative net Family Takaful contributions
AG = annual growth
Source : Compiled from Annual Reports ofSyarikat Takaful 1986 - 1991.
Table 4.3
Family Takaful's Operational Costs (in RM = Malaysian Ringgit)
1 RM % 2 RM % 3 RM % 4 RM % 5 RM %
1986 4,979 35.8 6,018 43.2 - 2,925 21 13,922 100
1987 9.936 9.1 88,411 81 5.410 4.9 5,464 5 109,221 100
1988 8,352 3.4 201,696 82 25.458 10.4 10,391 4.2 245,897 100
1989 19.131 4.63 345,542 83.64 23,955 5.80 24.492 5.93 413,120 100
1990 59,708 8.8 535,614 79 51,006 7.5 31,588 4.7 677,916 100
1991 97.023 9.0 648,874 60 302,058 28 32,798 3 1,080,753 100
Notes: 1 = rtlakaful 2 = surrenders 3 = claims paid and outstanding
4 = levies 5 = total operational costs
Source : Compiled from Annua/ Reports of Syarikat Takaful 1986 - 1991.
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(b) Investments of the Family Takaful Fund and profits attributable to the
Company and participants
Table 4.4
Profits from Investments of Family Takaful Funds (in RM = Malaysian Ringgit)
































































































































1 = dividend income from shares quoted in Malaysia 2 = income from term financing
3 = income from Investment Accounts with Holding Company (Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad)
4 = income from Malaysian Government Investment Certificates 5 = profit on disposal of shares quoted
in Malaysia 6 = profit on disposal of Malaysian Government Investment Certificates
Source : Compiled from Annual Reports of Syarikat Takaful 1986 - 1991.
The Family Takaful Fund is invested in the following type of investments:
1. investment in Investment Accounts with Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
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2. purchase of shares quoted in Malaysia
3. purchase of Malaysian Government Investment Certificates
4. investment in term financing.
As shown in Table 4.4 above, the Family Takaful Fund's investments during the
first six years of Syarikat Takaful's operations contributed six types ofmajor income,
namely:
1. dividend income from shares quoted in Malaysia
2. income from term financing
3. income from Investment Accounts with BIMB
4. income from Malaysian Government Investment Certificates
5. profit on disposal of shares quoted in Malaysia
6. profit on disposal of Malaysian Government Investment Certificates.
• As presented in Table 4.4 above, profit from the investments of the Family
Takaful Fund increased from RM 6,011 in 1986 to RM 73,373 in 1987, RM 131, 126
in 1988, RM 276,234 in 1989, RM 392,631 in 1990 and RM 1,053,052 in 1991. As
shown in Table 4.5 below and following the profit-sharing ratio of 70 : 30 agreed to
in the mudarabah contract between the participants and the Company, 30 per cent of
the profit (RM 1,803 in 1986, RM22,012 in 1987, RM 36,338 in 1988, RM 82,870
in 1989, RM 117,790 in 1990 and RM 315,916 in 1991) was transferred to the profit
sharing and loss account of Syarikat Takaful, and the remaining 70 per cent (RM
4,208 in 1986, RM 51,361 in 1987, RM 91,788 in 1988, RM 193,364 in 1989, RM




Family Takaful Plans and Mortgages : Profits Attributable to the company and participants
Company % Participants % Total %
1986 : RM 1.803 30 4,208 70 6,011 100
1987 : RM 22,012 30 51,361 70 73,373 100
1988 : RM 39,338 30 91.788 70 131,126 100
1989 : RM 82.870 30 193.364 70 276,234 100
1990 : RM 117,790 30 274,842 70 392,632 100
1991 : RM 315,915 30 737,137 70 1,053,052 100
Source : Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad, Annual Reports 1986 - 199T, idem, Laporan
Tahunan Ketujuh Ketua Pengarah Takaful, 1991, p. 10.
4.4.2. Group Family Takaful Fund
(a) Contributions of Group Family Takaful Fund
Syarikat Takaful has been operating the Group Family Takaful plan since the
1989 financial year. Table 4.6 below, provides statistics relating to the Group
Family Takaful Business, which include gross Group Family Takaful contributions,
total operational costs and underwriting surplus (profit), while Table 4.7 below
provides statistics relating to the details of operational costs incurred by the Group
Family Takaful Fund consisting of payment of re-takaful, reserves for unearned
takaful contributions, claims (paid and outstanding) and levies.
During the first three years of operations, the gross Group Family Takaful Fund
amounted to RM 852,500 in 1989, RM 1,633,574 in 1990 and RM 2,167,932 in
1991. The annual growth of the Group Family Takaful Fund was 91.6 in 1990 and
32.7 in 1991. After taking into account the operational costs comprising payment for
re-takaful, reserves for unearned takaful contributions, claims paid and outstanding
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and levies, underwriting profit is arrived at. The underwriting profit for the second
financial year was RM 292,520 as against RM 121,690 in the previous year. In the
third financial year, the underwriting profits recorded a growth of 177.2 per cent,
reaching RM 810,740. The increase of the surplus (underwriting profit) was as a
result of a decrease of the total operational costs to 62.6 per cent of the gross
contributions in 1991 from 82.1 per cent previously. As presented in Table 4.7
below, the decrease of the total operational costs in 1991 was due to the decrease of
the reserve for unearned Group Family Takaful contributions from RM 123,552 in
1990 to RM 15,220 in 1991, or from 9.2 per cent to 1.1 per cent of the total
operational costs in 1990 and 1991 respectively.
Table 4.6
Contributions of Group Family Takaful Plan (in RM = Malaysian Ringgit)


















AG = annual growth
* Including RM 29,976 transfered from Family Takaful Fund
Source : Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad, Annual Reports 1989 - 1991.
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Table 4.7
Operational Costs of Group Family Takaful Funds (in RM = Malaysian Ringgit)
Items 1989 RM % 1990 RM % 1991 RM %
1 178.511 24.4 109,129 8.1 133.757 9.9
2 143,260 19.6 123,552 9.2 15,220 1.1
3 405,135 55.4 1,100,355 82.1 1,197,343 88.2
4 3.964 0.5 8.018 0.6 10,872 0.8
5 730,870 100 1,341.054 100 1,357,192 100
Notes:
1 : rttakaful 2 : reserve for unearned takaful contributions
3 : claims paid and outstanding 4 : levies
5 : total operational costs
Source : Syarikat Takaful, Annual Reports 1989 - 1991.
(b) Income from investments
. During the first three years of its operations, the Group Family Takaful Fund was
invested mainly in the Investment Accounts of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, and
with term financing only in the 1991 financial year. As presented in Table 4.8
below, the returns on investments of the fund during the 1990 financial year
amounted to RM 18,515 as against RM 2,255 in the previous year. In the 1991
financial year, the return of investments reached RM 46,006, an increase of 148.5
per cent over 1990.
Underwriting profits and income realized from investments of the fund
constituted the total income of the Group Family Takaful Fund as depicted in Table
4.8 below. During the 1990 financial year, total income increased to RM 311,035
from RM 153,921 previously. In the third financial year, it reached RM 856,746, an
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increase of 175.5 per cent over 1990.
Table 4.8
Group Family Takaful's Income (in RM = Malaysian Ringgit)
Items 1989 % 1990 % 1991 %
Underwriting Income (RM)
Annual Growth (%)
























Source : Syarikat TakafuI Malaysia Sendirian Berhad, AnnuaI Reports 1989 - 1991.
(c) Profits attributable to the Company and participants
In accordance with the profit-sharing contract of mudarabah between Syarikat
Takaful and the participants, and as presented in Table 4.9 below, during the 1989
and 1991 financial years, 50 per cent of the profits were attributable to the Company
and the participants respectively. However, in the 1990 financial year, 82.4 and 17.6
per cent of the profits were attributable to the Company and the participants
respectively.
Table 4.9








Company 76,960 50 256.411 82.4 428,373 50
Participants 76,961 50 54,624 17.6 428,373 50
Total 153,921 100 311,035 100 856,746 100
Source : Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad, Annual Reports 1986 - 1991; Idem, Laporan
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Ketujuh Ketua Pengarah Takaful. 1991. p. 10.
4.4.3. General Takaful Fund
(a) Contributions of General Takaful Fund
Table 4.10
Contributions of General Takaful Fund (in RM = Malaysian Ringgit)
GC RM % AG% TOC RM % UP RM % AG %
1986 1.406,766 100 1.074.149 76.4 332,617 23.6
1987 4,690,558 100 233.4 3,195,186 68.1 1,495,372 31.9 349.6
1988 9,723,184 100 107.3 7,038,762 72.4 2,684,422 27.6 79.5
1989 16,516,474 100 70.0 11.207.886 67.9 5,308,588 32.1 97.8
1990 20,320.930 100 23.0 13.600,215 66.9 6,720,715 33.1 26.6
1991 25,657,356 100 26.3 18,507,580 72.1 7,149,776 27.9 6.4
Notes:
GC = gross contributions; TOC = total operational costs; UP = underwriting profits; AG = annual growth
Source : Compiled from Annual Reports ofSyarikat Takaful 1986 - 1991.
Table 4.11
General Takaful Fund : Operational Costs (in RM = Malaysian Ringgit)
year 1 2 3 4 5 TOC
1986 413,149 549.642 102,864 6.463 2,031 1,074,149
% 38.46 51.17 9.58 0.60 0.19 100
1987 991,836 1,301,089 878,063 24,198 _ 3,195,186
% 31.04 40.72 27.48 0.76 100
1988 1,643,091 2,132,309 3.211,478 51.884 _ 7,038,762
% 23.34 30.29 45.63 0.74 100
1989 2.888.465 1,965,251 6,245.661 108.509 _ 11,207,886
% 25,77 17.53 55.73 0.97 100
1990 2,919,376 1,398,531 9,122,366 159.344 598 13,600,215
% 21.47 10.28 67.08 1.17 0.004 100
1991 3,344,689 2,132,181 12,814.718 215,992 _ 18.507,580
% 18.07 11.52 69.24 1.17 100
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Notes:
1 = Rstakaful or refund; 2 = Reserve for unearned takaful contributions;
3 = Claims (paid and outstanding); 4 = Levies; 5 = Others; TOC = Total Operational Costs.
Source : Compiled from Syarikat Takaful's Annual Reports 1986 - 1991.
Table 4.10 above, provides statistics relating to the gross General Takaful
contributions, total operational costs and underwriting profits, while Table 4.11 below
presents statistics relating to the operational costs of the General Takaful Fund.
During the first six financial years, the gross General Takaful contributions
increased from RM 1.4 million in 1986 to RM 4.7 million, RM 9.7 Million, RM 16.5
million, RM 20.3 million and RM 25.7 million in the 1987 to 1991 financial years
respectively. However, the annual growth of the gross General Takaful contributions
decreased from 233.4 per cent in 1987 to 26.3 per cent in 1991. As presented in
Table 4.11 below, the operational costs for the General Takaful Fund consist of
payment of re-takaful or refunds, reserve for unearned takaful contributions, claims
(paid and outstanding), levies and others. During the first six financial years, the total
operational costs were fluctuating between 67 per cent to 68.1 per cent of the gross
General Takaful contributions. In the first year of operation, reserve for unearned
takaful contributions contributed the largest portion of the total operational costs, i.
e. 51.17 per cent. However, in the 1991 financial year, 69.24 per cent of the total
operational costs was contributed by claims (paid and outstanding).
After deducting payment of the total operational costs, the underwriting profits
are arrived at as presented in Table 4.10. During the first six financial years, the
percentage of the underwriting profits of General Takaful contributions were
236
fluctuating between 24 per cent to 33.1 per cent. However, the amounts of the
underwriting profits increased from RM 332, 617 in the 1986 financial year to RM
7, 149, 776 in the 1991 financial year. During the first six financial years, the annual
growth of the underwriting profits of General Takaful contributions was decreasing
from 349.6 per cent to 6.4 per cent. The highest annual growth of underwriting
profits was recorded in the 1987 financial year, i. e. 349. 6 per cent, because the
amount of the underwriting profits increased from RM 332,617 in 1986 to RM
1,495,372 in 1987.
(b) General Takaful Fund's investments
Table 4.12 below provides statistics relating to the returns of various General
Takaful Fund's investment. During the first six years of operations, General Takaful
Fund has been invested into four types of investments as follows:
1: investment accounts with Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
2. investment in term financing
3. purchase of shares quoted in Malaysia
4. Purchase of Malaysian Government Investment Certificates.
As presented in Table 4.12 below, the General Takaful Fund received six main
types of income from its investments, namely:
1. dividend income from shares quoted in Malaysia
2. income from term financing
3. income from Investment Accounts with Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
4. income from Malaysian Government Investment Certificates
5. profit on disposal of shares quoted in Malaysia
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6. profit on disposal of Malaysian Government Investment Certificates.
Table 4.12
General Takaful Fund : Income from Investments (in RM = Malaysian Ringgit)






















































































AG (%) - 1,330.6 243.9 41.5 52.3 48.5
Notes:
1 = dividend income from shares quoted in Malaysia
2 = income from term financing
3 = income from Investment Accounts with BIMB
4 = income from Malaysian Government Investment Certificates
5 = profit on disposal of shares quoted in Malaysia
6 = profit on disposal of Malaysian Government Investment Certificates
7 = other income 8 = total income from investments
AG = annual growth (%).
R = Ranking
Source : Compiled from Annual Reports ofSyarikat Takaful 1986 - 1991.
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During the first six years of operations of the General Takaful Fund, the total
income from investments was derived mainly from the profit from the investment
accounts with Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad. In other words, BIMB made the largest
contribution to the total income from the investments of the fund. In the first year of
investment, the General Takaful Fund received its only income from Investment
Accounts with BIMB, i.e. was RM 8,576. Until the 1989 financial year, the second
largest income was received from profit on disposal of shares quoted in Malaysia.
However, in the 1990 financial year, income from term financing constituted the
second largest share of total income of the fund's investments. The remaining income
was derived from the other sources, i. e. dividend income from shares quoted in
Malaysia, income from term financing, income from Malaysian Government
Investment Certificates, profit on disposal of shares quoted in Malaysia and profit on
disposal of Malaysian Government Investment Certificates. Returns on investments
of the fund during the 1991 financial year amounted to RM 1,350,438 as against RM
909,601 in the previous year, an increase of 48.5 per cent over 1990.
(c) General Takaful income and profits attributable to the Company and
participants
Underwriting profit and income realized from investments of the fund formed the
total profit accruing to the Company and the participants in accordance with
mudarabah principles. As presented in Table 4.13 below, during the first six years
of operations of the General Takaful Fund, income derived from underwriting profit
constituted more than 84 per cent of the total income that accrued to both the
Company and the participants. The remaining proportions of total income were
received from the profits of the fund's investments. The data from Table 4.13 below
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shows that the amounts of the total income increased from RM 241,562 in 1986 to
RM 1,618,060 in 1987, RM 3,106,398 in 1988, RM 5,905,711 in 1989, RM
7,630,316 in 1990 and RM 8,500,214 in 1991. However, the annual growth of the
total income was seen to be declining from 398.5 per cent in 1987, to 92 per cent in
1988, 90.1 per cent in 1989, 29.2 per cent in 1990 and 11.4 per cent in 1991.
Table 4.13





Total Income RM % Annual
Growth(%)
1986 315.986 97.4 8,576 2.6 241,562 100 -
1987 1,495,372 92.4 122,688 7.6 1,618,060 100 398.5%
1988 2,684.422 86.4 421.976 13.6 3,106,398 100 92%
1989 5,308,588 98.9 597,123 10.1 5,905,711 100 90.1%
1990 6,720,715 88.0 909,601 12.0 7,630,316 100 29.2%
1991 7,149,776 84.1 1,350.438 15.9 8,500,214 100 11.4 %
Source : Compiled from Annual Reports of Syarikat Takaful 1986 - 1991.
Table 4.14
General Takaful Fund : Profits attributable to the Company and participants (in RM =
Malaysian Ringgit)
Year Company RM % Participants RM % Total RM %
1986 129,825 40.0 194,737 60.0 324,562 100
1987 647.224 40.0 970,836 60.0 1,618,060 100
1988 1,258,603 40.5 1,847,795 59.5 3,106,398 100
1989 2,864.124 48.5 3,041,587 51.5 5,905,71 1 100
1990 3,815.158 50.0 3.815,158 50.0 7,630,316 100
1991 4.280.220 50.4 4,219.994 49.6 8,500,214 100
Source : Syarikat Takaful Sendirian Berhad. Laporan Tahunan Ketujuh Ketua Pengarah Takaful 1991, p.
15.
In line with the profit-sharing contract of mudarabah between the Company and
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the participants, at the end of a financial year, a certain ratio of profit is transferred
to the participants' General Takaful Fund. The remaining profits are credited to the
Company's General Takaful Fund. As was noted earlier, 60 per cent of the total
profits goes to the participants and the remaining 40 per cent to the Company.
However, in practice, as presented in Table 4.14 above, during the first six years
of General Takaful operations, the ratios of profit attributable to the participants
varied from 49.6 per cent to 60 per cent, while 40 to 50.4 per cent was attributable
to the Company. In 1991, Syarikat Takaful transferred RM 4,219,994, or 49.6 per
cent of the total General TakafuTs income, to the General Takaful Fund as profit
attributable to the participants as against RM 3,815,158 in the preceding year. The
remaining 50.4 per cent of the total income was transferred to the Company's
General Takaful Fund.
4.4.4. Performance of Syarikat Takaful
Syarikat Takaful has done well in the first six years of its operations. The
performance of Syarikat Takaful can be seen under the following headings:
(a) Branch network and employment structure
During the 1991 financial year, Syarikat Takaful successfully opened seven (7)
branches in seven (7) major towns in Malaysia, i. e. Kota Bharu, Kuala Terengganu,
Kuantan, Alor Setar, Ipoh, Melaka and Johor Bahru. In line with the Company's
commitment to expand its services, a total of eight Takaful Desks were opened at
selected branch offices of BIMB and Tabung Haji during the 1991 financial year.
Hence, at the end of 1991, there were a total of thirty seven (37) Takaful Desks:
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twenty one at the branch offices of Bank Islam and sixteen at the district offices of
Tabung Haji has been opened.77
As presented in Table 4.15 below, at the end of the 1991 financial year, the
Company's total staff strength increased to 176 consisting of 37 executives at all
levels and 139 in clerical and non-clerical grades.78 The total of staff strength at the
end of the previous year was 146, consisting of 31 executives at all levels and 115
in clerical and non-clerical grades, an increase of 21.2 per cent as against 8.1 per cent
i • 79
in the previous year.
Table 4.15
Syarikat Takaful : Staff Recruitment and Development 1988 - 991.




1988 26 60 86
.1989 33 102 135 57
1990 31 115 146 8.1
1991 37 139 176 21.2
Source : Syarikat Takaful, AnnuaI Reports 1986 - 1991.
(b) Total financing
The activities of the Company have been financed by the shareholders' fund, the
Family Takaful Fund, the Group Family Takaful Fund (which started in the 1989
77
Syarikat Takaful. Laporan Tahunan 1991, pp. 6-7.
78
Syarikat Takaful, Laporan Tahunan 1991. p. 7.
7'' Ibid. Laporan Tahunan 1990. p. 7.
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financial year), and the General Takaful Fund. As presented in Table 4.16 below,
after taking account of accumulated losses in the initial year, the shareholders' fund
stood at RM 9.8 million at 30 June 1988, compared with RM 9.4 million a year
earlier. During the 1989, 1990 and 1991 financial years, Syarikat Takaful's
shareholders's fund amounted to RM 10.4 million, RM 11 million and RM 12.3
million respectively. With the increased share of the Family Takaful Fund and the
General Takaful Fund in financing, the proportion of the Shareholders's Fund in the
total amount of financing has annually decreased from 87.6 per cent in 1986, to 69
per cent in 1987, 52.13 per cent in 1988, 38.3 per cent in 1989, 31.4 per cent in
1990 and 27 per cent in 1991. As shown in Table 4.19 below, the increased share
of the Family Takaful Fund in financing can be seen, for example, in the 1991
financial year, when the Family Takaful Fund contributed 45 per cent of the total
financing activities of Syarikat Takaful, as against 41.05 per cent in the previous year.
Table 4.16
Syarikat Takaful: Proportion of Shareholders, Family Takaful, Group Family Takaful and General
Takaful Funds in financing 1986 - 1991 (in Malaysian Ringgit).
Year SF (RM) FTF (RM) GFTF
(RM)













































































Notes: SF = Shareholders' Fund: FTF = Family Takaful Fund: GFTF = Group Family Takafu/ Fund; GTF
= General Takaful Fund
Source : Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad. Balance Sheets 1986 - 1991.
The annual growth of total financing of Syarikat Takaful increased by 27.1 per
cent in the second year, 37.21 per cent in the third year, 45.4 per cent in the fourth
year, decreased to 28.7 per cent in the fifth year and slightly increased to 30 per cent
in the sixth year of its operations.
(c) Syarikat TakafuTs investments
Syarikat Takaful derives its income from the profits of the investment of its
Shareholders' Fund in line with the profit-sharing contract of mudarabah, as well as
from the management of all the Family Takaful Funds, the Group Family Takaful
Funds and the General Takaful Funds. The Shareholders's Funds are invested by
Syarikat Takaful in the following type of investment:
1. investment in term financing
2. investment accounts with Syarikat TakafuTs holding company, i. e.
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
3. purchase of shares quoted in Malaysia
4. investment in fixed assets.
As presented in Table 4.17 below, Syarikat Takaful receives five types of major
incomes derived by its investments of the Shareholders' Fund as follows:
1. income from term financing
2. income from Investment Accounts with Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
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3. dividend income from shares quoted in Malaysia
4. profit on disposal of shares quoted in Malaysia
5. rental income from holding company and other.
Table 4.17
Syarikat Takaful : Income from the investments of the Shareholders' Fund (in RM =
Malaysian Ringgit)
Year 1 R 2 R 3 R 4 R 5 R 6 R Total
1986 _ na na _ na . 800,701
% 100 %
1987 _ 705,285 36.076 339,433 145,589 26,388 1,252,771
% 56.3 2 2.9 4 27.1 2 11.6 3 2.1 5 100 %
1988 23,819 414,674 52.887 1,039,218 145,989 36,068 1,712,655
% 1.4 6 24.2 3 30 2 60.7 1 8.5 4 2.1 5 100 %
1989 123,962 271.526 29.671 562,004 147,798 49,581 1,184,533
% 10.5 4 22.9 2 2.5 6 47.4 1 12.5 3 4.2 5 100 %
1990 146,609 349,168 43,354 272,579 147,989 54,435 1,014,134
% 14.4 4 34.4 1 4.3 6 26.9 2 14.6 3 5.4 5 100 %
1991 335,151 236,292 16.105 1,171,648 147,989 72,544 1,979,729
'% 16.9 2 11.9 2 SO00o 59.2 1 7.5 4 3.7 5 100 %
Notes:
1 = Income from term financing
2 = Income from Investment Accounts with Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
3 = Dividend income from shares quoted in Malaysia
4 = Profit on disposal of shares quoted in Malaysia
5 = Rental income
6 = Other income
na =Not available
R = Ranking
Source : Compiled from Annual Reports ofSyarikat Takaful 1986 - 1991.
During the first six years of operations, the largest proportion of income from the
investment of the Shareholders' Fund was derived from the the income from its
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Investment Account with BIMB in the second year, profit on disposal of shares
quoted in Malaysia in the third and fourth years, income from Investment Account
with Bank Islam in the fifth year and profit on disposal of shares quoted in Malaysia
in the sixth year .
During the 1989 and 1990 financial years, Syarikat Takaful recorded an income
of RM 1,184,533 and RM 1,014,134 respectively from the investments of its
Shareholders' Fund, compared with RM 1,712, 655 in 1988. The decrease was
attributable mainly to the reduction of income from the sales of quoted shares in
Malaysia as a result of the scaling down on the disposal of such shares in view of
the noticeable gains gradually emerging from the operations of both the Family and
General Takaful Funds.80 In other words, the sales of public quoted shares decreased
from RM 1,039,218 in 1988 to RM 562,004 and RM 272,579 in 1989 and 1990
respectively. However, during the 1991 financial year, the profit from these sales
increased again to RM 1,171,648 which resulted in an increase of the total income
of the Shareholders' Fund's investment from RM 1,014,134 in 1990 to RM 1,979,729
in 1991, an increase of 95.2 per cent.81
(d) Syarikat TakafuTs Incomes
As noted earlier and presented in Table 4.18 below, Syarikat Takaful derives its
income from the share of profit derived from the Family Takaful Fund, the Group
Family Takaful Fund and the General Takaful Fund as well as income from
811
Syarikat Takaful. Annual Report 1988. p. 7; Idem. Annual Report 1990, p. 6.
81
Syarikat Takaful. Annual Report 1991, p. 6.
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Shareholders' Fund's investments. Syarikat Takaful's share of profit derived from the
management of the General Takaful Fund increased from RM 0.1 million in 1986 to
RM 4.3 Million in 1991, an increase of 4,200 per cent. Likewise, the share of profit
attributable to Syarikat Takaful from the management of the Family Takaful Fund
increased to RM 0.3 million in 1991 from RM 1,803 i.e. about RM 2 million in
1986, an increase of 14,900 per cent. Equally, a sum of RM 0.4 million as a profit
credited to Syarikat Takaful from the management of its Group Family Takaful Fund
in 1991 compared with RM 0.08 million in the first year of the Group Family
Takaful plan's operation in 1989, an increase of 400 per cent over 1989.
Table 4.18
Syarikat Tuka/ul's Incomes (RM Million)
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1986 0.8 0.1 0.2 . 0.9 1.5 -0.6
1987 1.3 0.6 0.02 - 1.9 1.9 0.000,4
1988 1.7 1.2 0.04 0.08 3.0 2.4 0.6
1989 1.2 2.9 0.08 0.08 4.2 2.7 1.5
1990 1.0 3.8 0.1 0.3 5.2 3.4 1.8
.1991 2.0 4.3 0.3 0.4 7.0 4.3 2.7
Notes:
1 = Income from investment of Shareholders' Fund
2 = Profits from the General Takaful Fund
3 = Profits from the Family Takaful Fund
4 = Profits from the Group Family Takaful Fund
5 = Total income; 6 = Operating expenses
7 = Profits before zakat and taxation (gross profits)
Source : Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad, Annual Reports 1986 - 1991.
The total income for Syarikat Takaful during the 1991 financial year increased
to RM 7.0 million from RM 0.9 million in the 1986 financial year, an increase of
about 678 per cent. After deducting the operational expenses, Syarikat Takaful
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attained a profit of RM 2.7 million before zakat and taxation in 1991, compared with
RM 1.8 in the previous year. As presented in Table 4.19 below, Syarikat Takaful
incurred a loss of RM 576,448 after payment of zakat in the first year of its
operation, while in the second year, it managed to break even, showing a small
operating profit of RM 434, before the payment of zakat. However, after the payment
of zakat, it still incurred a loss of RM 1,180. In the third financial year, Syarikat
Takaful recorded a profit of RM 603,957 before the payment of zakat and the
provision of taxation. The net profit for the 1991 financial year stood at RM 1.6
million compared with RM 0.8 million previously, an increase of 98.1 per cent.
Table 4.19
Syarikat Takaful : Profit and Loss Accounts (in RM = Malaysian Ringgit)
Year Gross Profits Zakat Taxation Net Profits Annual Growth
1986 569,719 - _ -576.448 _
1987 434 6,726 - 1,180 -
1988 603,957 1,614 253,000 347,357 29337.03%
1989 1.457,000 3,600 574,415 873,085 151.4
1990 1.757,588 13,347 926,200 818,041 -6.3
1991 2.707,996 20,559 1,066,517 1,620,920 98.1
Source : Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad, Annual Reports 1986 - 1991.
4.5. Some Issues Relating to the Takaful Schemes
(a) The Takaful Act 1984
The Takaful Act was intended to be only a regulatory piece of legislation and not
a statutory source of the substantive law relating to an Islamic scheme of mutual
insurance. It was recommended that the takaful operators should be regulated in the
same way as commercial insurers. However, as the takaful business had to be
operated along Islamic lines, it was felt that it was inappropriate to extend the
Insurance Act 1963 to cover such operators. It was for this reason that the Takaful
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Act 1984 was passed. The Act not only enables the Government of Malaysia to
regulate and control takaful operators like all other insurers but also to ensure that
the operation of the scheme does not depart from the teachings of Islam.
Notwithstanding, the application of the principles of Islamic law in the operation
of the scheme is only implied in a few provisions of the Takaful Act. As such even
the scope and application of those principles is unclear. According to the Act, a
takaful business is defined as a business of takaful whose aims and operations do not
involve elements opposed by the Syariah,82 Moreover, in relation to the registration
of takaful businesses, the Act provides that the Director General of Takaful shall
refuse to register an applicant unless he is satisfied, inter alia, that the aim and
operation of the proposed takaful business will not involve any element which is "not
approved" by Syariah*3 The Act does not define Sharfah nor does it explain what
is meant by an element "approved" or "not approved" by Sharfah. This is a serious
omission as "approved by Sharfah" may have a meaning far wider than "being
permitted in Islam". This is because in Islam, apart from elements which are strictly
prohibited (haram), there are also elements which are discouraged or frowned upon
(.makruh) and those that are greatly encouraged (sunnat). While the presence of
elements which are haram will clearly not be approved by the Sharfah, it is not
clear whether the presence of makruh elements will be approved or disapproved by
the Sharfah.
82
S. 2. Takaful Act. 1984.
83 S. 8 (5) (a), Takaful Act. 1984.
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(b) The Syariah Supervisory Council.
The Takaful Act makes it a condition for the registration of a Takaful Company
that its articles of association has a provision for the establishment of a Syariah
Supervisory Council whose function is to advise the company on matters pertaining
to the Syariahf The report of the Committee also recommended that members of the
Council should be persons with expertise in areas like the Syariah and Islamic
Economics.85 It was also recommended that all decisions of the Council be made on
the basis of the Islamic concept of shura or consensus. The Council's function is
strictly supervisory; it does not participate in the daily affairs of the company. Both
the Act and the Report are silent on the status of the Council's advice. Perhaps a
company that fails to act upon such advice can be regarded as pursuing aims contrary
to the Sharfah, thus allowing the Director General of Takaful to cancel the
company's registration.
(c) The Takaful Contract
The Takaful contract is a contract based on the Islamic concept of mudarabah
between Syarikat Takaful as the entrepreneur (mudarib) and the participant as the
provider of capital {sahib al-mal). In consideration for his participation in the scheme,
the latter agrees to provide the former with the capital in the form of takaful
contributions. The entrepreneur in return agrees to provide the participant with a
scheme for investment and protection.
84
S. 8 (5) (b). Takaful Ad, 1984.
85
Report of Committee, op. cit.. note 28, p. 30.
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The takaful contract clearly spells out the rights and obligations of both parties,
such as the way in which the contributions will be used and the ratio in which the
profits, if any, will be shared. The Family Takaful contract also clearly spells out
what proportions of the participant's contributions will be paid into the Participant
Special Account (PSA) and the Participant Account (PA) respectively. It also declares
that the proportion that is paid into the former is a donation made by the participant
to help fellow participants. Thus everything there is to know about the contract is
made known to the participant in the contract itself.
The Takaful Act provides that a person under eighteen shall not have the capacity
to enter into a takaful contract.86 This differs from the Insurance Act 1963, which
provides that a person above ten years of age can enter into a contract of insurance
provided that if he is below sixteen, he must have the written consent of his parents
or guardian. Under the Age of Majority Act 1971,81 a person attains the age of
majority on his eighteenth birthday, but this is not the age of majority in Islam. In
Islam, a person's legal capacity depends, among others, on whether he is baligh
(mature; legally major) and there is no definite age for this. Rather, it is determined
by physical indications or by the declaration of the youth in question, or failing these,
by reaching the age of fifteen years.88
Admittedly, problems may arise if no specific age of majority is stipulated and
the subjective test of bulugh is used. The takaful scheme is not exclusively for
86
S. 64. Takaful Act, 1984.
" S. 2.
Schacht. An Introduction to Islamic Law, p. 124.
251
Muslims and such a test cannot be applied to others. Even amongst Muslims, the
determination of bulugh may give rise to problems. Hence, while the departure from
the strict Islamic concept of majority is understandable, it is unclear why in this of
all respects, the Takaful Act difers from the Insurance Act 1963.
In Islam as under the Common Law. a person continues to have the capacity to
enter into a legal relationship for as long as he remains sane and fully responsible for
his actions. Rightly therefore, the Takaful Act does not provide any maximum age for
a participant to enter a takaful contract. In practice, however, the Takaful Company
of Malaysia requires participants in the Family Takaful to be between the ages of
eighteen and fifty years at the time they enter the contract. Thus, while someone who
is over fifty legally has the capacity to enter into any contract, he cannot, in fact,
enter a Family Takaful contract.
Conclusion
The above discussion clearly shows that Syarikat Takaful channels its funds, i.e.
the Shareholders' Fund, the Family Takaful Fund, the Group Family Takaful Fund
and the General Takaful Income, primarily in a short-term investments such as
investment with Investment Accounts with Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad and purchase
ofMalaysian Government Investment Certificates (MGIC) and purchase of shares and
stocks quoted in Malaysia. As one of the Islamic financial institutions which offers
and operates Islamic Insurance schemes based on mudarabah and takaful contracts,
Syarikat Takaful could play a more effective role in financing economic development
in Malaysia by channelling its Funds and monetary sources in various ways of
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investment, especially in project-financing using contracts of mudarabah and
musharakah or by financing the entrepreneurs to purchase of inputs and fixed assets
using the contracts of murabahah and bay" bi thaman ajil. In the absence of an
Islamic money-market, interest-free short-run financial instruments are not available,
and the only channel open to Syarikat Takaful is to invest its Funds in BIMB but the
returns are relatively low as the Bank itself is saddled with excess liquidity.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PARTNERSHIP IN THE OPERATION OF
TABUNG HAJI
CHAPTER FIVE : PARTNERSHIP IN THE OPERATION OF
TABUNG HAJI
Introduction
This chapter will critically examine the establishment and operations of Lembaga
Urusan Dan Tabung Haji (LUTH) (The Malaysian Pilgrims Management and Fund
Board)] as the mobilizer of the savings of Muslims in Malaysia and the investor of
these savings in profitable investments in accordance with the principles of Islamic
commercial law. The topics that will be discussed include the historical background
and establishment of Tabung Haji, its corporate objectives, its economic activities and
its role as an Islamic financial institution in Malaysia.
5.1. Historical Background and Establishment
Tabung Haji was established in August 1969 to mobilise the savings of Muslims
and assist them in performing their pilgrimage to Mecca.2 The historical evolution of
Tabung Haji can thus be divided into two stages. The first stage was the setting up
of the Malayan Muslims Pilgrims Savings Corporation in 1962. The initial idea
behind the creation of this corporation was initiated by Royal Professor Ungku Abdul
Aziz of the University ofMalaya, a reputed academician and an authority on the rural
economy, who after making an extensive study of the rural economy in the 1950s,
presented a memorandum to the Government in 1959 entitled "A Plan to Improve
the Economic Position of Future Pilgrims", suggesting the formation of the
1
Hereafter referred to as Tabung Haji.
2 Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1990, p. 9.
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Pilgrims Savings Corporation which would assist Muslims to perform the hajj
without impoverishing them or imposing financial hardships after the hajj?
It was often assumed before 1962 that there were hardly any savings to be
mobilized in the rural sector. The Muslims traditionally used to save their money in
pillows, under mattresses, in cupboards or invested in land or livestock which would
be later sold to meet the expenses of hajj? However, the ways by which this huge
sum was saved5 were economically by functional activity which drained away funds
that might otherwise be employed in commercial activity and would promote the
economic development and national growth.6
Such saving behaviour among Muslims in Malaysia was not without justification.
The main reason for resorting to saving outside the financial framework was to
ensure that the money to be spent on the hajj was completely free from riba. The
savings facilities in any bank or financial institution at that time were unacceptable
to these Muslims because of the presence of riba?
1
Muhammad Saleh bin Hj. Awang. Haji di Malaysia : Sejarah dan Perkembangannya Sejak Tahun 1300 -
1405 Hijrah, Terengganu, Malaysia, 1986, p. 255.Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1990, p. 8; Tabung Haji,
Tabung Haji as an Islamic Financial Institutions, The Operation and Mobilization of Investment Resources
in an Islamic Way, Kuala Lumpur. 1991. p. 3.
4
Tabung Haji, Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji Sebagai Institusi Pelaburan Islam, Kuala Lumpur, 1990,
pp. 7-8; Razali Nawawi, "The Administration of Islamic Financial Institution - Malaysia's Experience",
in Syariah Law Journal, Vol. VII, (Petaling Jaya, September, 1991), p. 2.
5 Ungku Aziz in his study estimated that about RM 3 million was spent each year by pilgrims, a steady
source of savings which the Government could not afford to neglect. See Ungku Abdul Aziz, Pilgrims
Economy Improvement Plan, Kuala Lumpur, 1959, p. 1.
6 See Vonder Mehden, Islam, Development and Politics in Malaysia, Texas, U. S. A., 1978, p. 8; Focus,
"Malaysia's Tabung Haji",in al-Nahdah, Vol. IX (1), 1989, pp. 5-6.
7
Tabung Haji (1991),p. 2; Razali Nawawi (1991), op. cit., p. 2.
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Therefore, Ungku Aziz recommended that future hajjis could save in the
Corporation which would offer interest-free transactions and would yield profits.
Profits derived from investments would be returned in the form of profit-sharing or
dividends to depositors, thus not only avoiding riba but also assisting them
financially in meeting their expenses for hajj*
Ungku Aziz's recommendation could not be implemented then as the Government
was unable to resolve the question of riba. Nevertheless, it was finally carried out in
1962, following the recommendation of Sheikh Mahmoud al-Shaltut, Rector of al-
Azhar University, Cairo, who on his visit to Malaysia studied the plan and found it
to be an absolutely riba-free institution and technically sound. He praised the plan
as one that would greatly benefit the Muslims in Malaysia and urged its
implementation.9 Thus the Pilgrims Savings Corporation was incorporated in August
1962 and launched its operation in September 1962.10
The second stage in the development of Tabung Haji was marked by the merger
between the Pilgrims Savings Corporation which operated in Kuala Lumpur and the
Pilgrims Affairs Office which had been in operation since 1952 in Penang. The
merger of these two institutions led to the establishment of Lembaga urusan dan
Tabung Haji in August 1969." Tabung Haji was officially incorporated in 1969
8
Tabung Haji (1991), p. 2.
9
Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1990, p. 8; Tabung Haji (1991), p. 3.
10 This Corporation was incorporated under the law (Act ofParliament 34/62). Tabung Haji, Tabung Haji
25 Tahun. Kuala Lumpur, n.d., p. 4.
"
Wang dan Urusan Bank di Malaysia, 1992; Idem, Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report 1990, p. 154;
Tabung Haji. Annua/ Report 1990. p 8.
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under the Pilgrims Management and Fund Board Act 1969 (Act No. 8, 1969) and in
1973 under the Pilgrims Management and Fund Board Act (Amendment) 1973 (Act
No. 168, 1973).12
5.2. Corporate Objectives
5.2.1. Aims and Objectives
The Tabung Haji board has been set up to accomplish the following goals:
1. to enable Muslims to save gradually so as to provide for their expenses in
performimg the pilgrimage or for other expenses that are beneficial to them
2 to enable Muslims, through their savings, to participate in investments in
industry, commerce, plantations and real estates, as approved by the Sharpah
3. to provide for the protection, control and welfare of Muslims while on
pilgrimage through the various facilities and services of Tabung Haji.u
The clarity of the above goals enabled the formulation of the following
objectives:
1. to render the best and most satisfactory services to Malaysian Pilgrims in
matters pertaining to the performance of the hajj\ and
2. to give maximum investment returns to depositors on their savings.14
12
Tabung Haji. Annual Report 1977, p. 2; see also Annual Report of Tabung Haji 1990, p. 9.
13
Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1990, p. 9; Bank Negara Malaysia, Wang dan Urusan Bank, pp. 82 & 364;
Cf. Abd Rahim. et al., "Economic Development and the Hajj : Preliminary Observations from Asia with
Special Reference to Malaysia", in Kadir H. Din (ed.). Development and the Muslims, Bangi, 1993, pp. 193
- 208; Ozey Mehmet, "Malaysian Development by Trusteeship" in Islamic Identity and Development, Kuala
Lumpur. 1990, pp. 159 - 160.
14 Tabung Haji. Annual Report 1990, p. 9.
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In short, the objectives of Tabung Haji pertaining to public service and profits
are quite specific and clear-cut, which give the organization a very good foundation
for performance.
5.2.2. Organizational Structure
The organizational structure of Tabung Haji is shown in Figure 5.1 below.
Tabung Haji is a semi-government body under the Prime Minister's Department. Its
organizational structure reflects a fully autonomous body which is able to exercise
its statutory powers and executive policies for the benefit of its depositors. Its highest
authority, the board of directors is empowered under the Act of Tabung Haji to
formulate policies and implement programmes in the interest of the organization and
its depositors. Additional power is also given to administer the funds and all other
matters pertaining to the welfare of the pilgrims.
Members of the board comprise a chairman, a deputy chairman, a representative
of the Prime Minister's Department, a representative of the Treasury, a Director-
General, not more than five other members appointed by the Prime Minister and a
representative from the Ministry of Health (by invitation).15 Despite its vast powers,
the board of directors would only act upon the advice of two advisory councils,
namely the Financial Advisory Council on matters pertaining to finance and
investments , and the Hajj Operation Advisory Council on matters regarding the
15
Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1990. p. 10; Section 3(3), Act of Tabung Haji 1969.
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welfare of the pilgrims.16 Decisions made are then delegated to the management
headed by the Director-General for implementation, and are supervised by two
statutory committees, namely the Finance Committee and the Welfare Committee.17
Thus, the elements of check and balance are inherent in almost all processes and
procedures to ensure efficiency and trustworthiness.
At the headquarters level, the management is divided into four departments each
of which is headed by a Deputy Director-General, each specializing in specific
activities:
1. The Department of Finance and Investment, which is responsible for all
financial transactions in accordance with provisions stipulated in the Act of
incorporation.18
2. The Department of Hajj, which is responsible for discharging all services
pertaining to hajj affairs whether in Malaysia or Saudi Arabia.19
3-. The Department of Administration and Information, which is responsible for
matters pertaining to personnel recruitment, training and career development,
and dissemination of information regarding Tabung Haji activities.20
4. The Department of Corporate Affairs and Research, which is responsible for
all corporate matters, such as promotion of corporate image and evaluation of
corporate strategies, so as to ensure that Tabung Haji activities fulfil the
Tabung Haji (1990), op cit., pp. 12 - 13.
17 Ibid. pp. 14 - 15; Tabung Haji. 10 Tahun Tabung Haji 1963 - 1973, Kuala Lumpur, p. 12; Tabung Haji,
Annual Report 1989, pp. 16 - 17.
111 Tabung Haji. Annual Report 1989, p. 66; Idem, Annual Report 1990, p. 81.
19 Tabung Haji. Annual Report 1989. p. 15.
2" Tabung Haji. Annual Report 1990, pp. 54 & 59.
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needs of depositors and investors.21
Each of the above departments is divided into divisions which are further
subdivided into branches, units and sections to provide a better supervision and
control.
Figure 5.1 : Tabling Haji : Organizational Structure
Prime Minister's Department
Haji Operations Board of Director Financial Advisory
Advisory Council
Welfare Committee Director-General Finance Committee
I | T I
Department Department of Department Department of Corporate
For the Hajj Administration of Finance and Affairs and Research
and Information Investments
Source : Lembaga Urusan dan Tabling Haji.
5.3. Economic Activities of Tabung Haji
5.3.1. Mobilization of Deposits
Tabung Haji currently provides only one form of saving facility, that is , deposit
facility. It accepts deposits from its members on the Sharfah principle of wadfah.
21
Tabling Haji, Annual Reports 1987, p. 56; 1989, p. 93 and 1990, p. 81.
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This facility is open to all Malaysian Muslims, with the minimum deposit required
to open an account being RM 2.00.22 In the contract of wadi'ah, the depositors grant
permission to Tabung Haji to use their deposits for investment purposes. Any profits
from the investment are then distributed among depositors in the form of bonus after
the payment of zakat and after allocations have been made. No savings account book
is issued on opening an account. Instead, each member is given an account number
which is used when subsequent deposits are made. A statement of account is sent to
depositors twice yearly, that is, on 30 June and 31 December. Bonuses are calculated
at the end of the year and credited to the account of individual depositors after the
the net distributable profit for the year minus zakat has been determined.23
Depositors can make their savings at the Tabung Haji head office in Kuala
Lumpur or any branch offices in any state and province or through any post office
throughout the country or by monthly salary deductions. These methods of savings
have been devised on the premise that they are fool-proof, convenient for all
members, and can easily administered with the least possible expenditure.24
Besides, to attract new depositors, Tabung Haji through its Information and
Relations Division has launched from time to time various savings schemes for
schools, government departments and the private sectors. These include:
1. Saving schemes for school-children by introducing coin-boxes which are sold
Tabung Haji. Risalah Simpanan, n.d.
23 Tabung Haji. Annual Report 1984. p. 37.
24 Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1989. p. 39.
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at RM 5.00 each.25
2. Saving schemes for dependants where a depositor is encouraged to extend his
monthly salary deduction to his dependants.26
3. A monthly Bonus Payment Scheme for accounts exceeding RM 10,000 for at
least a year. Bonuses credited at the end of each year will be paid in equal
monthly instalments the following year. This scheme is specially devised for
depositors in the lower income group who receive compensation from the
government for their land and property forgone for development purposes.
Through this scheme, they are ensured a fixed monthly income.27
5.3.2. Withdrawal of Deposits
Tabung Haji is one of the very few financial institutions that provide a direct link
between savings and purpose. As such, savings deposited with Tabung Haji cannot
be withdrawn for reasons other than to defray all or part of the depositor's pilgrimage
expenses, except in the following cases:
1. the death of the depositors
2. when age, health and so forth, make it difficult for the depositor to undertake
pilgrimage
3. on production of satisfactory evidence that the depositor intends to emigrate
25
Tabung Haji. Annual Report 1990, p. 67.
2<'
Tabung Haji. Bagaimana Anda Boleh Menjadi Penyimpan di Tabung Haji, Kuala Lumpur, n. d., pp. 2 -
4.
27 Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1986. pp. 26 - 30.
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from Malaysia.28
On principle, withdrawals are allowed only once in six months, with a maximum
withdrawal of up to 80 per cent of the individual's credit balance. However, 100 per
cent withdrawals are allowed for the exceptional reasons stated above. A member
who is registered for pilgrimage in a certain year cannot make withdrawals within six
months before his departure but is allowed to withdraw his savings in Mecca or
Medina. In may be noted that the rules governing withdrawals of deposits accord a
long-term character to deposits so as to ensure that the primary aim of enabling the
members to save for the pilgrimage is achieved. Moreover, funds of the Tabung Haji
could be invested in lomg-term investments which usually take at least six months
for profits to accrue.
5.4. Tabung Haji as a Financial Institution : An Evaluation of Performance
5.4.1. Branch Network and Employment Structure
In the early years of its incorporation, Tabung Haji started off with very few
branch offices and a staff of hardly twenty. However, as at the end of 1991, its
branch offices had increased to 86,29 with 15 divisions under 4 departments at the
headquarters level in Kuala Lumpur. At the same time, the total number of staff
28
Interview with Che Gayah Salleh. Investment Officer of Tabung Haji, Kuala Lumpur, 25/11/94 ; Tabung
Haji, Deposit and Withdrawal Division; Radiah Abdul Kader, "The Malaysian Pilgrims Management and
Fund Board and Resource Mobilizations" in Mohamed Ariff (ed.), The Islamic Voluntary Sector in
Southeast Asia, Singapore, 1991, p. 143.
2'' This includes 83 branch offices in Malaysia and 3 branch offices in Saudi Arabia. Tabung Haji, Annual
Report 1990, p. 53.
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stood at 1021 with a high proportion of semi-skilled workers, including clerks and
technicians. The proportion of professional and semi-professional staff is still small,
comprising less than 20 per cent of total employees as presented in Table 1 below.
Table 1
Tabung Haji : Total number of staff; professional, semi-professional and semi-skilled
workers, 1989 - 1990.
Group 1989 1990
A (Professional) 63 65
B (Semi-Professional) 99 99
C (Semi-skilled workers) 460 557
D ( Semi-skilled workers) 278 274
Other staff:
Local staff in Saudi Arabia 13 14
Contract Staffs 19 12
Total 932 1021
Source: Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1990, p. 54.
5.4.2. Growths of Deposits
Table 2
Tabung Haji : Total Deposits and Total depositors, 1986 - 1990.
Deposits Total depositors
Year Total Deposit (RM) % Increase Persons % Increase
1986 480.099,744 00 976,438 00
1987 600,131.082 20 1,116,141 12.5
1988 789,538.420 24 1,301,937 14.3
1989 1,014,444,385 22.2 1.512,088 13.9
1990 1,074,494,357 5.6 1,735,678 12.9
Source : Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Reports 1986 - 1990; Tabung Haji, Annual Reports 1987
- 1990.
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As at 31 December 1990, Tabung Haji had accumulated a total of RM
1,074.494,357 worth of deposits with the total number of depositors reaching
1,753,678 persons as presented in Table 2 above.
Table 3
Tabung Haji : Growth of deposits and the Number of New Depositors, 1969 - 1990.
Year Deposits received




1970 9.4 34.3 12.4 74.6
1971 10.7 13.8 12.9 4.0
1972 18.4 72.0 23.9 85.3
1973 29.4 59.8 42.0 75.7
1974 51.7 75.9 82.6 96.7
1975 42.7 A 7.4 35.8 -96.7
1976 22.8 -46.6 15.5 -56.7
1977 26.9 18.0 27.1 74.8
1978 47.8 77.7 30.6 12.9
1979 68.8 43.9 34.7 13.4
1980 108.4 57.6 51.6 48.7
1981 150.3 38.7 58.4 13.2
1982 182.7 21.6 66.4 13.7
1983 195.9 7.2 75.1 13.1
■ 1984 209.5 6.9 133.4 77.6
1985 226.7 8.2 123.8 -7.2
1986 275.2 21.5 127.7 3.2
1987 331.5 20.5 138.6 8.5
1988 446.9 34.8 185.9 34.1
1989 556.9 24.6 212.8 14.5
1990 557.3 0.07 241.6 13.5
Source : Compiled from Annual Reports of Tabung Haji 1976 - 1990\ Idem, Deposit and
Withdrawal Division.
Table 3, above, provides data relating to annual deposits received, new depositors
and their growth for the period 1969 to 1990. With the exception of 1975 and 1976,
the growth of deposits during the past two decades shows an increasing trend.
Savings were in the range of RM 7 - 70 million a year during the 1970s and RM 100
- 560 million a year in the 1980s and in 1990. The most remarkable growth occurred
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between the third and fifth year of Tabung Haji's existence with deposits growing at
an average rate of 69 per cent. This may be attributed mainly to the success of
publicity measures undertaken in the rural areas beginning in 1972. Grand-scale
campaigns were launched in four major states where the majority of the rural Malay
population was concentrated. In 1974, small-scale campaigns were extended to
mosques and schools and exhibitions were held in various Government agencies. The
success of the publicity drive was followed by the opening of new branch offices in
twelve states peninsular Malaysia.30
A sharp decline in the volume of deposits in the years 1975 and 1976 (falling at
an average of 30 per cent per year) was caused by the implementation of the Shaykh
System in Mecca and Medina in 1975. In this system, pilgrims were not allowed to
choose a particular shaykh as their guide. This new ruling proved unpopular among
pilgrims because it often meant separation from friends and relatives during the
pilgrimage.31 Another major factor was the worldwide inflationary situation which
caused a rise in pilgrimage expenses. Total expenses to perform pilgrimage increased
to RM 2,720 - RM 3, 270 per person in 1976 from RM 1,500 in 1975, an increase
of 100 per cent.32 These two factors led to a decrease in the number of pilgrims,
which in turn affected the volume of deposits.
Deposits started to rise again in 1977, following the annulment of the Shaykh
System and have continued to increase ever since. However, since the beginning of
111
Radiah Abdul Kader (1991). op cit.. p. 145.
31 Tabung Haji. Annual Report 1976. p. 5.
32 Ibid, p. 6.
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1981, the rate of increase has slowed down, which may be due to the economic
recession. Trends in the growth of depositors more or less follow the trend in deposit
growth, with peaks in 1972 - 1974 and troughs in 1975 - 1976. Growth between 1978
and 1983 (excluding 1980) was rather moderate, with average increases of 13 per
cent. The huge increase in the number of depositors in 1984 consisted mainly of
school-children33 and new deposits recruited through the salary deduction scheme.34
Table 4
Tabung Haji : Deposit Accumulation, 1988 - 1990
Method of Saving 1988 1989 1990
RM Mil. % RM Mil. % RM Mil. %
1. Salary Deduction 142.7 30.6 181.2 32.5 221.8 39.8
2. Counter Collection
and Campaign
298.1 63.8 347.1 62.3 310.2 55.6
3. Post Office 24.8 5.3 25.9 4.7 21.7 3.9
4. Student and Children
Box Savings
1.3 0.3 2.7 0.5 3.6 0.7
Total 466.9 100 556.9 100 557.3 100
Source : Compiled from Annual Reports of Tabung Haji 1988 - 1990.
An examination of Tabung Haji deposits can also be viewed from various
categories of depositors, which can be classified mainly as : (1) those who intend to
perform pilgrimage; (2) employees in the Government and private sectors; (3)
"
Tabung Haji. Annual Report 1984. p. 38.
34 ibid.
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ordinary depositors; (4) students and children.35
Table 4 above shows data on the annual deposits accumulated by Tabung Haji
using various methods of collection from 1988 to 1990. Data from Table 4 shows
that the method of saving by counter collection and campaign represents the largest
per cent of total annual savings. It was followed by savings using the method of
salary deductions, post offices and students and children's savings.
5.4.3. Investment Activities
Even though initially Tabung Haji was established solely to facilitate Malaysian
Muslims performing pilgrimage,36 it is not prohibited from engaging in investment
activities.37 The provision made under the Act has been translated into the aims and
objectives of Tabung Haji at the operational level, namely: (i).the collection and
management of the pilgrimage fund; and (ii).the administration and management of
pilgrims.
Thus, the Act permits Tabung Haji to invest the depositors' money in order to
generate profits which will then distributed among the depositors in the form of
bonuses. In implementing its function, Tabung Haji adheres to the Sharfah principle
35
Tabung Haji, AnnuaI Report 1990, pp. 6-7.
36 The Preamble of Tabung Haji Act. 1969 (Act No. 8, 1969) specifies that tha main function of Tabung
Haji is to manage a fund for the maintenance and utilization of savings in connection with the protection,
control and general well-being of the pilgrimage to Mecca and matters ancillary thereto.
37 Section 4, Tabung Haji Act 1969 provide : It shall be the function of the Lembaga (Tabung Haji) to
administer the fund and all matters concerning the welfare of the pilgrims and to formulate policies in
connection therewith and do so such other things as may be done under this Act.
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of wadi'at al wakalah al-muflaqah, i.e. the depositors give consent to Tabung Haji
to manage their deposits for the purpose of investment.
Since the funds deposited with Tabung Haji by Malaysian Muslims are being
held for purpose of the pilgrimage, the areas of investments have to be within the
framework of the Sharfah,38 Therefore, Tabung Haji does not invest its funds in
government interest-bearing securities, other interest-bearing securities or shares in
companies producing goods which are forbidden in Islam. Nevertheless, the scope of
investment is still broad. At present, there are four types of investments undertaken
by Tabung Haji as follows:
1. investment in shares (equity participation)
2. investment in subsidiary companies
3. investment in land and building39
4. short-term investment.40
The investment activities of Tabung Haji can be classified into two types of
investments, that is long-term and short-term investments. Investments in the BIMB
are in the form of short-term investments; while investments in shares (equity
participation), subsidiary companies and land and building are classified as long-term
investments. All these investment activities are currently carried out under the
principles of mudarabah (profit-sharing), musharakah (equity participation) and
38
Section 23(1). Tabung Haji Act, 1969 provides for the assets of the funds to be invested in such manner
as the Tabung Haji management thinks fit.
3'' All these types of investments are in a long-term investments.
40 Tabung Haji (1991), p. 13.
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ijarah (leasing).41
To ensure that investments made by Tabling Haji are in compliance with the
Sharfah rules, each decision made in matters pertaining to investment is brought
under the advice of the National Advisory Council, for instance, if Tabung Haji is
doubtful as to whether such business conducted by the companies is in accordance
with the Sharfah. At present, this advice is sought from the expertise of the
Religious Supervisory Council of BIMBj2 Therefore, divergence from the Sharfah
principles should result in the withdrawal of shares or participation by Tabung Haji.
These have been occasions in the past when such actions were deemed necessary and
were taken by Tabung Haji,43
1. Investment in shares
Investment in shares is limited to selected Malaysian equities as permitted by the
Sharfah. These include shares of companies in major sectors such as plantations,
agriculture, manufacturing, trade, transport, mining and properties. The amount of
equity participation depends on the amount being offered but generally Tabung Haji
does not participate as a major shareholder. In cases where Tabung Haji or its
subsidiary companies are a substantial shareholder, that is, holding between 20 to 50
41
Tabung Haji. Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji, n. d., p. 6.
42 Interview with Che Gayah Salleh. Investment Officer of Tabung Haji, Kuala Lumpur, 25/11/94; See also
W. M. Wan Hussein, "Pengurusan Kewangan dan Pelaburan Islam : Pengalaman Tabung Haji", p. 32.
Paper presented at the Seminar Pentadbiran dan Pengurusan Islam, ITM, Selangor, Malaysia, 1991.
43 For example, in 1970s, Tabung Haji withdrew its investment from businesses involving liquor and the
hotel business. This attitude continued into the 1980s when two companies namely Rasa Sayang Hotel and
Bousted Holdings Limited were withdrawn frorrythe Tabung Haji investment portfolio since they had later
diversified into activities not according to SharTah. Berita Harian, 7 January, 1986, p. 1.
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per cent of the equity of a company, Tabung Haji officials are represented on the
company's board of directors.44 Constant reviews are made by Tabung Haji officials
on the activities of the companies to ensure that they comply with the Sharfah rules.
If found otherwise, Tabung Haji will sell off its shares in the company.45 Shares of
the companies are acquired in the form of quoted shares which are directly bought
in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, or unquoted shares which are acquired when
issued to the public. Equity shares are also acquired through partnership or joint-
ventures with other companies.46
Table 5
Tabung Haji : Annual Investment in Shares, 1987 - 1990.








1. Quoted Shares 16.6 3.62 44.18 94.90
2. Unquoted Shares 14.15 30.13 9.96 89.10
3. Subsidiary Companies' Shares 3.0 8.50 15.99 10.95
4. Funds Managers' Shares 5.66 2.46 - -
5. Other Shares 2.27 5.48 4.74 3.72
Total 41.14 50.19 73.87 198.69
Source : Compiled from Annual Reports of Tabung Haji 1987 - 1990.
As at 31 December 1990, Tabung Haji had invested its funds of RM 198. 69
million in the acquisition of shares. As presented in Table 5 above, a large portion
of its annual investment in shares was in the acquisition of shares of companies in
44
Tabung Haji. Annual Report 1990, pp. 93 - 97.
45 Interview with Che Gayah Salleh. Investment Officer of Tabung Haji, Kuala Lumpur. 25/1 1/94.
4<' Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1990, p. 34.
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the form of quoted shares and unquoted shares, followed by the acquisition of shares
in its subsidiary companies, funds' managers shares and other shares in the market.
Table 6










1 205.6 59.0 232.6 59.5 227.4 55.81 370.88 62
2 69.1 19.8 76.2 19.4 103.4 25.38 110 18
3 36 10.3 42.3 10.8 35.4 8.7 76 13
4 21.8 6.2 21 5.4 19.5 4.8 19.2 3
5 14 4.8 16.2 4.0 18.3 4.5 15.9 3
6 2.6 0.7 3 0.8 3.4 0.8 3.5 1
Total 100 100 100 100
Notes: 1 = Manufacturing, processing and trading; 2 = Plantation industry; 3 = Real estate; 4 = Rubber
industry; 5 = Mining industry; 6 = Others
Source : Compiled from Annual Reports of Tabung Haji 1987 - 1990.
During the financial years 1987 to 1990, a substantial portion of Tabung Haji's
investment in stocks and shares, that is about 55 to 60 per cent as shown in Table
6 above, went into the acquisition of shares in manufacturing, processing and trading
industries, as against the 18 to 25 per cent and 8 to 13 per cent from the total
accumulation of investment in shares invested in the plantation industry and real
estate sector respectively. The rest of its investment in shares went into other
economic sectors such as rubber and the mining industries as shown in Table 6
above.
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2. Investment in subsidiary companies
Investment in subsidiary companies is undertaken to enable Tabung Haji to
participate actively in economic activities. Subsidiary companies are companies which
have been incorporated and are wholly owned by Tabung Haji. Currently, Tabung
Haji has formed 6 (six) subsidiary companies; three of which operate in the
plantation industry and the rest of which are involved in real estate, transport and
trading, and property management.47
1. The Plantation Corporation Limited
2. Sabah Plantation Corporation Limited
3. The Construction and Housing Company Limited
4. The Transport and Trading Corporation Limited
5. Urus Bina Limited
6. Tabung Haji Plantation (Holdings) Limited.48
The Plantation Corporation Limited was formed in August 28, 1972 with an
authorized and paid-up capital of RM 50 million. The corporation is actively involved
in agricultural activities such as oil-palm, cocoa and rubber plantations and its
plantations are situated in parts of Pahang and Johor, covering areas of 12,586
hectares.49
47
Ibid. pp. 88 - 91.
4"
Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1990. pp. 88 - 91; Razali Nawawi (1991), op. cit., pp. 6-7.
4''
Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1990, pp. 88 - 89; Idem. Perbadanan Ladang-ladang Tabung Haji Sdn.
Bhd., n. d.
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Sabah Plantation Corporation Limited was established with an authorized capital
of RM 50 million and paid-up capital of RM 34,975,504. The main activity of this
corporation is oil-palm plantations which are situated in Sungai Tenegang and Sungai
Koyah. Sabah, covering an area of 3,963.6 hectares.50
The Construction and Housing Company Limited was incorporated in 31 October
1980 with a paid-up capital of RM 16 million and amounted to RM 20 million at the
end of 1990. The main operation of this company is building houses and commercial
buildings for sale to Tabung Haji members and the public.51
The Transport and Trading Corporation Limited was formed in September 9,
1972 with an authorized capital of RM 2 million. The main activity of this company
is to arrange charter flights with the national airline carrier to transport pilgrims to
Mecca and other matters pertaining to the pilgrimage.52
Urus Bina Limited's main function is to supervise the management of buildings
belonging to Tabung Haji all over the country including the provision of security
services to the buildings.53 Tabung Haji Plantation (Holdings) Limited was
incorporated in 20 December 1988 with an authorized capital of RM 25 million and
a paid-up capital of RM 3,435,175. The main activity of this company is to develop
land for plantations on partnership basis with the owner of the land. For example, this
50
Ibid., pp. 89 - 90; Tabung Haji, Tabung Haji 25 Tahun, n. d., p. 29.
51 Ibid., p. 28; Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1989, p. 108; Annual Report 1990, p. 90.
52 Ibid., p. 90; See also Idem. Perbadanan Pengangkutan dan Perusahaan Tabung Haji Sdn. Bhd., n. d.
53 Ibid.
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company has been involved in a partnership contract with Majlis Agama Islam Negeri
Sembilan (MAINS) (Religious Council ofNegeri Sembilan) to plant oil-palm on land
covering areas of 951 hectares in Gemas, Negeri Sembilan.54
3. Investment in real estate
Activities under this heading involve the construction of buildings for the use of
Tabung Haji offices as well as for rental purposes.55 Besides construction of
buildings, Tabung Haji also buys buildings for leasing and buys potential lots of land
for future development to form a land bank.56
Tabung Haji's investment in land and building as at 31 December 1990
amounted to RM 16.67 from RM 13.6 million in 1989, an increase of RM 3.07
million or 22. 6 per cent.57 Total Investment in land and building as at the end of
1990 amounted to RM 206.6 million.58 It is the aim of Tabung Haji to have its own
building in every major town in Malaysia either for its own use or for rental
purposes. Tabung Haji's biggest investment in this field is the construction of its
thirty-eight storey headquarters building on Jalan Tun Razak, Kuala Lumpur, which
was completed in 1985 at a total cost of RM 109 million (including the cost of
54
Ibid., p. 90.
55 Buildings owned by Tabung Haji locate not only in Malaysia but also in Saudi Arabia. Ibid, p. 27.
56 Ibid.
57 Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1990, p. 6.
5* Ibid., p. 20.
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land).5"5 As at the end of 1988, Tabung Haji was regarded as one of the institutions
which owned the largest amount of property in Malaysia with 62 buildings all over
the country and a very sizeable land bank.60
4. Short-term investment
Table 7







1. BIMB, Jeddah . 3.3 _
2. Islamic Development Bank.
Jeddah - 2.7 2.8
3. BIMB, Kuala Lumpur 206 36.3 -
4. Government Investment
Securities 50.9 368.4 234.7
5. Gulf International Bank Bahrain
(GIB) 14.3 68.7 0.008
6. BIMB, London - - 33.7
7. Bay' bithaman ajil - - 40
8. Musyarakah - - 50
Total 271.2 479.4 361.208
Source : Compiled from Financial Statements of Tabung Haji 1988 - 1990.
Short-term investment means investment undertaken by Tabung Haji and its
subsidiary companies through a special investment account with BIMB and
Government Investment Certificates using the contract of mudarabah. In the case of
BIMB, the ratio of profit-sharing is 75:25 in Tabung Haji's favour. Moreover, a
normal short-term surplus is maintained in the current account and invested by the
bank, and profits are shared in a ratio of 70:30. Tabung Haji also invests its
51
Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1988, p. 43.
611 Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1989, p. 27.
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temporary short-term funds in the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, Islamic Bank (Malaysia) Limited in London, and London and Gulf
International Bank of Bahrain in accordance with the Islamic principle ofmudarabah.
Moreover, in 1990 Tabung Haji also invested its funds of RM 50 million in project
financing with Shell Company MDS (Malaysia) Limited under the principle of
musharakah, and financing the acquisition of assets for Sarawak Shell Company
Limited under the principle of bayc bi thaman ajil amounting to RM 40 million as
shown in Table 7 above.
5.4.4. Income From Investments
Income received by Tabung Haji is derived from its investments. As presented
in Table 8 below, Tabung Haji receives four types of major income, namely:
1. Dividends from investment in shares;
2: Rent from buildings;
3. Profit from short-term investment in B1MB\ and
4. Profit from the sale of shares.
Table 8











1. 29.53 29 39.04 52.7 45.81 40 40.87 40
2 11.61 11.5 11.20 15.1 11.22 10 13.00 13
3 3.52 3.5 6.38 8.6 14.87 13 25.01 25
4 43.71 43 5.81 7.8 26.92 23 10.10 10
5 2.8 3 2.68 3.6 7.97 7 5.33 5
6 10.0 10 9.00 12.1 8.00 7 7.00 7
Total 101.22 100 74.11 100 114.80 100 101.31 100
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Notes :
1 = Dividend from shares; 2 = Rental income;
3 = Profit from short-term investment; 4 = Profit on sale of shares
5 = Other incomes; 6 = Government grant
Source : Tabung Haji. Annual Reports 1987 - 1990.
As shown in Table 8 above, the income of Tabung Haji has been stable over the
four year period 1987 - 1990. With the exception of 1988, total annual income
received by Tabung Haji over this period was around RM 100 million. During the
financial years 1988 to 1990, dividends from investment in shares made the largest
contribution to annual income. However, in 1987 more than 40 per cent of income
came from the profit on the sale of shares, while income from dividends constituted
29 per cent of the total annual income.
Until 1988, rent from buildings constituted the third major source of income.
However, from 1989, the third major source of income has been the profit from
short-term investment in BIMB. Profit from this short-term investment seems to have
increased during the financial years 1987 to 1990. The grant (subsidy) from the
Malaysian Government seems to be declining, i. e. from RM 10 millions to RM 7
millions over the four years. This grant is specially allocated so as to cover the
expenses of pilgrims before or after departure to Mecca.
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5.4.5. Appropriation of Profits
Table 9 below shows that the pre-zakat profits made during the financial years
of 1981 to 1986 have been stable with a slight fall in 1985 and 1986, i.e. RM 25.9
million and RM 23.4 million respectively, owing to the economic recession.
However, during the financial years 1987 to 1990 the pre-zakat profits made have
been inconsistent. The main factor which contributed to the fluctuation of the Tabung
Haji's profits during those financial years was the profits on the sale of shares. For
example, in 1987 RM 43.71 million out of RM 64.45 million of the pre-zakat profits
of Tabung Haji was generated from the sale of shares, an increase of RM 41.52
million from the previous year, which was RM 2. 19 million.
Table 9








1981 32.4 1.6 10.3 9.0
1982 32.2 2.3 12.7 8.0
1983 29.4 2.8 15.2 8.5
1984 29.8 1.4 34.5 8.5
1985 25.9 1.2 27.1 9
1986 23.4 1.4 27.7 7
1987 64.5 2.3 36.4 7.5
1988 38.5 2.1 39.3 6.5
1989 73.8 2.4 55.7 7.0
1990 56.2 3.0 25.5 6.5
Source : Compiled from Annual Reports of Tabung Haji 1981 - 1990.
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5.4.6. Payment of Zakat
Tabung Haji has been paying zakat on wealth and commerce since 1980. The
rate of zakat is 2.5 per cent on the sum of profits earned and the amount of working
capital at the end of the financial year.61 Zakat payments are made to the Islamic
Religious Department in each state which in turn redistributes the zakat fund among
the various beneficiaries. The amount received by each state is based on the credit
balance of the depositors in the respective states.62 At the end of the financial year
1990, zakat payment made by Tabung Haji was RM 3 million which in turn could
be used to help, for example, poor and needy Muslims in Malaysia as well as to
carry out economic projects aimed at improving the socio-economic conditions of
Muslims in Malaysia. In other words, Tabung Haji has also made a contribution to
the economic development of Malaysia by increasing payment of zakat each year as
presented in Table 9 above.
5.4.7. Payment of Bonus63
A large proportion of Tabung Haji net profits are distributed to depositors in the
form of bonuses. The annual rate of bonus varies from 6.5 to 9.0 per cent during
1981 - 1990 financial years, as presented in Table 9, depending on profit made.
However, at times when profits were very low, part of the Tabung Haji general
61
The question of zakat was raised some years ago but a clear fatwa (decree) was issued to the
management of Tabung Haji only in 1979. Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1981, p. 19; Annual Report 1984,
p. 37.
62 Tabung Haji, Zakat. n. d.
Tabung Haji. Bonus, n. d.
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reserves were used to pay a reasonably high bonus. This practice was evident in 1984
and 1985 when the bonus payment amounted to 115 and 104 per cent of the total
profits respectively. As a result, Tabung Haji was able to offer a competitive rate of
return to depositors at 8.5 and 9.0 per cent, which was comparable to the return from
other types of Islamic financial institutions' investments in the country such as BIMB.
As a matter of fact, these rates of bonuses were relatively higher than the 5 per cent
rate of profit paid on savings accounts in BIMB as at December 1985.
5.4.8. Evaluation of Performance and Recommendations
Tabung Haji is a financial institution of a special kind. It mobilizes funds from
savers (depositors) and channels them to investors. It acts as a banker and service
organization to its members and when they decide to perform the pilgrimage, it caters
for their needs before departure such as handling visa requirements, arrangements,
arranging for transportation, and giving information and education on pilgrimage.
Services catered for by TabungHaji in Mecca include the provision of accomodation,
food and medical and health care. The economic activities of Tabung Haji emanate
from its role as a banker to its members whereby it attempts to convert their deposits
into profitable investments.
Tabung Haji's performance can be evaluated from two aspects: (1) its success in
achieving its aims and objectives and (2) its contribution to the development process.
Looking at the growth of the size of its deposits and the number of its depositors
since its incorporation, it is apparent that Tabung Haji has been successful in
achieving its aim of enabling Muslims to save for the purpose of performing the
pilgrimage. When it was first formed in 1963, the organization had only 7.1 thousand
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members (depositors) with a total savings of RM 7 millions. However, as at the end
of 1990. its depositors reached 1.753.678 persons with total savings amounting to RM
1,074.5 million.64
The contribution of Tabung Haji in the process of economic development lies in
its role as the user of investible funds deposited with it.65 Its average annual inflow
of RM 40 millions66 illustrates the significant role it plays, as an investment
organization, in the economic development of the country. Thus far, Tabung Haji has
been successful in channelling its resources to specified areas and giving high returns
to depositors on their savings. The annual rate of bonus given to its depositors is
between 6.5 to 9.00 per cent which is regarded as a competitive rate in comparison
with other financial institutions in Malaysia.
Besides giving direct benefits to its depositors, Tabung Haji has also brought
various benefits to the Malaysian Muslims at large. Direct investments undertaken by
its subsidiary companies in the agricultural and real estate sectors provide
employment to more Muslims, in addition to increasing Muslim property ownership
in the country. In other words, Tabung Haji, like other trust agencies, acts as an
instrument in hastening the process of reducing the Malay 'capital deficiency gap' in
the above-mentioned sectors, while at the same time avoiding unequal distribution of
ownership amongst the Muslims, for the bulk of Tabung Haji's investments take the
form of share equities in companies engaged in manufacturing, the leading growth
M
Tabung Haji, Annual Report 1990, p. 67; Bank Negara Malaysia. Annual Report 1990, p. 154.
''5 See Lee Hock Lock. Household Savings in West Malaysia and the Problem of Financing Economic
Development. Kuala Lumpur, 1971. p. 197.
66 Radiah Abdul Kader (1991), op. cit., p. 159.
282
sector in the Malaysian economy. As the minimum amount of subscription to share
issues is generally beyond the means ofmost Muslim savers at any one time, Tabung
Haji plays the supporting role of buyimg these shares on behalf of its many
depositors. Therefore, it is possible to spread ownership over a large number of
individuals, lest it should be confined to a small group of rich Malay individuals with
higher income and propensity to save.
Internal corporate control which is defined as the legally enforceable power to
select, change or dictate the management of the company67 is shown by Tabung
Haji's share ownership in the respective companies. In this regard, if Tabung Haji
holds a bigger stake in some of the companies, it has the right to select and influence
the management of the company. Some influence could be exerted in terms of
providing employment to Muslims and, more importantly, in ensuring that the
activities of the company and their subsidiaries are in conformity with the Sharfah.
The distribution of Tabung Haji share ownership is quite dispersed in the
manufacturing sector, covering various types of industries such as petroleum,
foodstuffs, textiles, and electrical and engineering works, while in other sectors such
as the agricultural sector, the distribution is rather narrow and limited. This uneven
distribution may be attributed to the fact that investments in the agricultural sector
involve higher risks and lower returns. Another possible reason could be that the
Tabung Haji subsidiary companies are already involved in the agricultural sector.
Tabung Haji could play a more effective role in financing economic development
'7
M. L. Sieh Lee, The Structure ofOwnership and Control ofManufacturing Companies in Malaysia 1974
- 1975, Unpublished Ph. D Thesis. University of Sheffield, 1975. p. 13.
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by extending its investments into other agriculture activities besides primary
commodities such as palm oil. Small-scale and agro-based industries in the rural
areas are in need of finance. In this regard, Tabung Haji could help cover this
deficiency through project-financing using contracts of mudarabah and musharakah
or by financing the purchase of inputs using the contracts of murabahah and bayc bi
thaman ajil.
In the case of short term investment, Tabung Haji can still play an indirect role
by investing its funds in the Special Investment Account at BIMB. Since the
conditions for investment in this account are negotiable, a request can be made by
Tabung Haji that its investment is specifically channelled to finance entrepreneurs in
small-scale and agro-based industries.
One of the main problems faced by Tabung Haji relates to the profitable
disbursement of its surplus liquid funds. In the absence of an Islamic money-market,
interest-free short-run financial instruments are not available. The only channel open
to Tabung Haji is to invest in BIMB but returns are relatively low as the bank itself




At the theoretical level, the concept of Islamic banking on the basis of profit-
sharing using mudarabah and musharakah as modes of operations and financing, was
initially developed under the explicit assumption of the strict prohibition of riba in
Islam. Practically speaking, however, almost all existing Islamic banks have been
established and operated in capitalistic economies where the system of interest
persists.
The establishment of an Islamic bank under such an environment is not without
justification. Islamic banking is widely recongnized by Muslim scholars as one of the
approaches to be adopted in the process of Islamizing an economy. This approach is
based on the premise that under the existing political, social and technical constraints,
Islamization should be so phased as to avoid any abrupt changes which might cause
unpredictable disarray in the economy. According to this approach, Islamization of
the banking sector is to be implemented by first establishing a model of an Islamic
bank side by side with the existing interest-based banks. It is hoped that, through
time, the superiority of the Islamic banking model will cause the practice of interest-
based banking to be phased out without any adverse effect on the economy.
Experiences so far have shown that Islamic banking and financial institutions can co¬
exist with conventional banking and financial institutions, and there are signs that
they can continue to grow and progress.
A similar approach has been adopted in the implementation of Islamic banking
and finance in Malaysia. It was in a capitalistic environment that BIMB was
established in July 1983. The passing of the Islamic Bank Act by the Malaysian
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Parliament on March 10, 1983, paved the way for an Islamic bank to operate banking
business in the country in line with Islamic principles, rules and practices as
contained in Islamic commercial law. Its establishment was motivated by the
successful experience of similar financial institutions such as Tabung Haji (LUTH),
which was established in 1969 in Malaysia and other Islamic banks in other
countries. The main purpose of Tabung Haji is to promote and accumulate savings
from the Muslims and at the same time co-ordinate all aspects of pilgrimage activities
undertaken by its members. The fund is managed according to Islamic principles with
the Board of Trustees acting to ensure that the accumulated funds are invested in
activities permissible in Islam.
Following the establishment of BIMB, a number of measures have been taken to
strengthen other Islamic-oriented financial institutions in Malaysia. Such measures
include, among others, the setting up in 1985 of the Islamic Insurance Company
known as Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad (STMSB) which operates its
takaful schemes based on the contracts of mudarabah and takaful. These
developments became possible after BIMB had proved to be a viable institution due
partly to the support given by the public in dealing with Islamic banking in Malaysia.
As the Islamic financial sector is in its infancy in Malaysia, it is faced with the
major problem of competition with the established conventional sector. However, as
the Islamic sector gains maturity and experience the identity problem of the Islamic
institutions should be solved and the socio-economic justice behind their
establishment be fulfilled. BIMB, Tabung Haji and Syarikat Takaful need to evaluate
their mode of operations and goals to have a balance between profit-motivation and
service provision. Conventional banking has been in existence for many decades and
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is still far from perfect. Therefore, an Islamic alternative must not be expected to
work wonders within a short span of time.
Through the example of institutions like BIMB, Tabung Haji and Syarikat
TakafuL the Government can show how the Muslims have been helped in mobilising
their savings to be used for profitable investment in accordance with the Sharfah.
These institutions have been able to raise profit and gain an increasing number of
depositors (in the case of BIMB and Tabung Haji) or participants (in the case of
Syarikat Takaful) each year, in spite of competition from conventional counterparts.
Their profitability, liquidity and viability has led conventional banking and financial
institutions to operate interest-free counters which offer an alternative way of
investment using various principles of Islamic transactions such as wadicah,
mudarabah, musharakah, murabahah, bayc bi thaman ajil, ijarah and kafalah.
Likewise Tabung Haji, which was establised mainly for welfare purposes, has
gained a greater role in the development of the Muslim economy in Malaysia and has
managed to emerge as one of the largest holding companies there.
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB)
Progress made by the BIMB so far is encouraging and the experience is
somewhat similar to Islamic banking experiments in other countries. The Bank is
expected to continue its progress remarkably in the future, at least in achieving the
conventional banking objectives of profitability, liquidity and safety, in view of it
being the only Islamic bank granted permission to operate in Malaysia. However, the
ultimate criteria forjudging the success of the Bank should not be confined to just
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the degree to which riba is eliminated from its operation and the size of profits
earned in the process. Far more important is the extent to which the Bank helps
achieve other desirable goals of the Islamic economic system such as eradication of
poverty, optimum utilization of resources, maintenance of economic stability and
equitable distribution of income and wealth.
Available evidence clearly suggests that there is a tendency for the Bank to
confine its profit-generating operations to almost risk-free techniques to ensure
success. Consequently, this has lead to the bank's over-reliance on the murabahah
and bayc bi thaman ajil modes of financing rather than the entrepreneur-creating
operation of mudarabah and musharakah. To a certain degree, people doubt the
Bank's genuine intention to apply Islamic principles in banking. Thus the Bank has
been unable to influence the pattern of the distribution of profit between the providers
of capital and the users of that capital in a more equitable manner as enjoined in
Islam. It may be argued that more meaningful outcomes could have been achieved
had the Bank placed greater emphasis on the first-line modes of financing of
mudarabah and musharakah.
It is important to note that mudarabah and musharakah investments have been
given high importance in the evaluation of the degree of Islamicity of Islamic banks.
Confinement to murabahah and bayc bi thaman ajil transactions will only ensure the
Islamic bank the role of freeing itself from interest and nothing else. Such an
approach will undermine the bank's potential for the creation ofMuslim entrepreneurs
as well as the improvement of income distribution in favour of the Muslim business
community.
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Although in its operation BIMB has used all the instruments and mechanisms
which are devoid of riba, nevertheless, the main alternatives used are similar to
interest. It so happens that the returns on the modes of finance based on murabahah,
bayc bi thaman ajil and ijarah are all pre-determined as in the case of interest. Some
of these modes are said to contain some risk, but all these risks are insurable. The
concentration on these second-line techniques as opposed to partnership (mudarabah
and musharakah), which, as we have said above, has been regarded by Islamic
economists as the most appropriate, has created an identity crisis as to whether BIMB
is a true Islamic bank. Though various arguments are given by BIMB to justify its
preoccupation with murabahah and bayc bi thaman ajil transactions, these are not
fully convincing since the mark-up charged by the Bank is often higher than the
prevailing interest rate. This might create exploitation of customers which is equally
un-Islamic in nature. The ultimate criteria forjudging the success of the Bank should
not be confined to the degree to which riba is eliminated from its operation. The
operation of BIMB, which concentrates on second line techniques, could be
considered as an example of following the "letter of the law" rather than its "spirit".
Even though there is no clear evidence to lead us to disapprove of these techniques,
they defeat the spirit of equity and justice as propounded by the Sharfah principles
of profit and loss-sharing.
Syarikat Takaful
Available evidence clearly suggests that Syarikat Takaful has been successful in
achieving its economic objectives of profitability, viability and safety. However, from
the investment point of view, its funds are channelled primarily into short-term
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investments such as investment in investment accounts with BIMB, the purchase of
Malaysian Government Investment Certificates (MGIC) and the purchase of shares
and stocks quoted in Malaysia. These types of investments are regarded as almost
risk-free investments to ensure success. In this regard, it would be impossible for the
Syarikat Takaful to exert considerable influence to improve the pattern of profit
distribution among the providers and users of capital.
As one of the Islamic financial institutions granted permission to offer and operate
Islamic Insurance schemes based on mudarabah and takaful contracts, Syarikat
Takaful could play a more effective role in financing economic development in the
country by channelling its funds and monetary sources into various ways of
investment, especially in project-financing using contracts of mudarabah and
musharakah (financing the entrepreneurs). Then as a second-line activity, it
can also finance customers to purchase inputs and fixed assets using the contracts of
murabahah and bayc bi thaman ajil.
Tabling Haji
Tabung Haji is now becoming a big investor in property and stock markets while
at the same time one hears of complaints about its management, since its capitalist
side appears to be dominant. In addition, the minimum 10 per cent yearly dividend
is given irrespective of the outcome of the business, which has parallels with
conventional capitalist practices as opposed to those of Islam.
Furthermore, although, Tabung Haji has been portrayed as a successful Islamic
commercial institution, evidence gathered so far indicates that it has insisted upon
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achieving the conventional financial objectives of profitability, liquidity and safety.
As such, there is a tendency for Tabung Haji to confine its profit-generating
operations to almost risk-free techniques to ensure success. In this respect, Tabung
Haji could play a more effective role in financing economic development in Malaysia
by extending its investments into agricultural activities besides primary commodities.
Small-scale and agro-based industries in the rural areas are in dire need of finance.
Tabung Haji could help cover this deficiency through project-financing using
SharTah based contracts such as mudarabah and musharakah or by financing the
purchase of inputs and fixed assets using the murabahah or bayc bi thaman ajil or
bayc al-salam modes of financing.
Despite its shortcomings, Tabung Haji has proved its success over more than two
decades of operations, and can take pride in the fact that it is the only one of its kind
in the world.
Suggestions
Introducing an Islamic financial system in Malaysia is no easy task. Malaysia's
multi-ethnic and multi-religious demographic structure makes this task even more
challenging. The fact that Islamic financial institutions have been able, so far, to co¬
exist with other conventional counterparts is, perhaps, to a certain extent indicative
of the workability of the Malaysian approach. This, however, does not and should not
cloud the fact that legal difficulties have, in fact, shown that while piecemeal
tinkering with the conventional economic system may temporarily appease those
calling for the gradual Islamization of the entire economic system, such efforts may
give rise to serious constitutional and legal issues.
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In the case of Islamic banking, we can perhaps suggest a simple solution to the
problem of the limited practice of mudarabah and musharakah financing by the
BIMB and other Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia. To this effect, we might
leave the existing BIMB to continue its present practices and consider it only an
'Islamic commercial bank'. In doing so, we propose the establishment of what could
be called an Islamic Merchant Bank which will put more emphasis on mudarabah
and musharakah financing. We might also retain the term 'Islamic bank' in its
general form to be consistent with its distinctive nature and propose the establishment
of other Islamic commercial banks which are believed to possess the expertise to
provide a wide range of needs to members of the public, especially in the modes of
financing. Furthermore, the establishment of another Islamic bank or Islamic counters
in existing commercial banks will open the door for healthy competition among
Islamic banks and thus improve their efficiency.
One of the important areas where mudarabah and musharakah financing would
need to be provided is in funding of cottage and small-scale industries. It may be
desirable to establish specialised credit institutions with particular financing ability
to supplement private sector finance on a profit and loss-sharing basis to support such
industries.
Needless to say, Syarikat Takaful or Tabung Haji would be able to perform better
if there were more Islamic investment outlets in the country. This observation calls
for the establishment of other Islamic financial institutions such as an Islamic
Mortgage Bank, an Islamic Development Bank, Islamic Finance Companies and
Islamic Investment Houses which would complement the existing Islamic financial
and business institutions.
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As regards short-term of investment, Tabung Haji and Syarikat Takaful can still
play an indirect role by investing their funds and monetary resources in the Special
Investment Account at the BIMB. Since the conditions for investment in this account
are negotiable, a request can be made by Tabung Haji or Syarikat Takaful that its
investment is specifically channelled to finance entrepreneurs in any profitable
investment including small-scale and agro-based industries using mudarabah or
musharakah modes of financing.
One of the main problems faced by the Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia
such as Tabung Haji and Syarikat Takaful relates to the profitable disbursement of
their surplus liquid funds. In the absence of an Islamic money market and interest-
free short-term financial instruments, the only channel open to these financial
institutions is to invest in the BIMB, but the returns are relatively low as the bank
itself is saddled with excess liquidity.
We should also note that the success of Islamic banking in Malaysia requires
complementary changes such as the establishment of Islamic non-bank financial
institutions, specialised credit institutions, deposit insurance corporations and
investment audit corporations. In other words, an Islamic bank cannot exist in
isolation in upholding Islamic principles as well as its noble objectives in the
business world. It is within this nature of operation that it can effectively help
eliminate riba from the economic system and ensure the attainment of a more
harmonious and meaningful riba-free equity-based economy.
However, it is also important to note that if the establishment of Islamic banking
and finance is considered as part and parcel of the process of Islamization of the
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economy, as has been claimed in the case of Malaysia, a mere replacement of riba
by a profit-sharing or equity-based system will not suffice. Elimination of riba, after
all, is only one aspect of the Islamic economic reforms, as it is not the only virtue
that Islam stands for. Thus the achievement of the Islamic economic system must
be accompanied by and strengthened through other motivational and structural
changes. In other words, the introduction of Islamic banking and finance is only a
part of the process and not the be-all and end-all of it.
The establishment of B1MB as an example has been a catalyst for the
development of other Islamic institutions in the country. On important example is the
revitalisation of Baitul Mai in various states in Malaysia. The Baitul Mai has now
broadened its activities into the area of welfare aside from its traditional role as a
zakat disbursement body. A few Baitul Mais such as the one in Kuala Lumpur have
successfully ventured into business and property. The gains from trading are
ultimately used to help reduce economic and social inequities amongst the Muslims
through the various welfare and social programmes of the Baitul Mai.
Finally, it is encouraging to note that Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia
are functioning successfully side by side with traditional banking and other financial
institutions. This proves the point that it is possible to introduce Islamic principles
to the financial system in stages, without having to change overnight the entire nature
of the system. Above all, we can also say that by establishing Islamic banks and
financial institutions in Malaysia at least we provide more opportunities for devout
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